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1. Introduction
1.1. Research Question
This work investigates the intertemporal portfolio optimization of professional port-
folio managers. It analyzes whether the special conditions of delegation in which
portfolio managers make investment decisions can explain the observable invest-
ment patterns of portfolio managers. It further evaluates optimal portfolio policies
from the primary investor’s perspective. The focus is restricted to equity portfolios.
The classical models of portfolio optimization introduced by Markowitz (1952)
and developed in a multiperiod continuous time context by Merton (1969), Mer-
ton (1971) and Cox/Huang (1989) assume investors who act on behalf of their own
account. These investors invest their own capital, maximize utility from their own
consumption, and consider prices on the capital market as given.1 This setup reflects
the dominant situation on the capital markets in the past. In 1950 for example, about
90% of corporate equity was held by private households.2 But since then, more and
more households have delegated the management of their portfolios to professional
portfolio managers. In 2000, less than 40% of private households managed their
equity portfolios on their own. In contrast, the market for delegated investment
decisions has experienced long-term, continuous growth over the last 50 years. In
2000, equity holdings of mutual funds, the most prominent form of delegated invest-
ment decisions, accounted for approximately 20% in the US. Together with private
pension funds and state and local pension funds, both forms for delegated invest-
ment decisions, they reached over 40% of total equities outstanding. As a result,
direct equity investments represent only a minority of all equity investments today
- the delegation of equity investments has become the rule.
Primary investors, such as private households and corporations, have good rea-
1Cf. Merton (1990), chapters 2 & 3.
2Cf. for this and the remaining paragraph Allen (2001), p. 1167. For example, Fortune (1997)
provides a very detailed overview of the American mutual fund industry.
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sons to delegate their investment decisions to portfolio managers.3 Managing an
equity portfolio is time-consuming. Investors need to conduct research to estimate
risk and expected return, derive the optimal portfolio, execute the trades, and mon-
itor each position.4 Moreover, execution of trades is costly and difficult. Small
investors pay trading fees that are usually higher than those paid by large profes-
sional investors.5 In addition, with limited wealth it might be hard or impossible to
trade the fractions of assets required to realize the optimal portfolio. Professional
portfolio managers, on the other hand, can realize scale effects because they usually
offer investment services to more than one customer. They benefit from smaller
transaction fees and can, at least theoretically, invest in the optimal portfolio with,
if any, only limited distortion.
Even though it is attractive for primary investors to delegate investment decisions,
the drawback is that investment strategies of portfolio managers might differ from
those of primary investors.6 This potential deviation is rooted in the agency rela-
tion between portfolio managers and their clients.7 After primary investors have
delegated investment decisions to portfolio managers, they have no or only limited
power to influence the portfolio manager’s decisions.8 This limitation of control al-
lows portfolio managers to follow special investment strategies taking into account
their own conditions, ultimately leading to different demand patterns of portfolio
managers and primary investors.9
Various empirical studies provide evidence that professional portfolio managers
follow special investment strategies:10 they focus on large stocks with high liquid-
ity,11 and they prefer stocks that are listed in wide market indices (like the S&P
3Cf. e.g., Gruber (1996), p. 784f. , Cornell/Roll (2005), p. 58.
4Zhu (2005), for example, finds that households with higher costs of time are more likely to
delegate their investment decisions.
5Brennan/Hughes (1991) report that trading fees decline with increasing size of orders. Cf. Keim/
Madhavan (1997) and Keim/Madhavan (1998) for analysis of equity trading costs of institutional
investors.
6Cf. Gompers/Metrick (2001), p. 237.
7Cf. Chevalier/Ellison (1997), p. 1168, Gompers/Metrick (2001), p. 237.
8Cf. Gompers/Metrick (2001), p. 237f.
9Cf. Gompers/Metrick (2001), p. 238.
10Beside the sources quoted in the text cf., e.g., del Guercio (1996). Elton/Gruber/Blake (2003)
investigate the influence of incentive fees. In an interesting study Gaspar/Massa/Matos (2006)
reveal distortions within a mutual fund family. They find that performance differences within a
fund family are higher compared to similar funds that are not in one family.
11Cf. Falkenstein (1996), p. 116f, Gompers/Metrick (2001), p. 242, Lakonishok et al. (1991), p.
228.
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500).12 However, it is still under debate whether they also show preference for a
particular risk-return profile.13 The following paragraphs provide an overview of
the investment strategies of portfolio managers.
Falkenstein (1996) shows that mutual funds in general have a preference for high-
cap stocks and stocks with high liquidity, except for mutual funds that explicitly fo-
cus on small-cap stocks.14 Using simple sorting and various regression techniques,
he analyzes the influence of certain characteristics, including liquidity and size, on
the equity holdings by mutual funds.15 The basis for comparison is the mean share
of equity holdings for all mutual funds.16 Across all methodologies, he finds clear
evidence that mutual funds prefer stocks with high liquidity, measured as “monthly
volume divided by shares outstanding17”. In addition, there was a strong prefer-
ence for stocks of large size, measured as market equity,18 though not as strong as
liquidity. Falkenstein (1996) can confirm the preference for high liquidity across
multiple mutual fund categories.19 Only mutual funds that specialize in small-cap
stocks show no preference for high liquidity.20 Preference for size is not as dom-
inant across different mutual fund categories.21 Gompers/Metrick (2001) confirm
these investment preferences in a comprehensive study.22 They analyze with multi-
variate regression the power of various variables to explain institutional ownership.
Across different measures such as size, share price, and turnover23 they find that in-
12Cf. Gompers/Metrick (2001), p. 242, Chan/Chen/Lakonishok (2002), pp. 1418-1422.
13Cf. Falkenstein (1996), p. 129, Gompers/Metrick (2001), p. 243, Xu/Malkiel (2003), pp. 636-
638.
14Falkenstein (1996) investigates the equity holdings of over 1000 US mutual funds in 1991 and
1992. He includes only those mutual funds that hold more than 50% of their assets in equity. Cf.
Falkenstein (1996), p. 113.
15Cf. Falkenstein (1996), p. 116f. He also discusses the influence of size, price, beta, age, and
news stories. However, in this work I will focus on liquidity and size.
16Cf. Falkenstein (1996), p. 115.
17Falkenstein (1996), p. 117.
18Cf. Falkenstein (1996), p. 120.
19Cf. Falkenstein (1996), p. 130f.
20Cf. Falkenstein (1996), p. 130f.
21Cf. Falkenstein (1996), p. 130f.
22They use holding data from all portfolio managers that manage more than USD 100 million.
These managers are required to file their holdings exceeding 10,000 shares or USD 200,000
(so-called “13F” filings). Portfolio managers include banks, insurance companies, investment
companies (mutual funds), investment advisers (including large brokerage firms), and others
(including pension funds and university endowments). (Gompers/Metrick (2001), p. 232.) The
market holdings of these types in 1996 were 21.6%, 9.4%, 25.3%, 37.2%, and 6.5% amounting
to 51.6% of total market capitalization of all publicly traded stocks. (Gompers/Metrick (2001),
p. 235f.)
23Size is measured in terms of market capitalization, and turnover is measured in terms of monthly
volume divided by shares outstanding. Cf. Gompers/Metrick (2001), p. 240.
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stitutional investors prefer large stocks and stocks that provide sufficient liquidity.24
Lakonishok et al. (1991) report similar strategies for pension funds, another promi-
nent form for delegated investment decisions.25 They report that pension funds
focus on large stocks and hold only a few small stocks.26
Regarding preference for stocks listed in market indices Gompers/Metrick (2001)
report that institutional investors prefer stocks that are listed in the S&P500 index.27
This is consistent with findings of Chan/Chen/Lakonishok (2002). They investigate
the clustering of mutual funds investment strategies around the S&P500 as the most
widely used reference portfolio.28 Chan/Chen/Lakonishok (2002) find that most
mutual funds prefer to structure their portfolio with regard to stock size similar to
the S&P500.29
Regarding risk-return profiles of stocks, research results are still mixed. Chan/
Chen/Lakonishok (2002) report that, regarding past performance and book-to-
market value, mutual funds cluster around the center and avoid extreme perfor-
mance and book-to-market values.30 This is confirmed by Lakonishok et al. (1991).
They find that pension funds avoid stocks with extreme performances, they “hold
less extreme losers and winners31”. Falkenstein (1996) reports, that mutual fund
managers generally prefer stocks with higher volatility, in particular they avoid
stocks with low idiosyncratic volatility.32 Gompers/Metrick (2001) report simi-
lar findings. They mention mostly positive and significant regression coefficients
24Cf. Gompers/Metrick (2001), p. 242
25Lakonishok et al. (1991) use a data sample of 769 equity pension funds over the period 1985
to 1989. These funds managed USD 124 billion, about 18% of actively managed holdings of
pension funds in 1989.
26Cf. Lakonishok et al. (1991), p. 228.
27Cf. Gompers/Metrick (2001), p. 242. Gompers/Metrick (2001) put this measure in the context
of “prudent-man rule” investment style. In addition to the factors mentioned in the text, they
investigate book-to-market value, yield, volatility, age, momentum over past three months, and
momentum past nine months. However, these factors - beside volatility - will not be considered
here as they provide mixed results. (Cf. Gompers/Metrick (2001), pp. 242-244.
28Cf. Chan/Chen/Lakonishok (2002), p. 1418f. Chan/Chen/Lakonishok (2002) used a data sample
of 3336 US funds with information on fund holdings from 1983 till 1997. (Cf. Chan/Chen/
Lakonishok (2002), p. 1411f.)
29Cf. Chan/Chen/Lakonishok (2002), pp. 1418, 1420, 1422. Though there is a significant dis-
tortion towards small-cap stock holdings with the mutual funds, Chan/Chen/Lakonishok (2002)
attribute this to the significant portfolio of mutual funds in the sample that focus on small-cap
stocks. (Cf. Chan/Chen/Lakonishok (2002), p. 1420.)
30Cf. Chan/Chen/Lakonishok (2002), pp. 1418, 1420-1423. However, if mutual funds consider
extreme values, they prefer stocks with overperformance and lower book-to-market values. (Cf.
Chan/Chen/Lakonishok (2002), pp. 1418, 1420-1423.)
31Lakonishok et al. (1991), p. 228.
32Cf. Falkenstein (1996), p. 129.
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for volatility.33 Xu/Malkiel (2003) also report a strong link between institutional
ownership - pension funds, mutual funds, etc. - and the idiosyncratic volatility
of stocks.34 However, it remains contingent whether institutional investors prefer
stocks with higher volatility or whether they are the reason for higher volatility.
Xu/Malkiel (2003) provide evidence that institutional investors could cause this in-
creased volatility.35 They argue that the volatility of stocks with high institutional
ownership could be higher because institutions receive similar information at the
same time and react similarly.36
This work seeks to explain the undebated empirical results about the investment
strategies of portfolio managers, i.e., their focus on stocks with high liquidity and
stocks that are listed in market indices. It considers the different conditions un-
der which portfolio managers and primary investors pursue investment decisions
to explain the deviation in their investment decisions. I will focus on three condi-
tions that have a potential impact on optimal portfolio policies and are empirically
sound.37 First, portfolio managers cannot derive utility from consumption or from
terminal wealth as primary investors do. Instead, a portfolio manager’s incentive
system usually consists of a compensation in the form of a fixed management fee
based on total assets under management.38 They will usually derive utility from this
compensation. Therefore, their optimization criterion is different from the one of
the primary investor.
Second, portfolio managers face the allocation behavior of the primary investor.
The contribution of capital of primary investors to portfolio managers is, even
though with a long-term perspective, changeable at short notice. Indeed, in particu-
lar mutual fund investors systematically allocate capital to portfolio managers with
33Cf. Gompers/Metrick (2001), p. 243.
34Cf. Xu/Malkiel (2003), pp. 636-638.
35Cf. Xu/Malkiel (2003), p. 638.
36Cf. Xu/Malkiel (2003), p. 635. Some authors observe that portfolio managers increase the
risk of their portfolios towards the end of the financial year if they did not meet a bench-
mark requirement. Cf. Brown/Harlow/Starks (1996), Koski/Pontiff (1999), and Chevalier/
Ellison (1997). However, this phenomenon proved spurious when higher frequency data was
used. Cf. Busse (2001).
37Beside the conditions mentioned here, others could be relevant as well. For example, del
Guercio (1996) and Gompers/Metrick (2001) count the “prudent-man rule” as one factor. (Cf.
Gompers/Metrick (2001), p. 238.) Gompers/Metrick (2001) also name historical return pat-
terns of stocks as a potential factor to explain institutional investment patterns. (Cf. Gompers/
Metrick (2001), p. 239.)
38Cf. e.g., Golec (1992), Golec (2003), Halpern/Fowler (1991), and Lakonishok/Shleifer/
Vishny (1992). Section 3.1 provides more empirical details on compensation forms.
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superior past performance.39 The resulting capital flow, sometimes called “return-
chasing behavior”40, can be considered as an implicit incentive, additionally altering
the optimization problem of the portfolio manager.
Third, portfolio managers often trade significant amounts of capital. Unlike small
private investors who take prices on the capital market as given, their trades can have
an effect on prices.41 Hence, the small investor assumption,42 common in portfolio
optimization models, does not hold. It should be expected that the optimal portfolio
of a portfolio manager reflects this price effect from trades.43
Given the special characteristics of portfolio manager’s investment strategies and
the general conditions of their work, the objective of this thesis is to answer the
following questions:
1. In which way is the situation of a portfolio manager different from a primary
investor? What are the consequences for the setup of portfolio optimization
models for delegated portfolio management? Three aspects are pivotal:
a) What is the structure of the compensation for a portfolio manager?
b) How do primary investors allocate their capital to portfolio managers?
How important is past performance for reallocation of capital?
c) What impact do portfolio managers have on prices if they trade large
portions of stocks?
2. What is the optimal portfolio policy for portfolio managers concerning the
special conditions of delegated portfolio management, in particular
a) What is the effect of the compensation?
b) How does the capital allocation of primary investors change the optimal
portfolio policy?
c) What is the structure of the optimal portfolio, given price effects from
trades?
39Cf. e.g., Ippolito (1992), Chevalier/Ellison (1997), and Sirri/Tufano (1998). Section 3.2 provides
more details on primary investor behavior.
40Cf. Karceski (2002).
41Cf. e.g., Warther (1995) and Edelen/Warner (2001). Section 3.3 provides more details on price
effects from trades.
42Cf. e.g., Merton (1990), p. 17f.
43Cf. Gompers/Metrick (2001), p. 238f.
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3. Can the conditions of delegated portfolio management explain observed in-
vestment patterns regarding liquidity preference and preference for stocks
listed in market indices? What are the implications for primary investors in
terms of the efficiency of their delegated investments?
The next section will provide an overview of the research approach to address the
research questions above and highlight important related research. More details on
related research will be given in chapters 5 and 6 in conjunction with the respective
models.
1.2. Research Approach and Related Research
Question 1 will be addressed with a review of existing research literature. Questions
2 and 3 represent the core of this work. Both are studied with a theoretical modeling
approach, investigating the influence of management fees, capital flows, and price
effects from trades on the optimal portfolio policy of portfolio managers.
The models used are based on different methodologies depending on their com-
plexity. All models are laid out in an intertemporal finite horizon context. The
intertemporal, multiperiod character of the models reflects the typical delegation
situation that is intended to be a long-term relationship with potential actions dur-
ing the relationship. A finite horizon situation is typical for long-term savings, e.g.,
for retirement purposes. As far as possible the method of stochastic control, i.e.,
dynamic programming in continuous time, is used to derive closed-form solutions
of optimal portfolio policies. This methodology was pioneered by Merton (1969)
and Merton (1971) in the context of portfolio theory. Comprehensive treatments
of the methodology are numerous, examples are Fleming/Soner (1993) and Korn/
Korn (2001). In cases where a closed-form solution is not available, Markov chain
approximations will be used to solve the models numerically. The Markov chain ap-
proximation approach was initiated by Kushner (1977). It is extensively described
in Kushner/Dupuis (1992). Munk (1997) and Munk (2003) present its application
to portfolio theory. Certain complex models with price effects will directly be set up
in discrete time models using multinomial tree price processes. Binomial trees were
introduced by Cox/Ross/Rubinstein (1979) and extended by Boyle (1988), Boyle/
Evine/Gibbs (1989) and He (1991) to multinomial versions. Pliska (1997) provides
an excellent overview over their use in portfolio optimization.
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The relationship of primary investors and portfolio managers is an agency rela-
tionship similar to the relationship of equity owners and managers.44 Hence, agency
theory appears to be a natural theoretical fit for delegated portfolio management.45
In fact, the setup of the models in this work can very well be classified as hidden
action models with moral hazard,46 although agency theory is not used here. The
objective of this work is to derive optimal portfolio policies in order to predict port-
folio managers’ behavior and explain the empirically observed investment strategies
of portfolio managers. It is not the purpose of this work to solve the agency conflict
between the portfolio manager and the primary investor. Nevertheless, the behavior
of portfolio managers is also discussed from the primary investor’s perspective.
The influence of compensation and incentive systems in general on optimal
portfolio policies has been studied before.47 Starks (1987) and Roll (1992) in-
vestigate the impact of benchmark-related performance fees. Starks (1987) fo-
cuses on symmetric and asymmetric performance fees, whereas Roll (1992) ana-
lyzes the impact of fees that induce the portfolio manager to minimize the track-
ing error. Stoughton (1993) and Admati/Pfleiderer (1997) investigate the incen-
tive for the portfolio manager to reveal private information under various incen-
tive schemes. Nietert (1996) analyzes the portfolio structures of managers who
maximize utility derived from a management fee calculated on terminal wealth.
Ou-Yang (2003), Kraft/Korn (2008), Cvitanic/Wan/Zhang (2006), and Cadenillas/
Cvitanic/Zapatero (2007) present continuous time models investigating various in-
centive systems. Research about general option-like compensation schemes as in
Grinblatt/Titman (1989), Carpenter (2000) and Ross (2004) is only remotely re-
lated. Cornell/Roll (2005) present an asset pricing model that incorporates dele-
gated portfolio management.
The influence of capital flow on the portfolio manager’s decisions has been rarely
analyzed. Karceski (2002) uses a single-period model with linear capital realloca-
tion by private investors. Hugonnier/Kaniel (2010) implement a continuous time
model in which the capital managed by the portfolio manager is proportional to the
Sharpe ratio. Huberman/Kandel (1993) study the behavior of portfolio managers
in a signaling framework with reputation building. Huddart (1999) investigates the
44Allen (2001), p. 1166f, Gompers/Metrick (2001), p. 237.
45Stracca (2006) provides a recent overview of principal-agent related literature and delegated
portfolio management
46For such a setup cf. Kraft/Korn (2008).
47For a detailed discussion of some of the research mentioned in this and the following paragraphs,
cf. section 5.1.
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influence of reputation effects in the context of the private information of portfo-
lio managers. General reputation effects, unrelated to portfolio management, have
been studied e.g., by Scharfstein/Stein (1990) and Farnsworth (2003).
Only little research is available on portfolio optimization under price effects
from trades.48 Cuoco/Cvitanic (1998) present a model in which the parame-
ters of the price process depend on the portfolio policy but not on transactions.
Longstaff (2001) and Matsumoto (2006) analyze portfolio optimization if portfo-
lio managers face restrictions of executing orders, either because not all orders are
executed (Matsumoto (2006)) or because they can only trade a certain amount of
stocks (Longstaff (2001)). Vath/Mnif/Pham (2007) analyze the price influence from
trades in conjunction with transaction costs in an impulsive control framework.
Isaenko (2010) investigate the implications of transitory price impact on trading
behavior. Optimal portfolio choices under liquidity constraints are also analyzed by
Ghysels/Pereira (2008) and Pereira/Zhang (2010) using numerical methodolgies.
The implications of price effects from trades have been developed dominantly in
the context of hedging and option pricing. Jarrow (1992) and Jarrow (1994) present
early discrete time models. Frey/Stremme (1997), Platen/Schweizer (1998), Sir-
car/Papanicolaou (1998), Jonsson/Keppo (2002), Cetin/Jarrow/Protter (2004), and
Bank/Baum (2004) follow with continuous time implementations. Research about
optimal liquidation or purchasing strategies of single stocks is related with distance,
e.g., Bertsimas/Lo (1998), Almgren (2003), and Huberman/Stanzl (2005) for dis-
crete time, He/Mamaysky (2005) and Mönch (2005) for continuous time, and Sub-
ramanian/Jarrow (2001) for impulse control models.
Figure 1.1 presents an overview of other research. It also highlights the contribu-
tion of this work to existing research:
 It investigates the effect of the predominantly used proportional management
fee based on assets under management that is continuously withdrawn from
portfolio wealth
 It provides optimal portfolio policies in situations with linear and nonlinear
capital flows induced by primary investors
 It demonstrates the influence of price effects from trades on optimal portfolio
policies in a discrete time context using several alternative setups.
48A detailed discussion of these models is provided in chapter 6.
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Figure 1.1.: Overview of related literature. (Source: Own illustration)
1.3. Structure of Work
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 defines delegated portfolio manage-
ment and provides an overview of the historical development and existing products
in this area. Chapter 3 contains a detailed review of empirical literature on the
general conditions of delegated portfolio management through mutual funds and
institutional accounts: common compensation schemes, the behavior of primary in-
vestors and how they allocate capital to portfolio managers, and price effects from
trades. These empirical findings build the foundation for the theoretical models in
chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 4 very briefly lays out the methodology used in the fol-
lowing chapters. It summarizes stochastic control and its application to portfolio
optimization. Markov chain approximations are presented as a numerical approach
and its application to portfolio optimization is demonstrated. Multinomial, in par-
ticular trinomial, portfolio models are outlined as a purely discrete time framework.
Chapter 5 presents two models of delegated portfolio management both incorporat-
ing management fees and capital flows. Using the stochastic programming approach
a closed-form solution is presented for a linear model. A second model implements
nonlinear capital flow and numerical solutions will be given. After a general discus-
sion of model results, they will be reflected on from the primary investor perspective
10
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and their ability to explain investment patterns will be probed. Chapter 6 investi-
gates the effect of price influence from trades on the optimal portfolio policy. It
starts by formulating a portfolio model based on trinomial price processes and pro-
vides results on the influence of price effects on the optimal portfolio structure in
various alternative model setups. Chapter 7 concludes the thesis. Various mathe-
matical calculations and a description of the numerical solution approach are in the
Appendix.
11
1. Introduction
12
2. Research Context of Delegated
Investment Decisions
Before addressing the research questions, this chapter will provide the necessary
definition of delegated portfolio management and will lay out different forms of
investment decisions and their realization as products and services. It also explains
the focus of this work on mutual funds and institutional accounts. If not mentioned
differently, this work is restricted to the US equity market, because the most data
and information are available for this market.
2.1. Involvement in Investment Decisions
A primary investor, private or corporate, can invest in equity stocks with three dif-
ferent degrees of involvement:49 they can directly invest, call someone for support,
or delegate their investments. Figure 2.1 provides an overview of these different
forms.
Direct investments are those investments that are made without support from third
parties. The investor bases their decisions solely on information that is publicly
available for all market participants (historical data on stock prices, company news,
etc.). They might also use recommendations from publicly available analyst reports
or expert magazines. The investors typically use direct brokers or their normal
banking relationships for their transactions.
49The American Investment Company Institute and the Securities Industry Association use a sim-
ilar classification, cf. Investment Company Institute/Securities Industry Association (2005b), p.
3 and p. 6. They use two dimensions: depending on the investment vehicle, they discriminate
between individual stocks and stock mutual funds; depending on the source, they discriminate
between direct investment and investments through professional financial advisors. Cf. Invest-
ment Company Institute/Securities Industry Association (2005a). Even though these institutes
only consider holdings of corporate equity, the same structure applies for all kinds of financial
instruments such as bills, money market certificates, etc.
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Figure 2.1.: Forms of investment with different degrees of involvement. (Source:
Own illustration)
Supported investments are investments for which the investor turns to profes-
sional advisers. The investor still makes the final decision but relies to a certain
extent on the recommendations of a financial adviser. The financial adviser can be a
full-service broker, an independent financial planner, a bank and savings institution
representative, an insurance agent, or an accountant.50
In the case of delegated investments, the primary investor delegates the respon-
sibility for individual portfolio decisions, i.e., which assets to purchase, hold, and
sell. They transfer a certain amount of capital to a portfolio manager for delegated
portfolio management and define the principles for the investment strategy. These
principles can comprise return targets, accepted levels of risk, certain investment
constraints, etc. The portfolio manager then makes their own decisions on particu-
lar stocks, framed by the principles, and reports investment results to the investor.
This setup of delegated investments with only a primary investor and portfolio
manager is rather simplified. In reality, the circumstances of delegation might be
much more complex, both on the side of the primary investor and the portfolio
manager. For example, if the primary investor is an institutional investor (e.g., a
corporation), there will most probably also be delegation within the institutional
investor subject (e.g., the corporation has its own treasury department that delegates
50Cf. Investment Company Institute/Securities Industry Association (2005b), p. 6, for the defini-
tion of professional financial advisors.
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portfolio management).51
Within the portfolio manager subject, there might also be some delegation, e.g.,
the portfolio manager is an employee of a portfolio management company.52 In this
case, there is another level of delegation from the management and ownership of
the portfolio management company to the individual portfolio manager. It is also
possible that the portfolio manager company itself, e.g., a small insurance company
without its own treasury department, delegates the investment decision to another
portfolio manager.
In this work, the simplified setup with delegation only between the portfolio man-
agement function and the primary investor subject will be considered. Additional
layers of delegation within the investor subject and the portfolio manager subject
will be disregarded.53
2.2. Products for Delegated Portfolio
Management
Portfolio managers offer primarily mutual funds and institutional accounts to pro-
vide delegated portfolio management. These products are explicitly offered as del-
egated portfolio management products. In addition to these, there are implicit port-
folio management products such as insurance policies and pension funds. They
are offered to serve a special purpose, e.g., insurance against risk or accumulation
of pension contributions. However, by accumulating significant capital, they also
incorporate a portfolio management component. The following paragraphs will de-
scribe these major products.54
51Cf. as an example, the delegation in the context of pension funds in Lakonishok/Shleifer/
Vishny (1992), p. 341ff.
52Cf. Pozen (1998), p. 22f, Qiu (2003), p. 6.
53For an analysis of other layers of delegation cf. e.g, Lakonishok/Shleifer/Vishny (1992) and
Ferris/Yan (2007).
54The primary investor delegates their investment decision with mutual funds and insurance poli-
cies by purchasing standardized products. With institutional accounts and pension funds, the
primary investor delegates their investment decision by agreeing an indivual contral with the
portfolio manager. The conditions of the contract are freely negotiable but tend to be similar.
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Mutual Funds
Mutual funds pool capital from their shareholders and invest it in stocks, bonds, or
in the money market.55 In this work, I will focus on equity mutual funds. Their
legal structure varies from country to country. In the US, for example, mutual funds
are legally a single investment company.56 Mutual funds are standardized products
for delegated portfolio management. The delegation happens through the investor’s
purchase of a share of the fund. There is no individual bargaining about the condi-
tions of delegation, goals, or constraints. All this is predetermined by the portfolio
manager’s offering. The investor can only accept, i.e., purchase, or not accept, i.e.,
not purchase, the portfolio manager’s offer.
Mutual funds are predominantly targeted at private investors. Private investors
usually invest in mutual funds because they want to participate in the equity market
but do not want to or cannot manage their own portfolio. Investors can buy and
sell shares in mutual funds daily at their current price, which is the price of their
underlying investments at the end of the day, making mutual funds a very liquid
investment.57
Institutional Accounts
For institutional customers such as corporates, insurance companies, and pension
funds, portfolio managers offer institutional accounts.58 Institutional accounts are
individual services, their conditions are negotiated between the investor and the
portfolio manager. The contract regulates the principles of investment and the terms
and conditions (e.g., costs, reporting, etc.). It might be based on standardized forms
but it is generally open for bargaining. Within such an institutional account, the
portfolio manager will manage the capital of one institutional customer according
to the contract.
55Similar to mutual funds are closed-end funds, exchange-traded funds, and unit investment trusts.
However, these products are small in size compared to mutual funds and therefore not considered
here. Cf. Investment Company Institute (2006) for information and the market development of
these products. Cf. Investment Company Institute (2006), p. 118f., for a detailed definition of
mutual funds and exchange-traded funds and unit investment funds.
56Cf. Pozen (1998), p. 16.
57Cf. Pozen (1998), p. 18.
58Cf. Maurer (2004) for an overview of institutional investors in Germany, in particular insurance
companies and investment funds.
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Insurance Policies
Insurance companies offer capital accumulating insurance policies. For the German
market as an example, the cash-value life insurance is the most important policy
and demonstrates an exceptional market share, due to tax advantages granted by the
government. Cash-value life insurance policies are highly standardized products.
They provide a combination of a pure life-insurance and a special sort of savings
account. In addition to the risk premium, the policy holder contributes to the sav-
ings account. After a fixed period of time (usually several years), the investor will
receive a guaranteed capital return plus an additional capital gain that depends on
the investment performance of the insurance company. There are some legal invest-
ment restrictions for insurance companies regarding their investments in the stock
market and other financial instruments. However, the investor cannot observe the
detailed investments of the insurer. Cash-value life insurance policies are marketed
as rather riskless investments with a potential excess return for private investors.
A typical private investor would only invest part of their wealth in cash-value life
insurance policies.
Pension Funds
Pension funds offer corporates and public plan sponsors and endowments the man-
agement of their pension plans. They manage the retirement contributions of cor-
porations to fulfill their obligations for retirement plans for their employees.59 In
1995, the pension fund industry in the US served around 45,000 sponsors.60 The
average pension fund size is about USD 67 million.61 Sponsors regularly contribute
to the pension fund with payments for retirement contribution plans. Pension funds
are very common in the US, due to the local accounting rules, but play no important
role in Germany.
Pension funds can represent a complicated system of delegation.62 First, a cor-
poration delivers on its obligations originating in defined-benefit pension plans and
contributes into a pension fund. This fund can be managed by a corporate-owned
59Cf. Lakonishok/Shleifer/Vishny (1992), p. 340.
60Cf. del Guercio/Tkac (2002), p. 527.
61Cf. del Guercio/Tkac (2002), p. 527, there cited from McGraw-Hill’s “1995 Money Market
Directory” and the “1995 Directory of Pension Funds and their Investment Managers” (McGraw
Hill).
62Cf. Lakonishok/Shleifer/Vishny (1992), p. 340ff. For a detailed analysis of potential legal
structures of pension funds, cf. Clark (2000), pp. 76-93.
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treasury department.63 However, the treasury department usually does not man-
age the contributions by itself. Instead, it most frequently delegates the manage-
ment of the contributions to professional portfolio managers.64 The corporation can
found its own pension fund or participate in a joint pension fund that the portfo-
lio manager handles for many investors.65 The portfolio management can be done
by insurance companies, banks and trust companies, and investment counselors.66
In a survey among 139 state, county, and city retirement systems with 55 replies,
Halpern/Fowler (1991) report that only 14 funds do not use portfolio managers.67
A majority of more than two thirds of pension funds delegated the management of
their funds to portfolio managers. Portfolio managers usually offer an institutional
account for the pension fund.
2.3. Historical Development
Over the past 50 years, there has been a clear shift towards delegation of investment
decisions. Figure 2.2 shows the development of equity ownership in the US over
the last 50 years.
In 1950, 90% of households invested in corporate equity. This share declined
roughly 4% per year to drop to a total of 39% in 2000. At the same time, investments
of mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance companies into corporate equity have
experienced the opposite trend. Its share has steadily grown from 6% in 1950 to
49% in 2000. In 2000, pension funds represented the biggest portion with 23%,
slightly ahead of mutual funds with 19% and far ahead of insurance companies
with 7%.
Pension funds experienced the largest increase from 1970 with 9% to 1990
with 24%. Afterwards, its share slightly decreased from 24% in 1990 to 23% in
2000. From 1990 to 2000, the amount of state and local pension funds further in-
63I will focus on defined-benefit plans as that is the most common plan underlying pension funds in
1990. Cf. Lakonishok/Shleifer/Vishny (1992), p. 340. In a defined-benefit plan, the corporation
benefits from the performance of the fund exceeding its obligations towards employees, but also
leaving it as a residual claimant in the case of insufficient performance of the fund. Cf. Newman/
Milgate/Eatwell (1992), p. 131, and Lakonishok/Shleifer/Vishny (1992), p. 340.
64Cf. Lakonishok/Shleifer/Vishny (1992),p. 227.
65Cf. Lakonishok/Shleifer/Vishny (1992), p. 343.
66Cf. Lakonishok/Shleifer/Vishny (1992), p. 340.
67Cf. Halpern/Fowler (1991), p. 75. The survey covered 426 institutional accounts and 190
portfolio managers. Of the largest 100 portfolio managers, the survey comprises 76. Cf. Halpern/
Fowler (1991), p. 75.
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Figure 2.2.: Development of equity ownership in the US. (Source: Federal Reserve
Board „Flow of funds“, Allen (2001), p. 1167.)
creased, however the amount of capital invested in private pension funds decreased
by roughly the same amount.68 Mutual funds showed the largest growth from 7% in
1990 to 19% in 2000. Before 1990, they played only a marginal role with 2% and
5% in 1950 and 1970 respectively. The overall growth in pension funds and mutual
funds is even more astonishing regarding the general growth of corporate equity
from USD 143 billion in 1950 to USD 19,047 billion in 2000. Life insurances also
grew from 3% in 1950 to 7% in 2000, but only slightly.
The amount of capital held by institutional investors such as pension funds, mu-
tual funds, and insurance companies is usually entrusted to them as delegated in-
vestments. In that sense, about half of equity holdings, 49%, are delegated invest-
ments. Holdings by households are either direct investments or supported invest-
ments through professional advisers only. In that sense, delegation really matters.
68These details are not displayed in figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.3.: Portfolio management products in Germany. (Source: BVI, Deutsche
Bundesbank.)
2.4. Focus on Mutual Funds and Institutional
Accounts
The empirical basis for models in chapters 5 and 6 will be based on mutual funds
and institutional accounts. Both are explicit portfolio management products offer-
ing the investor delegation of management of the whole or a large portion of their
portfolio. This management is usually done by the portfolio manager and not out-
sourced to other professionals. Mutual funds in particular have the advantage that
data on product details is freely available. Mutual funds usually provide extensive
information on their investment principles, terms, and conditions. In contrast, insti-
tutional accounts are generally not transparent. However, typical contractual details
of contracts are publicly known.
Pension funds and insurance policies are not considered. Pension funds are gen-
erally a portfolio management product, but they very often outsource their portfolio
management to professionals via institutional accounts.69 Hence, it appears more
69Cf. section 2.2.
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realistic to base the models on institutional accounts directly. Insurance policies,
in particular cash-value life insurance policies, include portfolio management only
as a minor component. With a guaranteed interest rate, they are closer to a savings
account than a portfolio management product. However, their relevance in the Ger-
man market should not be underestimated. Figures 2.3 illustrates that life-insurance
companies manage more assets than mutual funds. Additionally, information from
insurance companies is very limited and their investment strategy is not publicly
available.
Overall, the characteristics of mutual funds and institutional accounts appear to
be best suited to form the basis for the empirical modeling of delegated portfolio
management. The following chapter will describe in detail the special conditions
of delegated portfolio management associated with mutual funds and institutional
accounts. It lays the foundations for the theoretical models in chapters 5 and 6.
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Portfolio Management
Portfolio managers follow special investment strategies:70 they focus on large stocks
with high liquidity,71 and they prefer stocks that are listed in wide market indices
(such as the S&P 500).72 A potential explanation could be the different conditions
under which portfolio managers and primary investors pursue investment decisions.
I will focus on three special aspects that are characteristic of delegated portfolio
management, in particular mutual funds and institutional accounts, and potentially
relevant for optimal portfolio policies:
1. Optimization criteria: the optimization criteria for a portfolio manager is to
maximize their compensation. This will, therefore, determine the structure of
the optimal portfolio.73
2. External changes of assets under management: the volume of assets under
management of a portfolio manager is determined by contributions and with-
drawals of the primary investor. Hence, it is critical for the portfolio manager
to understand how the primary investor allocates their capital. They face a
capital flow from and to their primary investors that they should consider in
their optimization problem.74
3. Influence on price process: portfolio managers very often manage huge
amounts of capital in one fund. Changing investment positions, therefore,
involves transactions of significant size. With such trades, portfolio managers
experience price effects and the small investor assumption does not hold for
them. This should have an influence on their optimization problem.
70Cf. section 1.1.
71Cf. Falkenstein (1996), p. 116f, Gompers/Metrick (2001), p. 242, Lakonishok et al. (1991), p.
228.
72Cf. Gompers/Metrick (2001), p. 242, Chan/Chen/Lakonishok (2002), pp. 1418-1422.
73The compensation is considered as an explicit incentive.
74This capital flow is considered as an implicit incentive.
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Figure 3.1.: Conditions of mutual fund and institutional account portfolio manage-
ment. (Source: Own illustration)
The first two conditions are typical for delegated portfolio management. The third
condition is not restricted to delegated portfolio management, and affects all in-
vestors who execute large transactions on the capital market. This chapter summa-
rizes investment patterns of portfolio managers and presents empirical results from
existing research about the three aspects above. Figure 3.1 summarizes the main
findings regarding the conditions of delegated portfolio management.
3.1. Compensation as Explicit Incentive
An incentive system can consist of explicit and implicit incentives. Explicit incen-
tives are those that are fixed in the contract between the portfolio manager and the
investor. In contrast, implicit incentives are not made explicit in the contract, they
emerge from the behavior of the contract partners.75 For the portfolio manager, the
explicit incentive is their compensation, usually a management fee.76 Their implicit
75Fama (1980) first mentioned this type of incentive in the context of labor markets.
76For mutual funds, the sales commission that is paid by the investor upon purchase of shares of
funds (usually as "front load") is not a reward for the portfolio manager. The sales commission
is usually a remuneration for the sales force and varies depending on fund type and sales channel
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incentive arises from the behavior of the primary investor. In the context of port-
folio management, implicit incentives can be the contribution and withdrawal of
assets under management (“capital flow”)77 or the dismissal of the portfolio man-
ager (“career concerns”).78 This section will cover the explicit incentives, implicit
incentives will be discussed in the next section. The following paragraphs provide
the essential characteristics of the compensation for mutual fund and institutional
account portfolio managers. It highlights the general form, its level, and the pay-
ment conditions. A brief summary picks up these characteristics that form the basis
for all model designs in chapters 5 and 6.
3.1.1. General Compensation Form
Asset-based fees are the dominant compensation form. Only a minority of funds
and accounts use performance-based fees. For mutual funds, this result is provided
by Golec (1992) and Golec (2003).79 In the latter study, out of a sample of overall
2351 mutual funds, a large majority of 2190 funds charged only a management fee
as a fraction of assets under management. Only a minority of 146 funds charged a
performance-based fee in addition to an asset-based fee. 39 funds charged a bonus
or penalties if the fund’s performance exceeds or falls short of an index’s perfor-
mance. 109 funds charged management fees as a fraction of the income of the fund.
The results of Golec (1992) are along these lines.80
Regarding the fee structure of institutional accounts, only limited information is
available.81 Standard fee schedules are available but the actual fees differ signifi-
cantly due to discounts offered by portfolio managers and other individual adjust-
ments in contracts.82 In a survey, Halpern/Fowler (1991) conclude that the majority
of institutional equity accounts use asset-based fees, performance-based fees can
only be found in a few equity accounts.83 Among 271 surveyed accounts, 254 were
from 3 to 6%. Cf. Fortune (1997), p. 53.
77Cf. e.g., Stracca (2006), p. 836f. and Karceski (2002).
78Cf. e.g., Heinkel/Stoughton (1994) and Holmstrom (1999)
79Cf. also Lesseig/Long/Smythe (2002) and Deli (2002) for mutual fund fee structure in the US.
Studies about the fee structure outside the US include Gil-Bazo/Sedano (2004) and Korkeamaki/
Thomas I. Smythe (2004).
80Heinkel/Stoughton (1994) argue that the lack of performance-based fees could be caused by the
higher relative risk aversion of the portfolio managers compared to primary, in particular private,
investors.
81Cf. Halpern/Fowler (1991), p. 74, del Guercio/Tkac (2002), p. 524.
82Cf. Halpern/Fowler (1991), p. 74.
83Other accounts than traditional equity funds such as venture capital, real estate, private equity, or
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actively managed.84 For the majority of these 254 accounts, portfolio managers
charged asset-based fees.85 Only for 29 accounts, did portfolio managers charge
performance-based fees.86
3.1.2. Level of Management Fees
Both mutual funds and institutional accounts charge around 50 basis points or more
as a management fee. A slight majority of mutual funds have fees that decline
with growing assets under management. Regarding the level of management fees,
Golec (2003) reports that the majority of about 80% of mutual funds charge more
than 50 basis points (0.5%). The remaining 20% charge 50 basis points or less.87
Out of those funds that charge asset-based fees, about 60% scale their fees, meaning
that the fund charges less if the fund grows. This results in a concave form of
management fees with regard to size.88
Lakonishok/Shleifer/Vishny (1992) report management fees of around 50 basis
points for institutional accounts, calculated on the assets under management in the
portfolio. For accounts of USD 50 million and above, 50% of investors paid be-
tween 43 and 56 basis points.89 Halpern/Fowler (1991) provide similar results.
Asset-based fees range from 33 to 68 basis points for small US equity accounts
with USD 10 million.90 The gap narrows for larger US equity accounts of USD
hedge funds use different fee structures. They generally prefer performance-based fees. Halpern/
Fowler (1991) report that the base fee of performance-based accounts are lower than for asset-
based accounts. For US equities, it is 30 basis points. This base fee is also much less dependent
on the size of the accounts. For call-option type performance compensation that is typical in the
hedge-fund industry, cf. Arnott (2005), p. 10, and Goetzmann/Ingersoll/Ross (2003)
84Cf. Halpern/Fowler (1991), pp. 75-77. The remaining 17 accounts were passively managed
accounts that do not require portfolio optimization by the portfolio manager.
85Cf. Halpern/Fowler (1991), pp. 75-77.
86Cf. Halpern/Fowler (1991), pp. 75-77.
87According to Golec (2003), there was a significant increase in fees by 1995. In earlier years, the
distribution of fees was in favor of cheaper funds. Between 1984 and 1995, the share of funds
charging more than 0.5% exploded.
88Heinkel/Stoughton (1994) suspect that declining fees reflect the existence of fixed costs on
the side of the portfolio manager. According to Golec (2003), for the few funds that use
performance-based fees, the majority (22 funds) charge 0.5% as asset-based fees. None of these
funds used scaling of fees, i.e., the fees remain constant regardless of the size of the fund. It
is noteworthy that the bonus and penalty fees are required to be equal for each fund resulting
from new regulations starting in 1971. Cf. Section 205 of the Investment Advisers Act. Cf.
Garcia (2001) who regards symmetric contracts as typical for the mutual fund industry.
89Cf. Lakonishok/Shleifer/Vishny (1992).
90Cf. Halpern/Fowler (1991), p. 76. Halpern/Fowler (1991) make their fee calculations consistent
across different accounts through standardization on the three account sizes USD 10, 50, and
250 million. Cf. Halpern/Fowler (1991), p. 75.
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250 million that charge 23 to 40 basis points.91 Similar results are available for
international and global equity accounts.92 Along the lines of mutual funds fees,
there appears to be a concave functional form with regard to the size of the fund.
However, this concave form is only visible aggregating different accounts in the
statistics.93 Individual accounts can be assumed to have constant fees. The depen-
dence of the fee on size might vary for individual accounts.
3.1.3. Payment Arrangement
For mutual funds and institutional accounts, the management fee is deducted di-
rectly from the fund’s assets. It is calculated once a year based on the average of
the fund’s assets under management.94 In addition to the management fee that com-
pensates the portfolio manager for managing the portfolio, there are other costs.
The so-called 12b-1 fee is charged for the distribution and marketing costs of the
portfolio manager.95 It can go up to 1%. Other expenses include “custodial, legal,
transfer agent and subtransfer agent/recordkeeping payments, and various other ex-
penses.”96 All costs are deducted from the fund’s assets.
3.1.4. Results for Model Design
Given these empirical results, the theoretical models will incorporate an asset-based
fee with a fixed fraction of the assets under management as the compensation for the
portfolio manager. The scaling of fees will be neglected because the effect in total is
small and it is only used by a small majority.97 Additional fees will be disregarded
because their purpose is to compensate the portfolio manager for their own costs
and, therefore, do not represent an incentive.
91Cf. Halpern/Fowler (1991), p. 76.
92Cf. Halpern/Fowler (1991), p. 77.
93Cf. Halpern/Fowler (1991), p. 75f.
94Cf. e.g., the fund prospectus of American Funds "The Growth Fund of America," Funds (2006),
p. 11. "The Growth Fund of America" is one of the largest mutual funds in the US with almost
USD 150 billion assets under management as of November 2006.
95Cf. e.g., Funds (2006), p. 5.
96Cf. Funds (2006).
97As will turn out later in chapter 5, the level of management fees won’t have an influence on the
portfolio anyway.
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3.2. Capital Flow as Implicit Incentive
Capital flows, i.e., the contributions and withdrawals of capital by primary investors
are a very important incentive for the portfolio manager. Stracca (2006) cites: “The
real business of money management is not managing money, it is getting money
to manage."98 These capital flows are considered as implicit incentives.99 They are
implicit because they function as an incentive only through an explicit incentive.
Because portfolio managers are compensated with an asset-based fee, the volume of
assets under management determine the level of their compensation. Hence, capital
flows affect the compensation of portfolio managers. The understanding of primary
investors’ behavior, how they allocate their capital, how they shift their investments
between different funds and accounts, is essential for portfolio managers in order to
maximize their compensation.
For mutual funds, capital flow100 appears as the purchase or sale of fund shares,
i.e., primary investors purchase or sell shares of the portfolio manager’s fund. Ac-
cording to del Guercio/Tkac (2002), in 1995 29% of mutual fund investors changed
their funds and 14% closed an account.101 Empirical research reveals that the flow
of funds represents a significant incentive for portfolio managers, in particular for
mutual fund portfolio managers.
For institutional accounts, capital flow appears primarily as gaining or losing sin-
gle customers. In 1995, 22% of institutional account investors terminated a portfo-
lio manager, 28% hired, and 15% terminated and hired a portfolio manager within
a year.102 Gaining or losing a single institutional customer is particularly important
because the amount of capital managed within institutional accounts is much larger
than the individual investments of primary investors in mutual funds.
The following paragraphs provides empirical evidence on the capital flow. It
98Stracca (2006), p. 836.
99Cf. Chevalier/Ellison (1997), p. 1168. Early applications of the concept of implicit incentives
in the context of portfolio management have been contributed by Heinkel/Stoughton (1994),
Chevalier/Ellison (1997), and Holmstrom (1999).
100The capital flow is sometimes termed “flow of funds”, cf. e.g., Berk/Green (2004).
101Cf. del Guercio/Tkac (2002), p. 526.
102Cf. del Guercio/Tkac (2002), p. 526.
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draws on capital market103 as well as consumer and marketing research.104 Af-
ter discussing factors that affect mutual fund capital flow, such as fund perfor-
mance, general market condition, risk, and costs, the section presents details on
the performance-flow relationship for mutual funds as the most important factor.
The influence of performance and risk on institutional account flow is discussed in
a separate section. Concluding remarks summarize the relevant characteristics for
the theoretical models.
3.2.1. Factors Affecting Capital Flow
Potential factors for capital flows are past fund performance, general market condi-
tion, risk, management fee, and load. These factors are discussed in this section.
Mutual Fund Performance
It had long been conjectured that the performance of mutual funds influences pri-
mary investors’ decisions to contribute or withdraw capital. Though early studies
of the 60s and 70s were not able to prove this relationship.105 Spitz (1970) con-
jectures that "inflows are more a function of the effectiveness of the fund’s sales
operation than its performance."106 Ippolito (1992) was among the first to show
that primary investors base their allocation decision to a large extent on past per-
formance. He studies the performance-flow relationship of 143 mutual funds over
the period of 1965 to 1984. Ippolito (1992) uses a CAPM-based performance esti-
mate but also a simple, non-risk adjusted measurement of performance.107 For both
103In addition to those fundamental studies in this section, others focus on detailed questions. For
example, Fant/O’Neal (2000) were able to show the persistence of a nonlinear performance-
flow relationship over the period from 1978 to 1997. Bergstresser/Poterba (2002) confirm the
performance-flow relationship for after-tax performance measures. Guercio/Tkac (2008) analyze
private investors’ reaction to Morningstar ratings. Other general studies on performance flow
include Patel/Zeckhauser/Hendricks (Cambridge, 1992), Sapp/Tiwari (2004), Decker (2005),
and Bu/Lacey (2008).
104Cf. Dechow (2003) for a recent and comprehensive overview of the literature of private in-
vestor’s mutual fund selection criteria. I will only focus on descriptive research of investors’
behavior. For a discussion about broader implications of mutual fund investors’ behavior, cf.
e.g., Bhattacharya/Pfleiderer (1985) and Greene/Hodges (2002). Cf. Kaplan/Schoar (2005) for
private equity fund investor’s behavior.
105of Finance/Commerce (1962) and Spitz (1970) find no or only a small link between performance
and capital flow. Smith (1978) was able to provide slightly stronger relationships, but the rela-
tionship was still limited.
106Spitz (1970), p. 145.
107Cf. Ippolito (1992), pp. 49-51, 59f.
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performance measurements he finds significant and strong performance-flow rela-
tionships for mutual funds. The positive relative return in excess of the market port-
folio of 2% translates into a higher growth of 1.4 percent points.108 Ippolito (1992)
points out that investors react more strongly to recent fund performance than long-
term performance. This relationship is unquestioned today and supported by sev-
eral subsequent studies for different data sets, e.g., Sirri/Tufano (1998), Chevalier/
Ellison (1997), and Karceski (2002).
General Market Condition
Beside the performance-flow relationship reported for mutual funds, there is a con-
siderable flow due to general market performance. Edelen/Warner (2001) show
with a data sample on a daily basis for the period from February 1998 to June 1999
that lagged market returns explain almost half of the variation in daily flow.109 For
example, two-thirds of one standard deviation of daily flow can be caused by a
one standard deviation shock to one-day lagged market returns.110 Karceski (2002)
shows with a monthly sample of mutual funds over the period from 1984 to 1996
that there is an influence both from current and lagged performance of the mutual
fund.111 He can show that total asset value as well as net new capital flow is pos-
itively influenced by lagged returns.112 Unexpected net new capital flow is only
influenced by concurrent market return.113 “The echo of these return-related shocks
propagate through time via the AR(3) process,” hence current flow depends on past
return.114
Risk
Regarding the influence of risk on capital flow, the research results are ambiguous.
Sirri/Tufano (1998) report that “there is mixed evidence that consumers are sensitive
108Cf. Ippolito (1992), p. 59f.
109Cf. Edelen/Warner (2001), p. 201f.
110Cf. Edelen/Warner (2001), p. 201.
111Cf. Karceski (2002), pp. 569-574.
112Cf. Karceski (2002), p. 571.
113Karceski (2002), p. 571.
114The finding of a positive relationship between concurrent market return and unexpected net new
capital flow is consistent with Warther (1995). However, Warther (1995) interprets this as a hint
for price influence from mutual fund transactions which is confirmed by Edelen/Warner (2001)
later on a daily basis. (Cf. section 3.3.2.) I will not use general market condition-related capital
flow in chapter 6, where price effects will be modeled explicitly.
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to the ex-post riskiness of fund investments."115 Using several separate measures of
performance and risk, regression coefficients on the risk measure are marginally
significant only in one analysis. In all other cases, pure risk measures were not sig-
nificant.116 There is even a significant influence of simple performance measures
if they are considered together with risk-adjusted measures.117 Krahnen/Schmidt/
Theissen (1997) report for the German mutual fund market that the influence of risk
depends on the time window considered.118 For short periods (below 18 months),
the risk-adjusted measure provides a better explanation of flow-of-funds, whereas
for longer periods (24 months) there is no preference for either measurement. del
Guercio/Tkac (2002) suggest that the appearing relationship between risk-adjusted
performance measures and flow of funds might be due to a high correlation be-
tween the risk-adjusted measures and publicly available performance assessments
such as the Morningstar rating.119 They find no explanatory power of Jensen’s al-
pha if they include the Morningstar rating into their regression analysis.120 In that
sense, investors do not actively consider the risk of mutual funds, but indirectly
by referring to publicly available performance measures when choosing their fund
investments.121
Management Fee
The level of management fees, in particular the change of management fees, has an
influence on capital flow. 122 Sirri/Tufano (1998) report that overall costs are nega-
tively related to capital flows as expected. In particular, he reports on the influence
of management fees that an increase of fees has almost no effect, but a decrease of
fees leads to an inflow of capital.123 One potential reason for this asymmetry, he
115Sirri/Tufano (1998), p. 1590.
116Cf. Sirri/Tufano (1998), p. 1598, pp. 1600-1604.
117Cf. Sirri/Tufano (1998), p. 1601.
118Cf. Krahnen/Schmidt/Theissen (1997), p. 10.
119Cf. del Guercio/Tkac (2002), pp. 525, 544f.
120Cf. del Guercio/Tkac (2002), p. 544f.
121Cf. del Guercio/Tkac (2002), p. 528.
122Other factors that might influence the flow-of-fund relation but that can either not be influenced
through portfolio management or that are more a matter of marketing strategy, and therefore,
lie outside the effects of portfolio management will not be considered. For the influence of age
refer to e.g., Chevalier/Ellison (1997), for the type of fund cf. Ippolito (1992), for the influence
of media attention refer to e.g., Sirri/Tufano (1998), for the influence of name changes refer
to Cooper/Gulen/Rau (2005), for the influence of other asset prices on mutual fund flow cf.
Goetzmann/Massa/Rouwenhorst (2000), and for the role of performance relative to fund family
cf. Kempf/Ruenzi (2008).
123Cf. Sirri/Tufano (1998), p. 1606, 1612.
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argues, could be that mutual funds advertise a decrease in fees much more than they
would advertise an increase. Being largely unaware of this increase, investors do
not react.
Load
The influence of fund load is mixed. Sirri/Tufano (1998) find that both an increase
as well as a decrease in loads have a positive influence on flow-of-funds.124 He
conjectures that an increase in loads is compensated by the higher motivation of
the sales representative, because the load is effectively a sales commission.125 Ip-
polito (1992) identifies differences of performance-flow relationship for load vs.
non-load funds.126 The performance-flow relationship is stronger for non-load funds
than for load funds. He conjectures that “the up-front charge at the time of pur-
chase discourages the flow of monies in and out of these funds compared to no-load
funds.”127 However, Sirri/Tufano (1998), in contrast, find that high-load funds show
a stronger performance sensitivity than low-load funds. They attribute this to the
higher marketing expenses of high-load funds that enable them to advertise high-
performing funds.128
Consumer and Market Research
Studies from market and consumer research confirm the general importance of per-
formance for capital flows: mutual fund performance is the primary selection crite-
ria of private investors. Next are criteria related to costs, such as management fees
and loads. Risk plays a marginal role only.
In telephone surveys conducted by Capon/Fitzsimons/Prince (1996), a clear ma-
jority of participants reported that “Investment Performance Track Record” is the
most important selection criterion out of nine different criteria.129 “Fund manager
reputation” is rated as the second most important criterion.130 Because reputation
124Cf. Sirri/Tufano (1998), pp. 1607, 1612.
125Cf. Sirri/Tufano (1998), p. 1612.
126Cf. Ippolito (1992), p. 62f.
127Ippolito (1992), p. 63.
128Cf. Sirri/Tufano (1998), p. 1612f.
129These criteria were: investment performance track record, fund manager reputation, scope (num-
ber of funds in family), responsiveness to inquiries, management fees, investment management
style, additional features, confidentiality, and community service/charity record. Cf. Capon/
Fitzsimons/Prince (1996), p. 66.
130Cf. Capon/Fitzsimons/Prince (1996), pp. 65-70.
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is very much influenced by past fund performance, these criteria are very closely
related.131 With conjoint experiments, Wilcox (2003) shows that customers rank
10-year average annual performance and previous year’s performance as the most
important decision criteria.132
Regarding the influence of risk, Capon/Fitzsimons/Prince (1996) report that only
14% of private investors used standard deviation to measure risk, 10% use beta and
4% use alpha or the Sharpe measure.133 Fees and loads are relevant criteria but
generally of less importance than performance. Capon/Fitzsimons/Prince (1996)
revealed that criteria such as management fees, scope (number of funds in fam-
ily), and responsiveness to inquiries are relevant. With only very limited influence
or almost no influence were criteria such as investment management style, addi-
tional features (checking, brokerage), confidentiality, and community service/char-
ity record. Capon/Fitzsimons/Prince (1996) identified advertising and commission-
based financial advisers as important information sources.134 The importance of
management fees is confirmed by Wilcox (2003).
3.2.2. Nonlinear Performance-Flow Relationship for
Mutual Funds
More detailed research is available about the relationship between fund performance
and capital flow. Ippolito (1992) reports asymmetries regarding the reaction of pri-
vate investors to positive and negative performance compared to a benchmark.135
Mutual fund investors contribute more capital in the case of positive relative per-
formance than they withdraw in the case of negative relative performance.136 The
positive effect is about three times higher than the negative effect. Among others,
131Nanda (2004) confirms the relevance of the reputation effect. Nanda (2004) shows that there is
a positive spillover effect from high performing mutual funds to other funds of the same asset
management company.
132Cf. Wilcox (2003), pp. 648-650. Other criteria have been: including load, management fee,
company name, previous year’s performance, 10-year average annual performance and fund’s
beta rating.
133del Guercio/Tkac (2002), p. 528.
134The importance of advertisements is underpinned by Barber/Odean/Zheng (2005). The rele-
vance of commission-based financial advisers for mutual funds is similar to advice regarding
the investment in individual stocks. Financial advisers add another layer of delegation, which,
however, I will not consider here.
135Goetzmann/Peles (1997) aim to explain the nonlinearity of the performance-fund relationship
with the phenomenon of “cognitive dissonance.”
136Cf. Ippolito (1992), p. 61.
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Sirri/Tufano (1998) and Chevalier/Ellison (1997) investigate more thoroughly the
asymmetry of the performance-flow relationship.137 Sirri/Tufano (1998) use a sam-
ple of 690 mutual equity funds over the period from 1971 to 1990. They measure
performance and risk with simple measures such as historical returns, relative re-
turns, and standard deviation of historical returns because these are the measures
that are available to mutual fund investors through purveyors of mutual funds.138
Sirri/Tufano (1998) are able to report a clear nonlinear performance-flow relation-
ship resembling the return profile of an option. High relative performance (com-
pared to other mutual funds) allow mutual funds to grow at high rates, whereas
low relative performance is followed by only a modest outflow of capital.139 These
results partially hold with other performance measures,140 including risk-adjusted
measures and long-term performance measurements.141
Chevalier/Ellison (1997) were able to reproduce these results. Figure 3.2 shows
their very clear result based on a sample of 449 mutual equity funds over the period
of 1983 to 1993. Chevalier/Ellison (1997) measure excess performance as the dif-
ference between the performance of the fund and a value-weighted market index.
The performance-flow relationship has the shape of a call option. The magnitude of
the performance flow is rather high. For example, a fund with a performance of 10
percentage points above the market return grows by 55%.
3.2.3. Linear Relationship for Institutional Accounts
The literature about the behavior of institutional account investors is more limited.
Lakonishok/Shleifer/Vishny (1992) find evidence that the number of clients of insti-
tutional portfolio managers is related to the performance of the portfolio manager.
Using a data sample that covers about 50% of the equity pension funds under del-
egation in 1990,142 they show that the number of accounts gained over the period
137Other research studying the nonlinear character include Carhart (1997), Goetzmann/
Peles (1997), and Gruber (1996). Lynch/Musto (2003) explain the nonlinearity in a model
where funds with bad performance change their management. Berk/Green (2004) explains the
nonlinear relationship by the rational behavior of investors under the assumption that portfolio
management skills are a scarce resource and dissipate with growing funds.
138Cf. Sirri/Tufano (1998), p. 1594.
139Cf. Sirri/Tufano (1998), pp. 1595f., 1598-1600.
140It is interesting to note that Sirri/Tufano (1998) report a significant influence of simple perfor-
mance measures even together with risk-adjusted measures. Cf. Sirri/Tufano (1998), p. 1601.
141Cf. Sirri/Tufano (1998), p. 1601.
142Cf. Lakonishok/Shleifer/Vishny (1992), p. 344ff.
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Young 
funds (<= 
10 years)
Old funds 
(> 10 
years)
Figure 3.2.: Performance-flow relationship for young (10 years) and old (>10
years) mutual funds. (Source: Chevalier/Ellison (1997), p. 1177)
1987 to 1990 is sensitive to past performance.143 They estimate that for every 100
basis points the portfolio management company beats the average portfolio man-
ager, it will gain an additional 2.6% accounts over the following three years. For
a high performing portfolio management company in the 90th percentile achieving
an annual over-performance of 450 basis points over the past three years, this would
mean an increase in accounts of 11.7% in the following years. Lakonishok/Shleifer/
Vishny (1992) estimate that the true figures on a single fund level are even higher,
as their analysis is based on aggregated data on the portfolio management company
level.
del Guercio/Tkac (2002) confirm these results. Using a sample of 562 portfolio
managers from 388 management companies over the years 1987-1994,144 they find
that institutional accounts use quantitative performance measures to initially assess
the quality of their investments in institutional accounts and reallocate funds ac-
cordingly.145 del Guercio/Tkac (2002) report that it is more likely that institutional
143Cf. Lakonishok/Shleifer/Vishny (1992), p. 367f.
144Cf. del Guercio/Tkac (2002), p. 532.
145Cf. del Guercio/Tkac (2002), p. 524.
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investors use risk-adjusted measures such as Jensen’s alpha.146 The relationship
between pure performance and flow is much weaker. However, unlike for mutual
funds, there is a relationship between Jensen’s alpha and the flow of funds which is
linear.147 Institutional investors punish portfolio managers for poor performance by
withdrawing capital.148 Measurement against a benchmark and the related tracking
errors also plays a prominent role. The fact that institutional investors unlike private
investors consider risk-adjusted performance measurements appears reasonable. In-
stitutional investors are usually better informed than mutual fund investors.149 Addi-
tionally, they increasingly use support from consultants who monitor portfolio man-
agers and recommend appropriate selections.150 However, the evaluation process of
institutional account portfolio managers goes beyond quantitative analysis. After
such a quantitative analysis, institutional investors evaluate their portfolio managers
“in face-to-face meetings on non-performance characteristics such as reputation and
credibility.”151 As a result, the explanatory power of quantitative measures for the
flow of funds is lower than for the mutual fund industry.152 They include portfolio
managers’ characteristics such as personality, credibility, reputation, and attentive-
ness.153
3.2.4. Results for Model Design
From the empirical results regarding capital flow, I will focus on implementing the
most important phenomena in the theoretical models in chapters 5 and 6. Given
the vast evidence, the models will include a linear (for institutional accounts) and a
nonlinear (for mutual funds) performance-flow relationship. In addition, I will im-
plement the concurrent flow based on general market condition. Not implemented
will be risk-adjusted measures, management fee, and load, due to their limited im-
portance.
146Cf. del Guercio/Tkac (2002), p. 538f.
147Cf. del Guercio/Tkac (2002), pp. 541, 543f.
148Cf. del Guercio/Tkac (2002), p. 550ff.
149Cf. del Guercio/Tkac (2002), p. 527.
150Cf. del Guercio/Tkac (2002), p. 528.
151del Guercio/Tkac (2002), p. 524. In fact, institutional investors introduce special consultants to
support their assessment of portfolio managers. Cf. del Guercio/Tkac (2002), p. 529.
152Cf. del Guercio/Tkac (2002), p. 525.
153Cf. del Guercio/Tkac (2002), p. 529.
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3.3. Price Effects from Trades
Traditional portfolio theory assumes that investors consider prices on the capital
market as given, i.e., their transactions have no influence on prices.154 However,
empirical research indicates that, in contrast, transactions have an influence on asset
prices.155 Therefore traders, in particular large traders, should incorporate their
influence on prices into the decision-making process.
Mutual fund and institutional account portfolio managers can be considered as
large traders, because they manage funds with a significant amount of capital.156
They also face capital flows as documented in the previous section. This requires,
in particular for mutual fund portfolio managers, trading regularly. However, be-
cause they do not receive information about recent capital flow in real time, mutual
fund portfolio managers cannot respond to every single small transaction of fund
shares.157 Instead, they receive collected transactions in a single batch early in the
afternoon of each trading day.158 Only then are they able to execute accumulated
trades to adjust the capital of the mutual fund for the new flow.
The following section provides results from empirical research about price ef-
fects. It focuses on price effects caused by single large trades and mutual fund
flows.159 A differentiated view on price effects for purchases and sales is provided
as well as specifications of price impact functions. Concluding remarks highlight
those specialties of price effects that will be picked up in the theoretical model in
chapter 6.
154Cf. e.g., Merton (1990), chapter 2, p. 17f.
155I will focus on empirical results on price influence. For a discussion about three supporting
hypotheses to explain such price effects, i.e. price pressure hypothesis, imperfect substitutes hy-
pothesis, and information hypothesis, cf. Scholes (1972), pp. 180-184, Harris/Gurel (1986),
p. 815f, Holthausen/Leftwich/Mayers (1987), p. 240f, Chan/Lakonishok (1993), p. 176,
and Cochrane (2004), p. 6. Cf. also Kraus/Stoll (1972), Hess/Frost (1982), and Mikkelson/
Partch (1985).
156In 1997, the average value of equity and mixed mutual funds in the US was about 650 million
USD. Cf. Fortune (1997), p. 59.
157Cf. for this and the remaining paragraph Edelen/Warner (2001), p. 198.
158In some special cases, e.g., for large institutional investors, they receive information about flows
informally in advance. Edelen/Warner (2001) report that portfolio managers claim that this flow
data has some predictive power.
159I will not discuss research on the topic of price effect from index (e.g., S&P 500) adjust-
ments. For price effects from index adjustments cf. e.g., Shleifer (1986), Harris/Gurel (1986),
Goetzmann/Garry (1986), Dhillon/Johnson (1991), Collins/Wansley/Robinson (1995), Beneish/
Whaley (1996), Lynch/Mendenhall (1997), Kaul/Mehrotra/Morck (2000), Liu (2000), Peter-
son (2004), Chen/Noronha/Singal (2004), Biktimirov/Cowan/Jordan (2004), Biktimirov (2004),
Chakrabarti et al. (2005), and Greenwood (2005). Mitchell/Pulvion/Stafford (2004) analyze
price reactions in the context of mergers.
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It should be noted that market participants will most probably anticipate the effect
of their transactions on prices and, therefore, take countermeasures. They might
e.g., split up large block orders to avoid price effects. Hence, empirical research
can only capture the remaining price effect after individuals have taken measures to
preclude price effects.160
3.3.1. Evidence for Price Effects
Research that provides evidence of price effects from trades is vast. Therefore, I
will focus on some important contributions in this section.161 Kraus/Stoll (1972)
are among the first to analyze the influence of block trades on asset prices. They
analyze 7009 block trades with more than 10,000 shares on the New York Stock Ex-
change.162 For seller-initiated trades, they find an average price decrease of 0.43%
over the day.163 For buyer-initiated trades, they find an average price increase of
0.66%. Kraus/Stoll (1972) can also show that the size of the price effect depends
on the size of the order.164 Holthausen/Leftwich/Mayers (1987) report very similar
results. They find that a sale of 1% of equity or 1% of normal daily trading volume
temporarily decreases the asset price by 0.371% or 0.357% respectively.165 For
buyer-initiated trades, a sale of 1% of equity is related to an increase of 0.287%.166
Chan/Lakonishok (1993) find an increase of prices of 0.34% from opening to clos-
ing quote after a buyer-initiated trade and a modest decrease of -0.04% after a seller-
160Cf. Holthausen/Leftwich/Mayers (1987), p. 239.
161Beside the research quoted here, other authors have investigated price effects from trades:
Scholes (1972), Loeb (1983), Glosten/Milgrom (1985), Mikkelson/Partch (1985), Burdette/
O’Hara (1987), Easley/O’Hara (1987), Glosten (1989), Ball/Finn (1989), Barclay/Litzenberger/
Warner (1990), Holthausen/Leftwich/Mayers (1990), Seppi (1990), Hasbrouck (1991a), Has-
brouck (1991b), Madhavan/Smidt (1991), Easley/O’Hara (1992), Easely/O’Hara (1992), Gross-
man (1992), Hausman/Lo/MacKinlay (1992), Barclay/Warner (1993), Madhavan/Smidt (1993),
Huang/Stoll (1994), Keim/Madhavan (1996), Chakravarty (2001), Levin/Wright (2002), Chor-
dia/Roll/Subrahmanyam (2005), and Dey/Kazemi (2008). O’Hara (1995) and Madhavan (2000)
provide an extensive review of recent research of the literature of market microstructure, includ-
ing empirical studies about price effects from trades. Campbell/Ramadorai/Vuolteenaho (2009)
provide general recent research references. Some special issues are discussed e.g., by Sias (1997)
(price effects with closed end funds) and Avramov/Chordia/Goyal (2006) (discuss the relation
between illiquidity and short-run reversal).
162Kraus/Stoll (1972) identify a trade as buyer-initiated if the tick immediately before the block
trade was lower, and as seller-initiated if the tick before the block trade was higher than the tick
of the block trade, trades with a zero tick are excluded.
163Cf. Kraus/Stoll (1972), p. 575f.
164Cf. Kraus/Stoll (1972), p. 582.
165Cf. Holthausen/Leftwich/Mayers (1987), pp. 249, 264.
166Cf. Holthausen/Leftwich/Mayers (1987), pp. 249, 264.
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initiated trade.167 Overall, the reported price effects are of the same magnitude.
Chan/Lakonishok (1995) were able to consider the fact that many large orders are
split up into smaller transactions that would otherwise be large block transactions.168
They are able to “treat the entire sequence (’package’) of trades as the basic unit of
analysis [...]."169 Chan/Lakonishok (1995) report that 53.2% of all trades (dollar-
valued) span a period of four or more days.170 For such packages, they report an
increase of 0.98% for buyer-initiated trades and a decrease of 0.35% for seller-
initiated trades.
Griffin/Harris/Topaloglu (2003), unlike most authors before, find no evidence for
price influence. Instead, they interpret their results as evidence that much of the
price increase associated with institutional trading is due to institutional investors
following intraday trends.171 Their data sample consists of all NASDAQ trades and
quotes for NASDAQ 100 stocks within the period from May 1, 2000 till February
28, 2001.172 On an intraday basis using 5-minute intervals and selecting data with
the largest purchases and sales,173 Griffin/Harris/Topaloglu (2003) find that prices
during the 30 minutes before an institutional large block purchase show an abnormal
return of around 0.70% and no further abnormal return after the institutional pur-
chase.174 Prices show negative abnormal returns of around -0.60% before a large
institutional sale, followed by no more abnormal returns after the sale.175 Figure 3.3
shows the price movement and order imbalance.
However, the interpretations of Griffin/Harris/Topaloglu (2003) are not plausi-
ble. First, it appears at least odd that institutional buyers realize a trade just in the
167Cf. Chan/Lakonishok (1993), pp. 179ff., 183f. They use over 1 million individual transactions
from 37 large money managers from July 1986 to the end of 1988, covering 5% of the dollar
value traded during that period. (p. 177) They are also able to correctly identify buyer-and
seller-initiated trades without using the tick classification. (p. 175)
168Cf. Chan/Lakonishok (1995), p. 1147. For a more detailed view of the trading behavior of
institutional investors cf. Conrad/Johnson/Wahal (2001), Conrad/Johnson/Wahal (2002), and
Conrad/Johnson/Wahal (2003).
169Chan/Lakonishok (1995), p. 1148. Chan/Lakonishok (1995) combine orders of the same di-
rection of one portfolio manager if they are not interrupted by more than 5 days. Cf. Chan/
Lakonishok (1995), p. 1149.
170Cf. Chan/Lakonishok (1995), p. 1152. Their sample consists of 155789 packages. Cf. Chan/
Lakonishok (1995), p. 1150.
171Cf. Griffin/Harris/Topaloglu (2003), p. 2285.
172Cf. Griffin/Harris/Topaloglu (2003), p. 2289ff.
173Griffin/Harris/Topaloglu (2003) use the buy-sell imbalance, the difference between buy and sell
volume, to identify large purchases and sales. Cf. Griffin/Harris/Topaloglu (2003), p. 2292.
174Cf. Griffin/Harris/Topaloglu (2003), p. 2301ff.
175Cf. Griffin/Harris/Topaloglu (2003), p. 2301ff.
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Figure 3.3.: Excess return in relation to order imbalance. The horizontal axis shows
5-minutes intervals before and after the transaction. The grey bar de-
picts the institutional imbalance, the diagonal shaded bar the individual
imbalance. The dashed line represents the return relative to the NAS-
DAQ 100 index. (Source: Griffin/Harris/Topaloglu (2003), p. 2302,
figure 3, panels A and B)
moment when the cumulative abnormal return reaches its peak.176 Second, block
trading very often involves a different trading mechanism.177 "Many block trades
use the service of a block trader, or ’upstairs market maker’, who forms a syndi-
cate of buyers to take the other side of the trade."178 These syndicates are set up in
advance of the actual trade which could explain the abnormal returns prior to the ac-
tual trading of the block.179 And third, selected trade data using the largest positive
and negative excess return, instead of the largest purchase and sale, provides differ-
ent results. Griffin/Harris/Topaloglu (2003) show that based on this selection, stock
prices show an abnormal return of around 1.75% for the largest buys and around
-2.00% for the largest sales.180 But unlike in the previous selection of trades, the
176Cf. Griffin/Harris/Topaloglu (2003), p. 2301ff.
177Cf. O’Hara (1995), p. 233.
178O’Hara (1995), p. 233.
179Cf. , p. 32.
180Cf. Griffin/Harris/Topaloglu (2003), p. 2304.
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prices here rise and fall just in the 5-minutes interval when the institutional trades
buy and sell, i.e., their imbalance rises significantly.181 After the initial rise, prices
show a small reversal of abnormal returns of about 0.25% for purchases and about
0.5% for sales.182 Overall, it is more plausible that the results of Griffin/Harris/
Topaloglu (2003) support price effects from trades than trend-following behavior of
institutional investors.
3.3.2. Mutual Fund Flow and Price Effects
There is also extensive research supporting the hypothesis that mutual fund flow
causes price effects. From the vast literature, I will report on two representative
studies.183 Warther (1995) finds that unexpected mutual fund flows are concurrent
with a significant increase in stock prices on a monthly basis over the period from
January 1984 till December 1992.184 He separates the expected from the unexpected
flow of funds using an AR(3) model on the lagged net sales.185 It turns out that the
unexpected net sales of mutual funds explain largely concurrent returns with an R2
of 53%.186 A 1% sudden net sale which is roughly two times the standard deviation
of the unexpected net sales results in a stock return of 5.7%.
Edelen/Warner (2001) find evidence for the impact of mutual fund capital flow
on asset prices on a daily basis. They find for the period from February 1998 till
June 1999 that unexpected flows on a daily basis affect stock prices with the same
magnitude but slightly lower than individual institutions’ trades.187 An unexpected
flow of one standard deviation results in an abnormal return of 0.37%.188 Using
intraday return figures, Edelen/Warner (2001) find that returns in the late afternoon
181Cf. Griffin/Harris/Topaloglu (2003), p. 2304.
182Cf. Griffin/Harris/Topaloglu (2003), p. 2304.
183The literature on this topic is again vast, I will, therefore. focus on some important contri-
butions. Beside the below mentioned research please cf. Ferson/Warther (1996), Sias (1996),
Remolona/Kleiman/Gruenstein (1997), Adler/Yi (1998), Boyer/Zheng (2002), Fortune (1998),
Nofsinger/Sias (1999), Edelen/Warner (1999), Edelen (1999), Wermers (1999), Zheng (1999),
Engen/Lehnert (2000), Potter (2000), Chen/Jegadeesh/Wermers (2000), Cha/Lee (2001), Goetz-
mann/Massa (2003), Pastor/Stambaugh (2003), Chen et al. (2004), Kadiyala (2004), and Philip-
pas (2005).
184Cf. Warther (1995), pp. 210, 213.
185Cf. Warther (1995), p. 217f.
186Warther (1995) reports that there is no significant difference between using the flow of funds vs.
net purchases of funds as both are highly correlated with 89%. Cf. Warther (1995), p. 219f.
187Cf. Edelen/Warner (2001), p. 196f.
188Cf. Edelen/Warner (2001), p. 203. In particular, Edelen/Warner (2001), p. 203f., find no
evidence for a relation between return and lagged flow.
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are positively affected by the unexpected flow of the same day.189 They explain this
with preliminary daily flow calculations and executions of mutual funds.190 They
argue that if the calculation of the daily flow is costly, it is best for mutual funds to
calculate a rough estimate if the majority of flows are available and they can still act
on it. To execute flow adjustments before the closing quote is important for mutual
funds because the mutual fund investor always executes trades in mutual funds at
the closing quote.191
3.3.3. Permanent and Temporary Price Effects
Early research provides evidence for permanent price effects from purchases and
largely temporary price effects from sales. Kraus/Stoll (1972) report for purchases
an initial price increase of 0.75% followed by only a small decrease of 0.09% re-
sulting in an overall increase of 0.66%.192 In contrast sales cause an initial decrease
of 1.14% followed by an increase of 0.71% resulting in a net decrease of 0.43%.
Holthausen/Leftwich/Mayers (1987) find that their reported increase for buyer-
initiated trades of 0.287% is permanent, whereas the decrease for seller-initiated
trades of 0.371% is temporary.193 Chan/Lakonishok (1993) report the overall price
increase associated with buyer-initiated trades can be separated into a 0.22% in-
crease from opening quote to block quote and a further increase of 0.12% from
block to closing quote.194 In contrast, price effects from seller-initiated trades show
a reversal on the same day. After an initial decrease of -0.14% from opening quote
to block quote, an increase of 0.10% follows from block quote to closing quote.195
Kraus/Stoll (1972) attribute the phenomenon of the different duration of price
effects to the fact that large purchases are quite rare and liquidity is not provided
by market makers or other investors, because market makers and investors seldom
go short.196 Chan/Lakonishok (1993) conclude that large purchases reveal private
information because institutional investors usually hold a limited portfolio and the
189Cf. Edelen/Warner (2001), p. 211.
190Cf. Edelen/Warner (2001), p. 207f.
191Cf. Goetzmann/Massa (2003), p. 10.
192Cf. Kraus/Stoll (1972), p. 575f.
193Cf. Holthausen/Leftwich/Mayers (1987), pp. 249, 264.
194Cf. Chan/Lakonishok (1993), p. 179ff.
195Cf. Chan/Lakonishok (1993), p. 175.
196They cite market professionals with the sentence "blocks are sold, not bought." (Kraus/
Stoll (1972), p. 573) They also remark that their sample includes stocks involved in mergers and
takeovers which might be, in part, responsible for the discrepancy. Cf. also Cochrane (2004), p.
16, for short-selling constraints, in particular regarding small stocks.
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selection of a particular stock out of the universe of potential investments might
reflect some private information.197 Large sales, on the other hand are more likely
to be driven by the liquidity demand of the portfolio manager.198 Another reason
could be that brokers and market makers are more likely to take long positions as
counterparties for sales for lower price concessions, compared to the more risky
and, therefore, expensive short positions as counterparties to purchases.199
Chiyachantana et al. (2004) revisit the asymmetry of price effects for purchases
and sales as reported by previous authors.200 They suggest that the general market
condition is responsible for the differences in price effects. In a positive market
environment with rising stock prices, purchases cause a larger effect, in a negative
market environment with falling stock prices sales cause a larger effect.201 They
explain this dependence by lower levels of liquidity for purchases in positive mar-
ket environments and for sales in negative market environments: "Institutions pay
for consuming liquidity (immediacy) when buying in rising markets and selling in
falling markets. On the contrary, when trading against the market, institutions ef-
fectively provide liquidity and, therefore, face lower price impact."202
In contrast, research by Potters/Bouchaud (2003), whose results will be presented
below, indicates that price effects are permanent. Overall, whether and under which
conditions price effects are permanent and temporary appears to still be under de-
bate.
3.3.4. Form of Price Impact Function
The proprietary nature of data on institutional trading has made empirical research
on the detailed form of price impact functions difficult.203 However, recent research
197Cf. Chan/Lakonishok (1993), p. 184f.
198Cf. Chan/Lakonishok (1993), p. 184f.
199Cf. Chan/Lakonishok (1993), p. 184f.
200Chiyachantana et al. (2004) use a sample of institutional trades in international stocks from 36
countries covering the years 1997, 1998 (upward trend), and 2001 (downward trend) with over
one million transactions. They also investigate effects that are beyond the scope of this research,
e.g., a positive relationship of price effect with volatility and order complexity, higher trading
costs in "emerging markets, nonliberalized markets, and markets with poor shareholder rights."
(Chiyachantana et al. (2004), p. 871.)
201Cf. also Saar (2001) for comprehensive literature on this issue.
202Chiyachantana et al. (2004), p. 885.
203Cf. Chiyachantana et al. (2004),p. 872. Early studies attempted to estimate the elasticity of the
demand curve using IPO data or repurchases of stocks (cf. e.g., Scholes (1972), Loderer/Cooney/
van Drunen (1991), and Field/Hanka (2001)), but prices around IPOs are probably influenced by
additional information. Cf. e.g., Levin/Wright (2002) to overcome this information effect.
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has been able to report detailed characteristics of the price impact function. The
authors consistently report monotone increasing and concave price impact function.
According to Kritzman/Myrgren/Page (2006), a concave price impact function is
also commonly used by practitioners.204 This section summarizes the results from
recent research.205
In order to reveal the functional relation between order size and price effect,
Plerou et al. (2002) use the trades and quotes of the 116 most frequently traded
stocks at the New York Stock Exchange over the period from 1994 to 1995.206 To
approximate the price effect they define 
 as the difference between the number
of buyer-initiated and seller-initiated trades. They find a nonlinear, concave rela-
tionship between the trade volume 
 and the change in price, the conditional ex-
pectations.207 More specific, Plerou et al. (2002) fit a hyperbolic tangens function
B0 tanh(B1
), with parameters B0 and B1 and the imbalance volume 
, to the ob-
served price effects. This fit is suitable for trade effects measured after a longer time
period as can be seen from figure 3.4b.208 For price effects shortly after trades, a
power law function 
1= approximates the price effects better. Optimal parameters
are 1= = 0:66  0:02 after 15 minutes and 1= = 0:34  0:03 after 5 minutes.209
Figure 3.4b shows the short-term fit.
Lillo/Farmer/Mantegna (2002) and Lillo/Farmer/Mantegna (2003) confirm the
findings of Plerou et al. (2002) and are able to reconstruct a single price impact
curve for many stocks with different capitalization. They use a sample of the largest
1000 stocks at the New York Stock Exchange over the period of 1995 to 1998, cov-
ering about 113 million transactions and 173 million quotes.210 As price effect, they
204Cf. Kritzman/Myrgren/Page (2006), p. 27.
205Cf. also Kempf/Korn (1999), Gabaix et al. (2003), Plerou et al. (2004), and Coggins/Lim (2005)
for additional research. Iori et al. (2003) present a model that predicts the concave price im-
pact function in an order-driven market. Perold/Salomon (1991) explain concave price impact
functions with transaction costs and convex price impact functions with information-motivated
trading. Dey/Kazemi (2008) derive price impact curves theoretically for a market with pure in-
formation, pure liquidity, and information-liquidity traders. Keim/Madhavan (1995) investigate
the duration of trades. Keim/Madhavan (1996) find in an early study that the price effect has a
concave form and attribute this to the fact that the "upstairs market" is involved for larger trans-
actions. Cf. Keim/Madhavan (1996), pp. 26-31, as another source for a concave price impact
function.
206Cf. Plerou et al. (2002), p. 027104-0.
207Cf. Plerou et al. (2002), p. 027104-2.
208Cf. Plerou et al. (2002), p. 027104-3.
209Cf. Plerou et al. (2002), p. 027104-3.
210Cf. Lillo/Farmer/Mantegna (2002), p. 1. Coggins/Lim (2005) apply the same methodology for
a different sample with similar results for the Australian stock market.
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(a) Hyperbolic price impact function for seperate
positive and negative imbalances.
(b) Concave price impact function for merged
positive and negative imbalances.
Figure 3.4.: Nonlinear price impact functions. 
 is defined as the difference
between the number of buyer-initiated and seller-initiated trades.
hGi
 are conditional expectations of price changes. (Source:
Plerou et al. (2002), p. 027104-2, figure 2.)
define the change in price from one transaction to the next quote revision.211 They
find that the price effect has a concave form and grows with transaction size.212 The
price impact function can be approximated by a power low function ! , where ! is
the normalized transaction size213 and  depends on the market capitalization, rang-
ing from 0.5 for small transactions in larger stocks to 0.2 for larger transactions in
smaller stocks.214 These values are in line with those reported by Plerou et al. (2002)
for short period price effects. Adjusting for market capitalization and liquidity, they
are able to reconstruct a single price impact function.215 Therefore, market capital-
ization appears to be the most important driver for the scaling of the price effect-
trading size relationship.
Chan/Lakonishok (1993) already indicated the influence of firm and order size
on the price effect.216 They find that the price effect of purchases is bigger for small
companies and small for bigger companies, ranging from 0.29% for the largest firm
211Cf. Lillo/Farmer/Mantegna (2002), p. 2.
212Cf. Lillo/Farmer/Mantegna (2002), p. 1.
213Lillo/Farmer/Mantegna (2002) normalize the transaction size by dividing through "the average
value for each stock in each year." (Lillo/Farmer/Mantegna (2002), p. 2.)
214Generally a smaller exponent means a larger price effect relative to the size of the transaction.
Cf. Lillo/Farmer/Mantegna (2002), p. 1.
215Cf. Lillo/Farmer/Mantegna (2002), p. 3.
216Cf. Chan/Lakonishok (1993), p. 186f, for this and the following paragraph. Chan/
Lakonishok (1995) largely confirm these results for packaged orders.
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to 0.49% for the smallest firm. For sales, this relationship holds as well, however
the return reversal is also stronger for smaller companies.
Potters/Bouchaud (2003) identify a concave price impact function of logarithmic
form. They estimate the price impact function being of the form r() ln(V ) with
V as the trading volume,  as the time distance from the order.217 They find that
the time-dependence of r() is rather limited. r() increases during the first 100
seconds and then decreases to a finite value. The total variation of r() does not
exceed 50%. The influence of the trading volume appears to be logarithmic.218
Potters/Bouchaud (2003) conclude that the price effect is quasi-permanent. They
conjecture that market participants interpret each new trade as new information and
that orders rearrange around the latest trading price.219
3.3.5. Results for Model Design
Given the extensive research on price effects from transactions and mutual fund
flow alone, it appears reasonable to incorporate price effects into portfolio opti-
mization models. Because there is strong evidence for general price reversal, this
phenomenon will be implemented. Regarding a differentiation between purchases
and sales, the literature provides an ambiguous picture. I will, therefore, not include
this differentiation in the model. As price impact functions, I will consider a lin-
ear form to generally understand price effects and a more realistic concave function
as suggested by Plerou et al. (2002), Lillo/Farmer/Mantegna (2002), Lillo/Farmer/
Mantegna (2003), and Potters/Bouchaud (2003).
After having discussed the empirical characteristics of the situation of portfolio
managers that will form the basis for the theoretical models in chapter 5 and 6,
the following chapter presents an overview of the methodology that will be used to
solve the theoretical models.
217Cf. Potters/Bouchaud (2003), p. 138f.
218Cf. Potters/Bouchaud (2003), p. 139.
219Cf. Potters/Bouchaud (2003), p. 139.
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This chapter outlines three methodologies to solve intertemporal portfolio prob-
lems: continuous time dynamic programming as an algebraic approach, Markov
chain approximations as a numerical methodology for continuous time models, and
purely discrete time approaches using the lattice multinomial approach. Continuous
time dynamic programming will allow the derivation of algebraic closed-form so-
lutions for multiperiod but rather “simple” models. Markov chain approximations
will be used for more complicated models where closed-form solutions are not at-
tainable. Purely discrete time models are applied to provide solutions for optimal
portfolio policies with price effects. Since continuous time dynamic programming
and the lattice multinomial approach are well known, this chapter will only briefly
outline its application to standard portfolio optimization problems. For the Markov
chain approximation method, this chapter will additionally outline the general ap-
proach, because this methodology is not as widely used in the finance literature.
The results presented from standard portfolio optimization problems using all three
methods will build a basis for further discussion in chapters 5 and 6.
4.1. Dynamic Programming and Portfolio
Optimization
This section outlines the standard portfolio optimization problem in a multiperiod,
continuous time context and its solution using dynamic programming.220 It then
discusses the standard’s results.
220For a general introduction to continuous time dynamic programming, please refer to the stan-
dard literature, e.g., Merton (1969), Merton (1971), Fleming/Soner (1993), chapter 4, Korn/
Korn (2001), chapter 5. Other standard references are Duffie (1992) and Björk (Oxford: 2004).
For multiperiod discrete time models, cf. Duffie (1992), chapters 1-4, and Pliska (1997). The
dynamic programming technique was initially developed by Bellman (1957). An alternative ap-
proach to solve multiperiod problems in continuous time is the martingale approach, pioneered
by Cox/Huang (1989). However, even though the martingale approach is mathematically more
elegant, the dynamic approach remains more intuitive.
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4.1.1. Intertemporal Portfolio Optimization
Portfolio optimization addresses the problem of optimal investment-consumption
decisions. Merton initiated the application of dynamic programming to solve the
portfolio optimization problem in continuous time.221 Let there be i = 1 : : : n risky
assets whose prices Pi follow the stochastic differential equations
dPi(t) = iPi(t)dt+ iPi(t)dBi(t) i = 1 : : : n (4.1)
with constant market coefficients, the drift i and the standard deviation i, and the
Brownian motion dBi(t).
The investor consumes c(t) at time t. Let Ni(t) be the number of the i-th risky
asset held by the investor in t. Aggregating all n asset together, the total wealth
X(t) of the investor develops according to
dX(t) =
nX
i=1
Ni(t)dPi(t)  c(t)dt:
The portfolio policy wi(t) =
Ni(t)Pi(t)
X(t)
represents the share of wealth X(t) invested
in the i-th asset. Substituting wi(t) into the wealth equation above gives
dX(t) =
nX
i=1
wi(t)X(t)
dPi(t)
Pi(t)
  c(t)dt: (4.2)
Using the definition of the price process in equation 4.1 this is equivalent to
dX(t) =
 
nX
i=1
wi(t)i
!
X(t)dt  c(t)dt+
nX
i=1
wi(t)iX(t)dBi: (4.3)
The constraint
Pn
i=1wi(t) = 1 ensures that the total wealth is invested. If there is a
riskless asset governed by the differential equation
dP0(t) = rP0(t)dt;
221Cf. Merton (1969) and Merton (1971).The derivation of the fundamental wealth process in this
section closely follows Merton (1990), chapter 5, pp. 124-127. The solution approach presented
afterwards follows Korn/Korn (2001), chapter 5.4, p. 236ff.
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the wealth equation becomes
dX(t) =
 
r +
nX
i=1
wi(t)(i   r)
!
X(t)dt  c(t)dt+
nX
i=1
wi(t)iX(t)dBi (4.4)
The investor seeks to maximize expected utility from consumption over a finite
period and from terminal wealth by choosing their optimal rate of consumption
c(t) and the optimal portfolio policy wi(t), i = 0; : : : ; n. Technically, the investor
maximizes
J(t;X;u) = Et;X
Z T
t
L(s; c(s))ds+	(T;X(T ))

(4.5)
with L() as the utility and	() as the Bequest utility function of terminal wealth of
the investor. Et;X is the expectation at time t and given the valueX of the stochastic
process at time t.
To provide an explicit solution to the maximization problem, a CRRA utility
function is used. Let
L(t; c(t)) :=
1

e tc(t) (4.6)
with  > 0,  2 (0; 1).  is the parameter of risk aversion. The Bequest utility
function in analogy is
	(T;X(T )) =
1

X(T )
The maximization problem can be solved using dynamic programming. The op-
timal portfolio policy with riskless asset results in
w(t) =
1
1  
 1(  1r); (4.7)
with 1 as n-dimensional vector of ones,  1 as the inverse of the covariance matrix
of the n Brownian motions. The optimal consumption is given by
c(t) =
 
et  f(t) 1 1 X(t) (4.8)
with
f(t)
1
1  = e
a
1  (T t) +
1  
(a  )

e
a 
1  T   ea 1  t

e
a
1  (T t)
and
a :=  1
2
(  1r)0 1(  1r) 1
   1 + r:
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For the special case that there are only risky assets for investment, the optimal
portfolio policy changes to
w(t) =
1
10 11
 11+
1
1  

 1  1
0 1 11
10 11

(4.9)
Two things are noteworthy in the standard setup. First, the model determines
separately the optimal share wi(t) of wealth W (t) invested in each particular asset
and the optimal consumption c(t). This is also reflected in the optimal portfolio
policy 4.7 and 4.9 which is independent of optimal consumption 4.8. In fact, the
setup is such that both are independent of each other at each point in time t. Looking
at the wealth equation 4.3 and 4.4, consumption influences the change in wealth
dX(t). But the portfolio policy is unaffected by it because the wealth at t is not
affected by consumption, i.e., the whole wealth is invested which is assured byPn
i=1wi(t) = 1.
And second, the transactions necessary to stay at the optimal portfolio policy
wi(t) are not made explicit in this approach. However, they do happen and are
necessary: the investor must trade at every “infinitesimal small” time t to keep
the actual shares wi(t) at their optimal value. In a frictionless market as it is as-
sumed here, in particular without feedback processes on prices induced by trades or
without transaction costs, this approach appears appropriate. However, in order to
introduce price influence or transaction costs, these transactions must be modeled
explicitly. This constraint will be addressed in chapter 6.
The following section briefly discusses optimal portfolio structures 4.7 and 4.9
from an economic perspective.
4.1.2. Discussion of Standard Results
The classical solutions for the optimal portfolio in equations 4.7 and 4.9 have a well-
known structure.222 The optimal portfolio policy for the case without a riskless asset
is given by223
w(t) =
1
10 11
 11| {z }
(a)
+
1
1  | {z }
(c)

 1  1
0 1
10 11
 11

| {z }
(b)
:
222Cf. e.g., Merton (1990), p. 105f. and Ingersoll (1987), p. 287f.
223Cf. Ingersoll (1987), p. 287f.
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The solution term consists of a minimum-variance sub-portfolio (a) and a return-
oriented sub-portfolio (b). The weights of both parts are determined by the factor
(c), the reciprocal of the constant relative risk aversion score 1    of the CRRA-
utility function. In order to ease notation, I will note the minimum-variance term
1
10 11
 11with the vectorMV , resulting in
w(t) = MV +
1
1  

 1  10 1 MV  : (4.10)
The structure of the return-oriented sub-portfolio contains the return-oriented el-
ement  1 itself, as well as a volume adjustment of the minimum-variance sub-
portfolio, 10 1  MV . This latter adjustment simply decreases the minimum-
variance sub-portfolio for the same volume as it is increased by the return-oriented
portfolio such that the constraint 10w = 1 still holds. The optimal portfolio pol-
icy remains the same with different maximization objectives, e.g., maximization of
expected utility from consumption till T .224
In the case with a riskless asset that provides a constant yield r, the solution
simplifies to225
w(t) =
1
1  
 1(  r1):
The minimum-variance and the return-oriented portfolio are combined together to
the so-called tangency portfolio  1(  r1). The demand for assets is structurally
independent from the risk aversion of the investor, the so-called Tobin separation.226
Only the amount of wealth invested is determined by the reciprocal of the measure
of relative risk aversion. In addition to their investments in risky assets, the investor
will invest the fraction 1  10w of their wealth in the riskless asset.
The optimal consumption
c(t) =
 
et  f(t) 1 1 X(t)
is proportional to the current wealth with the proportionality factor depending on
time.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the optimal solution in the typical return-variance dia-
gram.227 The x-axis displays the standard deviation  of the depicted portfolios, the
224Cf. e.g., Merton (1969).
225Cf. e.g., Merton (1990), p. 105.
226Cf. Tobin (1957).
227Cf. e.g.,Merton (1990), p. 136.
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µ
!
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Efficient frontier
Investment line of 
primary investor
Minimum-
variance 
sub-portfolio
0
Investment without 
delegation
Tangency portfolio
T
V
I
Utility function of 
private investor
Figure 4.1.: Efficient investment of self-acting primary investor displayed in   
 diagram. The horizontal axis represents the standard deviation, the
vertical axis represents the expected return of portfolios. r is the risk-
less rate. (Source: Own illustration)
y-axis the expected return . The minimum-variance and the return-oriented sub-
portfolios span the efficient frontier. The efficient frontier starts at the minimum-
variance portfolio V. The tangency portfolio T is located where the investment line
of the primary investor through the -axis at point r (risk-free rate) touches the ef-
ficient frontier. This line represents the risk-return profile of efficient portfolios for
the investor. They realize a portfolio with the risk-return profile at I consisting of
the risk-free asset and the tangency portfolio. This portfolio is located where the
utility function of the investor touches the investment line.
4.2. Numerical Approximations with Markov
Chains
The dynamic programming approach outlined in the previous section provides
closed-form solutions for stochastic control problems in continuous time. But de-
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pending on the complexity of the dynamic problem, a closed-form solution may not
be available. In fact, in many cases such a solution cannot be found.228 For these
cases, numerical solution methods are available. For stochastic control problems,
two approaches can be distinguished, the finite difference/finite element method
to solve the HJB-equation and the Markov chain approximation of the underlying
stochastic system.229
The first approach, the finite difference/finite element method, requires the solu-
tion of the optimal control in terms of the value function. Substituting this solution
into the HJB results - for controlled Markov diffusions - in a non-linear partial dif-
ferential equation (PDE). This equation can then be solved for the value function
using the finite difference/finite element method. However, it requires a symbolical
solution of the optimal controls. In addition, in some cases the PDE will not have a
solution in the classical sense.230
The second approach, the Markov chain approximation, was introduced by Kush-
ner (1977) and is described in detail in Kushner/Dupuis (1992).231 Its basic idea is
to discretize the underlying state- and time-continuous stochastic system using a
discrete state and discrete time Markov chain. The transition probabilities of the
Markov chain are chosen so that the resulting discrete value function approximates
the continuous value function well. From the comprehensive toolbox of Markov
chain approximation, I will only focus on the relevant aspects for this work.
4.2.1. Markov Chain Approximation Method
The outline of the Markov chain approximation method in this and the following
section 4.2.2 follows Munk (1997), Munk (2003), and Kushner/Dupuis (1992).232
Discretization of State Space and Time
The objective is to approximate a continuous state and continuous time stochastic
process, e.g. as in equation 4.3, with a controlled discrete Markov chain. Let h =
228Cf. Munk (2003), p. 48.
229Cf. Zakamouline (2005), p. 334, Munk (1997), chapter 5. Tapiero/Sulem (1994) provide a
comprehensive overview of numerical solution methods for stochastic control problems. Cf.
also Chow (1993) and Chow (1996) for a Lagrange-based method which is only applicable for
infinite horizon problems and will, therefore, not be considered.
230Cf. Munk (1997), chapter 5. For an application of the finite element method in the context of
portfolio optimization cf. Muthuraman/Kumar (2006) and Muthuraman (2007).
231For the application in portfolio/consumption problems cf. Munk (1997) and Munk (2003).
232Cf. Munk (1997), chapter 5, Munk (2003), pp. 51-57, and Kushner/Dupuis (1992), chapter 5.
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
hi ji 2 N0
	
be such a controlled discrete Markov chain on a discrete state spaceRnh
with time steps i 2 N0. Throughout this text, finite difference type approximation
of the continuous stochastic process will be used.233 For that type of approximation,
the state spaceRnh is a uniform h-grid on Rn, i.e.
Rnh :=
(
x 2 Rnjx =
nX
i=1
kieih; ki 2 Z
)
;
where ei is the i-th unit coordinate vector and the parameter h is the discretization
parameter that determines the discrete steps of the state space.234 To simplify nota-
tion, I will drop the super- and subscript h where possible. The set of states Z(y)
that can evolve from a given state y is defined as
Z(y) := fz 2 Rnj9i : z = y  eih or 9i; j 6= i : z = y  eih ejhg
The stochastic evolution of the Markov chain  will be governed by transition
probabilities p(y; zju) with y; z 2 Rn and u as control. p(y; zju) defines the proba-
bility of the Markov chain to evolve from the state y to the state z over the next time
step, given the control u is applied in state y.
Let ui = u(i) be the control at time step i. The sequence u = (ui)i2N0 is
called an admissible control for  if u 2 U  Rn, if  is a Markov chain and if  is
controlled by u. Denote the set of admissible controls for  with the initial condition
0 = y as A(0; y).
For the discretization of time, I assume, for simplicity, fixed time steps  with
number of time steps N = T , where T is the finite time horizon. N is then the
number of time steps. The point in time ti is then given by ti = i   , i 2 N0.
233Cf. Munk (1997), chapter 5.5, for details on the finite difference type approximation.
234The state space is uniform because the distance between two states is equal for all dimensions. I
restrict the state space to the uniform case for the ease of computation. Cf. Munk (1997), chapter
5, for a non-uniform definition.
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Value Function and Convergence
In the finite horizon case with discrete space and discrete time approximation the
criterion to minimize (the discrete analogy to equation 4.5) is
J(ti; y;u) = E
"
N 1X
j=i
exp
(
 
j 1X
k=i
(tk; k; uk)
)
L(j; uj)
+exp
(
 
N 1X
k=i
(tk; k; uk)
)
	(N )
 i = y
#
The approximation to the continuous time value function is then given by
V (ti; y) = sup
u2A(ti;y)
J(ti; y;u) (4.11)
The objective is to choose the Markov chain approximation, i.e., the transition
probabilities, in a way that the discrete value function 4.11 converges to the ana-
logue continuous value function if h approaches 0 for all states y 2 Rn. This is the
case if the conditional mean and variances of the Markov chain approximation con-
verge to the drift and the variance term of the continuous process.235 A definition
of a Markov chain that converges to the price process in equation 4.1 is given in the
next section.
4.2.2. Explicit Approximation for Finite Horizon Problems
For a finite horizon stochastic control problem, this section provides the sufficient
transition probabilities. The probabilities will be specified such that the time ap-
pears as an explicit variable.236 In this case, the discrete dynamic programming
equation for the value function in equation 4.11 becomes
V (ti; y) = sup
u2A(ti;y)
(
e (ti;y;u)
X
z2Z
p(y; zju)V (ti+1; z) + L(ti; y; u)
)
(4.12)
with boundary condition V (T; y) = 	(y). Equation 4.12 is quite intuitive. The
value of the current state y contains two parts: the first part consists of the dis-
235For more details on the convergence cf. Munk (1997), chapter 5.3, and Kushner/Dupuis (1992),
chapters 9, 10 for finite horizon problems 12.
236Cf. Munk (1997), chapter 5.7. Munk (1997), chapter 5.7, also provides sufficient probabilities if
time is considered as an implicit variable.
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counted sum of all values V (z) of all potential next states z, multiplied with the
probabilities p(y; zju) conditional under the action u with which these states will be
attained. The second part represents the utility or cost L(ti; y; u) of the current state
y and action u for the duration  . The optimal solution is the one that maximizes
equation 4.12.
The problem represented in this value function can be solved with a backward
iteration algorithm.237 With that algorithm, the solution starts at the finite horizon
T to find the optimal control and value function of the finite horizon state. Using
these solutions, one can then move backwards to T    to find the optimal control
and value function again. This continues until ti = 0.
Let  and  be the drift and variance terms in the continuous time state process
dy = (t; y(t); u(t))dt+ (t; y(t); u(t))dB(t):
 and  depend on time t, the current state y(t), and the control u(t). To simplify
the notation, I will drop the explicit time dependence of the state y and the control
u. Let
Ai(tk; y; u) := i(tk; y; u)
Bij(tk; y; u) := iji(tk; y; u)j(tk; y; u)
Then the transition probabilities p(y; zju) are the following:
p(y; yju; tk) = 1  
nX
i=1
1
h2
Bii(tk; y; u) + 
nX
i=1
nX
j=1;j 6=i
1
2h2
jBij(tk; y; u)j
  
nX
i=1
1
h
jAi(tk; y; u)j (4.13)
p(y; y  eihju; tk) =  1
2h2
Bii(tk; y; u)  
nX
j=1;j 6=i
1
2h2
jBij(tk; y; u)j
+ 
1
h
Ai (tk; y; u) (4.14)
237Cf. Munk (1997), chapter 5.7.1.
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p(y; y + eih+ ejhju; tk) = p(y; y   eih  ejhju; tk) =  1
2h2
B+ij (tk; y; u); j 6= i
(4.15)
p(y; y   eih+ ejhju; tk) = p(y; y + eih  ejhju; tk) =  1
2h2
B ij (tk; y; u); j 6= i
(4.16)
p(y; zju; tk) = 0 for z =2 Z(y) [ fyg (4.17)
Here B+ = max(B; 0) and B  = max( B; 0). To ensure that equations 4.13 to
4.17 define a probability measure, the relation

 
nX
i=1
1
h2
Bii(tk; y; u) +
nX
i=1
1
h
jAi(tk; y; u)j  
nX
i=1
nX
j=1;j 6=i
1
2h2
jBij(tk; y; u)j
!
< 1
(4.18)
has to hold for all k, y, and u. This ensures that the probability 4.13 remains pos-
itive. One way to achieve this is to select  small enough so that condition 4.18
holds. However, this can be very disadvantageous from a numerical standpoint be-
cause it might imply a large number of time steps. It might also be necessary to
restrict the control space U so that for a given  condition 4.18 holds.
4.2.3. Finite Horizon Portfolio Optimization
This section will describe the solution of the standard portfolio problem outlined in
section 4.1.1 using the Markov chain approximation method outlined above.238
Model Setup
I will consider the portfolio problem without consumption where utility is derived
from terminal wealth only with a power utility function. Therefore L(j; uj) = 0
and 	(N ) =
1

(N )
 . The time preference factor (tk; k; uk) is set to 0 to avoid
time-dependence of the solution.
Let
dX(t) =
 
nX
i=1
Hi(t)i
!
dt+
nX
i=1
Hi(t)idBi
be the continuous time wealth process, whereHi(t) is the amount of money held in
Asset i at time t, with
Pn
i=1Hi(t) = X(t) and time-independent parameters i and
238Cf. Munk (1997), chapter 6, and Munk (2003) for another application of Markov chains for
portfolio optimization.
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i.239 As the model parameters are not time-dependent, I will restrict the portfolio
optimization to the last period, i.e., from N   1 to N .
Parameter Values
For computational simplicity, the portfolio consists of two assets only. For the re-
mainder of this section, the following numerical values will be used. Asset 1 has
a yield of 1 = 0:1 and asset 2 has a yield of 2 = 0:05. The covariance matrix
between both assets is given as 
2:25 0:825
0:825 1:21
!
:
The risk aversion factor is  = 0:5.
The state space consists of two variables y1 and y2 which represent the current
holdings in each asset. It is by definition restricted to [0; 1]  [0; 1] with h = 1=30
for both assets. Hence, in total there are 900 states. The total assets are, therefore,
X = y1 + y2. The finite horizon is set to T = 1, the number of time steps is set to
N = 10000. The control space for the control u = (H1; H2) is restricted to
U := fu 2 [H;H]2 : H1(t) +H2(t) = X(t)g (4.19)
with H =  1:5 and H = 1:5.
In order to simplify numerical computations, the problem in two controls can be
reduced to a problem in one control. The control space U in equation 4.19 allows
for the substitution of one control as
H2 = X  H1:
With this substitution, the problem must only be solved for H1.
Numerical Solution
Figure 4.2a depicts the visual inspection of the probability condition in equation
4.18. It displays the value of the left-hand side of equation 4.18 for all admissible
values of the two controls. In this case, as outlined above, the controls are restricted
239wi(t) =
Hi(t)
X(t) represents the share of wealth invested in the i-th asset at time t. With this, the
numerical solutions can easily be compared to the closed-form solution in equation 4.10.
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Figure 4.2.: Probability condition and optimal portfolio policy in Markov chain ap-
proximation. (Source: own calculation)
to the interval [ 1:5; 1:5]. For the combination of N and the control space the
figure indicates that condition 4.18 holds. The value function in equation 4.12 has
a convex shape for the set of admissible controls which allows for robust numerical
solutions.
Figure 4.2b depicts the typical solution of the outlined standard portfolio prob-
lem. The graph shows that the share of total wealth wi(t) invested in each stock
remains constant for all values of total assets.240 In absolute terms, this would mean
an increasing investment in both assets for increasing assets under management.
The numerical solution is sufficiently close to the analytical solution. For the
20-th state in both variables, which is approximately at a state value of 0:63, the an-
alytical solution gives for H1 and H2 the values 0:2680 and 0:7320. The numerical
solution at that state is very close with 0:2673 and 0:7327.
240The numerical solution entails a distortion for very small total assets close to 0. Therefore, the
graphs shows the optimal shares only from the fifth state on which is roughly 0:13. A similar
distortion is visible in Munk (2003), e.g., p. 79, figure 1.
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4.3. Discrete Time Models
For rather complex portfolio optimization problems, neither the continuous time
framework nor Markov chain approximations might be feasible to find solutions.
It then might be appropriate to revert to single or multiple period discrete mod-
eling. Even though such models, in particular single-period models, are not very
realistic, they are often suited to understanding basic interrelationships.241 More-
over, they are usually mathematically simpler and multiperiod discrete models are
widely used in the financial industry.242 An approach that is intuitive and easy to
implement243 is the lattice binomial approach for a single risky asset developed by
Cox/Ross/Rubinstein (1979) and later extended by Boyle (1988) and Boyle/Evine/
Gibbs (1989) for multiple risky assets. This approach was initially developed in the
field of option pricing.244 He (1991) demonstrates the use of trinomial and general
multinomial processes in the context of portfolio optimization.245
This section presents portfolio solutions using binomial and trinomial models. It
omits a more general outline of the theoretical concepts.246 In particular, the latter
will be used in chapter 6 as a benchmark for comparison.
4.3.1. Multinomial Portfolio Models
Let there be i = 1; : : : ; n risky assets whose multninomial discrete price process
Pi(t) is recursively defined as
Pi(t) =
8<:Pi;0 if t = 1Pi(t  1)  si if t > 1: (4.20)
where Pi;0 is the initially given price in t = 0 of the i-th asset. si is a discrete
random variable withK different states k = 1; : : : ; K representing the return of the
i-th asset from t  1 to t. Every state will be reached with the probability p(k); k =
1; : : : ; K. For K = 3 this price process is said to be trinomial. The realization of
a particular price processes is marked in each t with the argument k = 1; : : : ; K
241Cf. Pliska (1997), p. 1.
242Cf. Pliska (1997), pp. 1, 72 and 100.
243Cf. Boyle (1988), p. 2f.
244Cf. e.g., Korn/Korn (2001), pp. 205-215.
245Cf. He (1991), pp. 345-355.
246For an outline of the general theory please refer to e.g., Pliska (1997), chapter 3. Other references
are Cox/Ross/Rubinstein (1979), He (1991), and Korn/Korn (2001), pp. 205-215.
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for the realization of the stochastic variable, si(k), and t = 1; : : : ; Kt 1 for the
realization of the price, Pi(t; t), and dependent variables, e.g., asset holdings. A
riskless asset integrates well into this framework. If the riskless asset i provides a
riskless rate of r, the return factors si(k) change to
si(k) = 1 + r k = 1; : : : ; K:
This price process has the form of a tree.247 At each point in time, the discrete
randam variable si determines which path of the tree to follow to the next period.
Figure 4.3 depicts the functional values of a trinomial process over two periods, i.e.,
with t 2 f1; 2; 3g using the common tree picture. After three periods the price can
have one out of 9 possible final states. At each point in time, one state of nature is
realized in the price tree as depicted in figure 4.3 and some other states of nature
become unreachable. In the trinomial model in figure 4.3, at time t = 1 all prices in
t = 2 and t = 3 are possible. If in t = 2, for example, the second state realizes, i.e.,
Pi(2; 2) = Pi(1; 1)  si(2) is the current price, only the prices Pi(3; 4), Pi(3; 5), and
Pi(3; 6) become reachable at t = 3, until finally in t = 3 the state 4 is realized and
the price reaches Pi(3; 4).
The investor holdsNi(t) number of shares of the i-th asset over the period t to t+1
for all t = 1; : : : ; T   1.248 Negative values of Ni(t) correspond to short positions
in that particular asset. Ni(t), respectively the vector N(t) = (N1(t); : : : ; Nn(t)),
is the control to the state process representing total wealth. The investor arrives
in t with a total wealth before transactions and consumption, indicated with the
superscript a,249 of
Xa(t) =
8<:X0 if t = 1Pn
i=1Ni(t  1)  Pi(t) if t > 1:
(4.21)
with previous portfolio holdings Ni(t   1) and current prices Pi(t). The initial
portfolio value is given externally as X0.250 In t, the investor consumes the amount
247Cf. for a trinomial example He (1991), pp. 345-347. Cf. Shreve (2004), pp. 2 and 8 for binomial
models.
248This notation and the following definitions of total wealth and consumption are consistent with
e.g., Merton (1990), p. 125. Cf. Pliska (1997) for a different notation where the investor decides
at t  1 about the investment for the period t  1 till t.
249The superscript a stands for ante.
250For simplicity, it is assumed here that this value is given without specifying whether it con-
tains assets or cash. This will be relevant in the model with price impact in chapter 6 and will,
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Pi(1, 1)
Pi(2, 1) = Pi(1, 1) · si(1)
Pi(2, 2) = Pi(1, 1) · si(2)
Pi(2, 3) = Pi(1, 1) · si(3)
Pi(3, 1) = Pi(2, 1) · si(1)
Pi(3, 2) = Pi(2, 1) · si(2)
Pi(3, 3) = Pi(2, 1) · si(3)
Pi(3, 4) = Pi(2, 2) · si(1)
Pi(3, 5) = Pi(2, 2) · si(2)
Pi(3, 6) = Pi(2, 2) · si(3)
Pi(3, 7) = Pi(2, 3) · si(1)
Pi(3, 8) = Pi(2, 3) · si(2)
Pi(3, 9) = Pi(2, 3) · si(3)
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3
Figure 4.3.: Trinomial tree model with two periods. Bold lines and shaded boxes
indicate the realization of an example price process. (Source: Own
illustration. For a similar tree with two assets cf. He (1991), p. 347)
c(t) financed by transactions which is expressed in the budget constraint
nX
i=1
Ni(t  1)  Pi(t)  c(t) =
nX
i=1
Ni(t)  Pi(t):
Their wealth after consumption and transaction, indicated by the superscript p,251 is
given by
Xp(t) =
nX
i=1
Ni(t)  Pi(t):
Of particular interest in the following analysis will be the share of wealth invested
in a certain asset. This share is defined as
wi(t) =
Ni(t)  Pi(t)
Xp(t)
:
therefore, be discussed there.
251The superscript p stands for post.
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In analogy to the continuous time case, the criterion to maximize is252
J(X0) = EX0
(
T 1X
t=1
L(t; c(t)) + 	(T;Xa(T ))
)
(4.22)
subjected to the self-financing constraint253
Xa(t)  c(t) = Xp(t) t = 1; : : : ; T   1: (4.23)
According to equation 4.22, the investor consumes until T   1 and derives utility
in T only from terminal wealth, which can then be measured as Xa(T ). The self-
financing constraint 4.23 ensures that the same amount of wealth is invested with
the transaction that is available before the transactions in t.254
Given the definition of the price process as a multinomial process, the criterion
to maximize in equation 4.22 can be specified to
J(X0) =
TX
t=1
Kt 1X
t=1
~p(t)L(t; c(t; t)) +
KT 1X
T=1
~p(T )	(T;X
a(T; T )): (4.24)
s.t.
Xa(t; t)  c(t; t) = Xp(t; t) t = 1; : : : ; T   1; t = 1; : : : ; Kt 1: (4.25)
with ~p(t) as probability of state t given by multiplying all probabilities along the
path in the tree till t.
Several approaches are available to arrive at closed-form solutions of the model
in equations 4.24 and 4.25.255 First, to arrive at algebraic solutions dynamic pro-
gramming in discrete time could be used.256 In a multinomial model as outlined
above, the value function can be calculated with a backward iteration algorithm.
With multiple periods and complex model equations, this will become increasingly
difficult.257 Another option to solve the maximization problem is to use a Lagrange
252For simplicity, I omit the time preference factor, cf. e.g., Pliska (1997), p. 163, for a criterion to
maximize with time preference factor.
253Unlike in Pliska (1997), p. 149, there is no need for an additional constraint Xpre(1; ) = X0
because that is already part of the definition of Xpre in equation 4.21.
254Cf. Pliska (1997), p. 82.
255Cf. Pliska (1997), pp. 149-162.
256Cf. Pliska (1997), pp. 153-155.
257Cf. Pliska (1997), p. 155.
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approach with equations 4.24 and 4.25.258 However, depending on the structure of
the problem, the number of periods and assets, this can even be more difficult.259
The martingale approach is another solution approach.260
Because the model with price effects is rather complex, I will use numerical so-
lution methods directly on equations 4.24 and 4.25.261 The optimization problem
in equations 4.24 will be solved for a given set of parameters using the constraints
in 4.25. The disadvantage of such numerical optimizations is that it is often im-
possible to ensure global optimality of a specific solution unless the maximization
criterion satisfies certain conditions, for example, convexity or concavity in all vari-
ables. However, to provide reliable solution values, I have probed the optimization
problems with several parameter values not reported in this text, in particular arti-
ficial constraints to force the algorithm outside the initial solution space and small
changes in parameter values to monitor solution values. Even though this cannot
exclude local optima, it can at least ensure plausible values and reduce the danger
of tapping into a local optimum.
4.3.2. Discussion of Numerical Results
After describing the general methodology of multinomial portfolio models in the
previous section, this section will provide results of standard portfolio problems
using trinomial specifications. I will focus on pure portfolio problems without con-
sumption because these models will be the focus of analysis in chapter 6.
In analogy to section 4.2.2, I will consider a portfolio problem without consump-
tion where utility is derived from terminal wealth only with a CRRA utility func-
tion.262 Hence, let L(t; c(t; t)) = 0 and
	(T;Xa(T; T )) =
1

(Xa(T; T ))
 :
Let K = 3 and T = 3; i.e. a trinomial two-period portfolio optimization problem.
258Cf. Pliska (1997), pp. 150-151.
259Cf. Pliska (1997), p. 152.
260Cf. Pliska (1997), section 5.2.
261Cf. to Appendix B for the implementation of the numerical solution method.
262The CRRA utility function has the advantage of a constant relative risk aversion, i.e. the risk
aversion does not depend on the size of the portfolio. This is especially helpful for the numerical
analysis in chapter 6. If the portfolio structure with capital flows and price effects deviates from
the standard deviation, this deviation is then due to these characteristics and not due to a different
risk aversion triggered by altering portfolio sizes.
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Pi,0 Pi(1, 1)
Pi(2, 2)
Pi(3, 4)
Ni(1, 1)
Ni(2, 2)
X0 X
a(1, 1) X
a(2, 2)
Xa(3, 4)
Xp(2, 2)Xp(1, 1)
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Figure 4.4.: Portfolio optimization problem in discrete time framework with two
periods. The dark grey bar, the terminal wealth, represents the target
of the maximization. The light grey bars represent the controls that
achieve the maximum terminal wealth. (Source: Own illustration)
The maximization problem can now be specified to
max
N(1);N(2)
9X
3=1
~p(3)
1

(Xa(3; 3))

subject to
Xa(t; t) = X
p(t; t) t = 1; 2; t = 1; : : : ; 9:
Figure 4.4 illustrates this optimization problem. It shows the three components
price process, control, and the wealth process. For price process the example from
figure 4.3 is used. The holdings represent the control. The last row shows the two
definitions of portfolio value, Xa and Xp. The horizontal alignment of prices and
holdings indicate that the portfolio value Xa(t; t) is calculated based on holdings
Ni(t  1; t) and prices Pi(t; t) whereas the portfolio valueXp(t; t) is calculated
based onNi(t; t) and the same prices Pi(t; t). Note that the initial wealth is given
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Parameter Description Value
X0 Initial assets under management 1,000,000.00
P1;0 First asset, initial price 100.00
P2;0 Second asset, initial price 100.00
s1(k) First asset, multiplying factor 1.07, 1.01, 0.96
s2(k) Second asset, multiplying factor 0.98, 1.01, 1.05
p(k) Probability for first state 13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3
 Risk aversion factor for utility function 0.5
Table 4.1.: Parameter values of the standard trinomial model. (Source: Own illus-
tration)
as X0 and no initial number of shares is specified because by definition Xa(1; 1) =
X0.
Results for the Trinomial Model Without Riskless Asset
Numerical solutions will be provided for a single- and two-period model. Models
with more periods do not add additional insight as the solutions are identical to
those of the single- and two-period models. A trinomial model will be used in
order to investigate the investment strategy with two risky assets. The parameter
values are summarized in table 4.1. The standard deviation of the first risky asset is
higher than that of the second risky asset. The assets are almost perfectly negatively
correlated with a correlation coefficient of  0:99. Such an extreme parameter was
selected because it allowed rather stable numerical optimizations, in particular in
conjunction with price effects in chapter 6.263 The first asset performs well in states
in which the second asset performs poorly and vice versa. All states are reached
with the same probability. The risk aversion parameter is arbitrarily set to 0:5. With
these parameter settings, the model is arbitrage-free.264
Figure 4.5 reports the results for the single-period as well as the two-period
model. Given the parameter settings above, the investor invests less in the asset
with the higher standard deviation. They also invest the same share of wealth in
all the periods of the two-period models. In the two-period model, the number of
263For a derivation of return factors in a trinomial case from explicit values for return, standard
deviation and correlation, cf. He (1991), pp. 345-347.
264Regarding arbitrage-free multiperiod models cf. Pliska (1997), pp. 92-96.
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t = 2
Number
of
shares
Relative
weight of
shares
(in percent)
6.111
3.889
Asset 1 Asset 2
5.9076.1116.3296.111
4.1123.8893.6893.889
κ1 = 1 κ2 = 1 κ2 = 2 κ2 = 3
t = 1
κ1 = 1
t = 1
Single-period model Double-period model
t = 2
61,11
38,89
61,1161,1161,1161,11
38,8938,8938,8938,89
κ1 = 1 κ2 = 1 κ2 = 2 κ2 = 3
t = 1
κ1 = 1
t = 1
Ni(t, κt)
wi(t, κt)
Figure 4.5.: Results for the standard portfolio optimization problem in discrete time
framework with one and two periods. (Source: Own calculations)
shares invested in the second period changes, due to the changed wealth at the end
of the first period depending on the realized state k.
Discrete time models will be considered in chapter 6 to analyze the influence of
price effects on the optimal portfolio policies. Prior to this, the following chapter
5 will investigate the effect of compensation and capital flows in continuous time
models.
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5. Portfolio Policies under
Compensation and Capital
Flow
After an outline of the methodological basis to solve portfolio problems in the pre-
vious chapter, this chapter will address the research questions in a continuous time
model using dynamic programming and Markov chain approximations. After a dis-
cussion of related literature and a presentation of the general setup of the portfolio
optimization models used, section 5.3 addresses the problem of optimal portfolio
policies under management fee and capital flow. It contains a linear model and
closed-form solutions are compared with results from standard portfolio problems
presented in the previous chapter. Section 5.4 provides solutions for optimal port-
folio policies in more complex, nonlinear setups. Results are also discussed from
the primary investor perspective and are probed whether they can explain observed
investment strategies of institutional investors.
5.1. Related Research
5.1.1. Compensation and Portfolio Optimization
Starks (1987) investigates the effect of symmetric and asymmetric performance fees
on investment decisions of portfolio managers. A symmetric performance fee re-
wards the portfolio manager if the performance of their portfolio exceeds that of a
benchmark portfolio. The symmetric performance fee penalizes the portfolio man-
ager if their portfolio falls behind the benchmark. An asymmetric performance fee
rewards the good performance of the portfolio manager, however does not penalize
them for bad performance. In his single-period setup with general utility functions,
the portfolio manager’s fund is perfectly correlated with the market portfolio, which
69
5. Portfolio Policies under Compensation and Capital Flow
also functions as the benchmark portfolio. He finds that in such a setup a symmetric
performance fee does not induce the portfolio manager to increase the level of risk
(the  of the fund). They will invest so that their utility curve is tangential to the
security market line. With an asymmetric performance fee however, the portfolio
manager will always invest more at higher risk (choose a higher ) than the primary
investor.265
Stoughton (1993) analyzes the effect of linear and nonlinear compensation
schemes as an incentive for the portfolio manager to extend their efforts. Com-
pensation is based on current wealth, analogous to the linear management fee used
in this section. Stoughton (1993) uses a single-period agency-theoretic model in
which the agent can influence the quality of their expectations about future returns
by expanding or restricting their efforts. He finds that with a linear contract the
agent does not expend their full efforts. Even worse, the efforts of the portfolio
manager cannot be extended with a higher linear share of benefits for the portfolio
manager (unlike in typical agency frameworks). A quadratic contract, on the other
hand, can reduce the agency conflict. The portfolio manager is compensated based
on the difference between the actual outcome of the state of nature and a signal that
the agent should disclose to the primary investor. These quadratic contracts are even
asymptotically optimal for very risk-tolerant primary investors.
Roll (1992) analyzes portfolio decisions of a portfolio manager who is compen-
sated based on their portfolio’s tracking error with regard to a benchmark portfolio.
Roll (1992) argues that a portfolio with minimal tracking error indicates persis-
tent outperformance of the portfolio manager over the benchmark, given that the
tracking target is set above the benchmark. With such compensation, the portfolio
manager will try to minimize the variance of the tracking error. Figure 5.1 illus-
trates the main results of this single-period model in the common    -diagram.
Unless the benchmark portfolio is a globally efficient portfolio, i.e., it lies on the
efficient frontier, the managed portfolio will not be efficient. The benchmark port-
folio defines a new efficient frontier to the right of the globally efficient frontier.
Naturally, if all portfolios on this efficient frontier are dominant, the investment of
the portfolio manager is inefficient. The same applies if additional restrictions are
imposed on the -factor of the managed portfolio. His results are very similar to
those presented in this work, however the underlying models are different.
265Starks (1987) extends the model such that the actions of the portfolio manager are accompanied
by costs. In such a situation, their effort level is suboptimal from the perspective of the primary
investor. This situation is aggravated in the case of asymmetric performance fees.
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Figure 5.1.: Efficient frontier and optimal portfolio for a tracking error minimizing
portfolio manager. (Source: Roll (1992), p. 16.)
Admati/Pfleiderer (1997) extend the model of Roll (1992) and include private in-
formation on the side of the professional portfolio manager. Assuming, similar to
Roll (1992), a benchmark-oriented compensation, they show that this will lead to
an inefficient portfolio in most circumstances. This is due to two effects: first, the
level of risk aversion can be different for the portfolio manager and for the primary
investor.266 Second, due to the benchmark-adjusted compensation element the port-
folio manager partly realizes the benchmark portfolio. In addition to the analysis
of the portfolio structure, Admati/Pfleiderer (1997) also study whether benchmark-
adjusted compensation can reduce moral hazard and adverse selection arising from
the private information of the portfolio manager. Their results are overall negative.
Benchmark-adjusted compensation even reduces the level of effort of the portfolio
manager and is not helpful to discriminate between the informed portfolio manager
and the uninformed.
Nietert (1996) uses a continuous time setup similar to the setup in this work. In
his models, a portfolio manager maximizes expected utility from compensation.267
This compensation is defined as a fixed fraction of terminal wealth and alternatively
266Admati/Pfleiderer (1997) model both as risk-averse with an exponential utility function but dif-
ferent risk aversion factors. Cf. Admati/Pfleiderer (1997), p. 328 f.
267Cf. Nietert (1996), p. 31.
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as a fixed fraction of continuous wealth.268 The compensation is distributed to the
portfolio manager but not deduced from the portfolio value. Nietert (1996) provides
closed-form solutions for the finite horizon as well as the infinite horizon case. In
all cases, the optimal portfolio policy is identical to the solution in Merton (1971)
presented in section 4.1.2.269 Unlike in Nietert (1996), the models in this work will
implement compensation that is deducted from the portfolio value.
A continuous time analysis of delegated portfolio management in the context of
symmetric information is presented by Ou-Yang (2003).270 He finds that an opti-
mal contract is symmetric, i.e., it penalizes and rewards the portfolio manager in a
symmetric way. The contract should depend on the current wealth as well as on the
portfolio’s excess return compared to an active, i.e., time-varying, benchmark index
and reward the portfolio manager at the end of the period. Ou-Yang (2003) develops
this solution in a framework in which the portfolio manager incurs quadratic costs
based on the portfolio structure and linear costs based on the wealth level using an
exponential utility function. This cost structure implies that the portfolio manager
faces larger costs the more they invest in certain stocks. Even though this cost struc-
ture is usual in principal-agent frameworks, its viability in this particular context is
not empirically grounded.
Kraft/Korn (2008) provide a similar analysis to Ou-Yang (2003), but they use a
contract including a quadratic deviation from a benchmark to solve an agency con-
flict for a general class of utility functions. Kraft/Korn (2008) show that a quadratic
or option-like contract that compensates the portfolio manager at the end of the
contract can solve the agency conflict and induce the portfolio manager to seek the
first best solution, i.e., as if the primary investor could control their actions. Such a
quadratic contract includes a linear component, the typical risk-sharing compensa-
tion of principal agent models. The quadratic term, that penalizes deviations from
a benchmark portfolio, forces the portfolio manager not to deviate from the linear
compensation part. Generally, the growth optimal portfolio will serve as a sufficient
benchmark portfolio.
268Cf. Nietert (1996), p. 31f.
269Cf. Nietert (1996), pp. 37, 45, and 47.
270Other continuous time models of delegated portfolio management are Cvitanic/Wan/
Zhang (2006) and Cadenillas/Cvitanic/Zapatero (2007). However, in their models, the portfolio
manager can influence the drift of the underlying stochastic process with their level of effort.
This is not a situation, I will consider here.
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5.1.2. Capital Flows and Portfolio Optimization
Karceski (2002) provides a model that incorporates capital flows into the investment
decision of the portfolio manager. In his single-period model with actively and
passively managed funds, the portfolio manager faces linear flow depending on the
general market performance. Additionally, primary investors shift capital from a
passive fund towards an active fund based on its outperformance, while penalizing
a high variance of the tracking error. To simplify the model, the portfolio manager
can only invest in two types of stocks with low- and high-beta characteristics. The
active portfolio manager maximizes the expected assets under management, hence
they are risk-neutral.271 As a result, the portfolio manager tilts their investments
in high-beta, i.e., riskier stocks. Karceski (2002) explains this behavior by the fact
that the portfolio investor has the chance to outperform the market in the case of a
positive general market development. In such a situation, they would benefit from
higher aggregate equity inflows.
In a working paper Hugonnier/Kaniel (2010) develop a continuous time multi-
period model of a single agent and a single principal without private information.272
They incorporate capital flow generated from the assumption that the primary in-
vestor is unable to invest directly in risky assets but only through the professional
portfolio manager. They choose a setup in which the amount invested at higher risk
is equal to the Sharpe ratio.273 Hugonnier/Kaniel (2010) distinguish two cases with
the parameters driving the stochastic price process constant or time-dependent. In
the case of constant parameters, the amount invested in the risky asset is propor-
tional and the flow is reciprocal to the fee level. In the case of varying parameters,
the portfolio manager hedges against unfavorable shifts in the flow. They invest in
a way that the wealth of the investor is correlated with the Sharpe ratio: because
the portfolio manager will receive more capital if the Sharpe ratio is high, they will
get even more if at the same time the overall wealth of the primary investor is high.
Hugonnier/Kaniel (2010) do not investigate the efficiency of the portfolio.
271Karceski (2002) does not use a typical utility function for the portfolio manager. Cf.
Karceski (2002), p. 564.
272Hugonnier/Kaniel (2010) use backward stochastic differential equations to solve their model.
273Hugonnier/Kaniel (2010) model a myopic investor with log- utility. Cf. Hugonnier/
Kaniel (2010), p. 188.
73
5. Portfolio Policies under Compensation and Capital Flow
Private 
investor
Portfolio
manager
Fund
Stocks…
Risk-
less 
asset
Investment
Management
Compensation
Private investor
– Is rational utility maximizer of 
terminal wealth
– Can independently invest in 
riskless asset
– Delegates investment decision 
about risky stocks, can 
continuously contribute or 
withdraw capital to or from fund
– Possesses only limited 
information about fund
Portfolio manager
– Is rational utility maximizer of 
management fee
– Decides independently about 
investment strategy for risky 
assets
– Receives proportional 
management fee, withdrawn from 
assets under management
Situation of delegated investment decision
b
d
a
f
g
e
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
c
1
2
n
Figure 5.2.: General model setup of delegated portfolio management under com-
pensation and capital flows. (Source: Own illustration)
5.2. The Situation of Delegation
The general model setup, illustrated in figure 5.2, is the following: the primary
investor decides to delegate their investment decisions concerning the risky assets
to a portfolio manager. The investment possibilities of the portfolio manager are
restricted to these risky assets only, they cannot invest in the risk-free asset. Within
the set of risky assets, their investments are not restricted, they can invest in the
same n risky assets as the primary investor could do, both short and long. However,
the primary investor might invest in the riskless asset by themselves.
The primary investor and the portfolio investor have the same information about
the market.274 Both have the same information about the expected drift of asset
prices , its standard deviations , and the correlations  between them. However,
the primary investor cannot control the exact investment of the professional investor.
They can only infer from the resulting performance which includes the realization
of a random event. They do not use any bonding or monitoring to influence the
274This is a homogeneous expectations setting, cf. Kraft/Korn (2008).
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professional investor’s behavior.275
The contract between the primary investor and the portfolio manager is not rene-
gotiable and lasts for the whole investment period [0; T ]. The primary investor
transfers their wealth at the beginning of the period to the professional investor and
receives the resulting wealth back at the end of the period. The primary investor
compensates the professional investor for their efforts with a fixed fraction  of the
portfolio wealth over the course of the investment until the end of the fixed invest-
ment period. There is no additional terminal compensation. Both share the same
utility function but with potentially different risk aversion parameter .
The contract allows the primary investor to reallocate their capital, i.e., to con-
tribute more capital to the portfolio manager or to withdraw capital. The decision
about the volume of capital allocated to the portfolio manager is influenced by the
general market performance and the investment performance of the portfolio man-
ager compared to a benchmark portfolio.
1. Capital market performance: depending on the overall performance of the
capital market, the primary investor adjusts their capital under management.
If the overall capital market is doing well above the expectations measured
with a - still to be defined - general market portfolio, the primary investor will
contribute new capital to the professional portfolio manager. If the overall
capital market is doing poorly below expectations, they will withdraw capital.
2. Investment performance: the primary investor delegates more or fewer of their
investment decisions to the portfolio manager depending on the past perfor-
mance of the portfolio manager. If the portfolio manager has achieved an
outperformance compared to a - still to be defined - benchmark portfolio,
they will delegate more of their capital. If the portfolio manager has un-
derperformed compared to the benchmark portfolio, they will delegate less.
A linear dependence on investment performance will be used in section 5.3.
Section 5.4 will provide solutions for nonlinear dependencies.
The model in section 5.3 comprises compensation and capital flow in a single setup,
due to methodological similarities. However, the solution for both conditions will
be discussed separately. The model in section 5.4, even though it contains compen-
sations, will focus on the effects of capital on the optimal portfolio policy.
275In an agency context, this is the classical setting of hidden action derived from hidden informa-
tion after contracting (moral hazard). There will be no hidden information before contracting,
i.e., no adverse selection problem.
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Figure 5.3.: Schematic illustration of capital flows. (Source: Own illustration)
5.3. Closed-Form Solution for Linear Model
5.3.1. Model Setup
Management Fee
The combined model is based on the wealth process 4.3 of the standard portfolio
optimization model. The wealth process in this case represents the total of all assets
under management of the portfolio manager. Consumption in the standard model is
replaced with the compensation of the portfolio manager. The portfolio manager is
allowed to withdraw the management fee X(t). This management fee is calculated
as a fixed fraction  based on the current assets under management X(t), i.e., the
value of the portfolio. The management fee is withdrawn from the portfolio value.
Capital Flow
The capital flow that influences the volume of assets under management of the port-
folio manager is modeled with two functions, see figure 5.3. The capital market
performance is represented by the development of a general market portfolio. Note
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that this general market portfolio is not necessarily the market portfolio in the sense
of classical portfolio optimization as the portfolio with only systematic risk. Let
the n-dimensional vector wM be this general market portfolio with elements wMi ,
i = 1; : : : ; n, as the percentage of total assets invested in asset i with ni=1wMi = 1.
dP (t) is the vector of price processes of all i = 1; : : : ;n risky assets according to
equation 4.1. The portfolio manager is affected by this portfolio because their assets
under management will increase or decrease depending on the performance of this
portfolio. The function
gM(t) = a  ni=1wMi
dPi(t)
Pi(t)
X(t)
models this influence. The structure of this equation is similar to Merton’s wealth
equation 4.2.
The past performance of the portfolio manager will be measured against a
benchmark portfolio wB, an n-dimensional vector of elements wBi representing
the percentage of total assets under management invested in the i-th asset with
ni=1wBi = 1. Using a linear relationship, the flow of funds related to the port-
folio manager’s performance can be expressed as
gB(t) = c  ni=1 [wi(t)  wBi ]
dPi(t)
Pi(t)
X(t) (5.1)
The total flow of capital g(t) = gM(t) + gB(t)therefore becomes
g(t) = a  ni=1wMi
dPi(t)
Pi(t)
X(t) + c  ni=1 [wi(t)  wBi ]
dPi(t)
Pi(t)
X(t)
With the price process from equation 4.1 this results in
g(t) = a 
nX
i=1
wMiiX(t)dt+ c 
nX
i=1
[wi(t)  wBi ]iX(t)dt
+ a 
nX
i=1
wMiiX(t)dBi + c 
nX
i=1
[wi(t)  wBi ]iX(t)dBi
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which can be simplified to
g(t) =
nX
i=1
(a  wMi + c  [wi(t)  wBi ])iX(t)dt
+
nX
i=1
(a  wMi + c  [wi(t)  wBi ])iX(t)dBi (5.2)
Assets Under Management Process
Taking together the management fee and the flow of funds, the assets under man-
agement develop according to
dX(t) =
 
nX
i=1
wi(t)i
!
X(t)dt  X(t)dt+ g(t) +
nX
i=1
wi(t)iX(t)dBi (5.3)
with g(t) according to equation 5.2.276 Note that the consumption in the standard
portfolio model is replaced with a fixed management fee X(t) that is deducted
from the assets under management. Using the definition of g(t), equation 5.3 can
be rearranged to
dX(t) =
"
nX
i=1
((1 + c)wi(t) + a  wMi   c  wBi)iX(t)  X(t)
#
dt
+
nX
i=1
((1 + c)wi(t) + a  wMi   c  wBi)iX(t)dBi
It should be noted that the management fee only has influence on the drift of
the overall process, whereas the flow of capital has influence both on the drift and
the stochastic factor of the assets under management process. Compared with the
standard problem in 4.3, two things have changed. First, consumption is replaced
with a fixed management fee. Second, not only the portfolio policy has an influence
on the drift and stochastic factor but also the general market portfolio wM and the
benchmark portfolio wB. It should also be noted that the factor c of the benchmark-
related flow scales the portfolio policies influence on drift and stochastic element.
276The state space is given by Q0 = [0; T )  R. The state process is not restricted to [0; T )  R+
to remain positive, however the solution will be such that the process is always positive.
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Minimization Criterion and HJB Equation
Let U = fu 2 [w;w]n : 10u = 1g be the control space for the control u(t) =
(w1(t); : : : ; wn(t)). The additional restriction 10u = 1 ensures that the total wealth
is invested. The criterion to maximize in this case is
J(t;X;u) = Et;X
Z T
t
L[s;X(t)]ds

The professional investor maximizes the utility derived from management fees that
depends on current wealth X(t) over the period of investment [t; T ]. There is no
utility from terminal wealth for the portfolio manager. They are only rewarded on a
permanent basis with management fee and no extra remuneration at the end of the
investment horizon.
Let
V (t;X) = sup
u2A(t;X)
J(t;X;u)
be the value function associated with the optimization problem 5.29. The HJB
equation for this problem can then be stated as
max
w2U
n
((1 + c)w(t) + a  wM   c  wB)
0
X(t)  X(t)

 VX(t;X)
+
1
2
((1 + c)w(t) + a  wM   c  wB)
0
 ((1 + c)w(t) + a  wM   c  wB)
X2(t)  VXX(t;X) + L(t;X) + Vt(t;X)
	
= 0: (5.4)
5.3.2. Optimal Portfolio Policy
To derive the optimal portfolio policy, I will follow a general three-step approach
proposed by Korn/Korn (2001) and Korn/Kraft (2004):277
1. Solve the optimization problem given by the HJB equation resulting in a can-
didate v for the optimal control.
2. Insert this candidate v into the HJB and develop a solutionW to the nonlin-
ear partial differential equation (HJB), i.e., a specification of the value func-
tion. The verification theorem ensures that this value function also solves the
original optimization problem.
277Cf. Korn/Korn (2001), p. 232 and Korn/Kraft (2004), p. 405.
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3. Check all assumptions made, in particular those necessary to apply the veri-
fication theorem.
Step 1: Optimal Control Candidates
Let the utility function in analogy to equation 4.6 be
L(t; X(t)) :=
1

e t [X(t)] : (5.5)
Compared to the standard utility function, the consumption argument is replaced
with the management fee for the investor.
Let the value function be strictly concave and the wealth process strictly positive.
I use the Lagrange approach to search for optimal control candidates. The Lagrange
approach will allow to incorporate the investment restriction
Pn
i=1wi(t) = 1 into
the optimization problem. The Lagrange function for equation 5.4 is
L := L[t;X(t)]+Vt+VX
h
((1 + c)w(t) + a  wM   c  wB)
0
  
i
X(t)+
1
2
VXX

h
((1 + c)w(t) + a  wM   c  wB)
0
 ((1 + c)w(t) + a  wM   c  wB)X(t)2
i
  0(1  10w(t))
including the budget constraint 1   10w(t) = 0 with the Lagrange factor 0. The
necessary conditions for optimality are therefore
0 = Lw(w) =  01+ VX(1 + c)X(t)
+ VXX(1 + c) ((1 + c)w(t) + a  wM   c  wB)X(t)2 (5.6)
0 = L0(w) = 1  10w (5.7)
0 =

((1 + c)w(t) + a  wM   c  wB)
0
(t)X(t)  X(t)

 VX(t;X)
+
1
2
((1 + c)w(t) + a  wM   c  wB)
0
 ((1 + c)w(t) + a  wM   c  wB)X2(t)
 VXX(t;X) + L(t;X) + Vt(t;X): (5.8)
Assuming a concave value function and a strictly positive assets under management
process, these conditions are also sufficient for the optimal solution. The optimal
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control candidate depending on the value function V develops to (see Appendix A)
w(t) = MV +
1
1 + c

VX
VXXX(t)

10 1 MV    1
  (a  wM   c  wB) + 10 (a  wM   c  wB) MV )
Solution to the HJB Equation
Using the approach
V (t;X) = f(t)  1

[X(t)] (5.9)
the optimal control results in (see Appendix A)
w(t) = MV +
1
1 + c

1
1  

 1  10 1 MV 
  (a  wM   c  wB) + 10 (a  wM   c  wB) MV )
Using 10wM = 1 and 10wB = 1 the above equation reduces to
w(t) = MV +
1
1 + c

1
1  

 1  10 1 MV 
  (a  wM   c  wB) + (a  c) MV ) (5.10)
The approach in 5.9 is a solution to the optimization problem with the factor
f(t) =
1
  + a 
 
e( +a)T   e( +a)t e at + ea(T t)
and
a = 

(1 + c)
10 1
10 11
+
(a  c)
10 11
10 1  
+
1
2
(   1)
 
(1 + c)2
1
10 11
+
(a  c)2
10 11
+ 2(1 + c)
(a  c)
10 11
!
+
1
2
1
(   1)
 
(10 1)2
10 11
  0 1
!#
:
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Checking Assumptions
All assumptions made are satisfied:278
 The wealth process X(t) with the optimal portfolio policy w(t) is the
unique strictly positive solution to the wealth process from equation 5.3 with
the optimal portfolio policy in A.8. The differential equation satisfies the
conditions on the coefficients of the stochastic process.279
 The optimal control w(t) is constant and, therefore, bounded in U .
 The value function, as the product of the strictly positive function f(t) and
the concave utility function, is strictly concave as well. It is, like the stan-
dard solution, a classical C1;2 solution and satisfies the polynomial growth
condition.280
For details on these assumptions cf. Appendix A.
5.3.3. Influence of Management Fee
This solution will be discussed in detail in this and the following two sections. I
will start to discuss the effect of the management fee without flow of capital. Then
I will discuss separately the influence of both capital flow effects in the following
two sections.
If no flow of capital is present, i.e., a = c = 0, then the general solution from
equation 5.10 becomes
w(t) = MV +
1
1  

 1  10 1 MV  (5.11)
This is essentially the same as the solution to the standard portfolio problem without
riskless asset in equation 4.9. Hence, the structure of the optimal portfolio for the
self-investing investor in equation 4.9 does not change if the investor is compensated
with a proportional management fee which is deducted from the portfolio value.281
278Cf. Korn/Korn (2001), p. 234, 239f.
279Regarding the conditions on the coefficients cf. Korn/Korn (2001), p. 224.
280Cf. Korn/Korn (2001), p. 239.
281Nietert (1996), pp. 37, 45, and 47, reports the same result if compensation is not deducted from
the portfolio in a framework as Merton (1971). Cf. also Wilhelm (1987), p. 197, for optimal
proportional compensation in an agency-theoretic framework.
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Figure 5.4.: Efficiency of delegated portfolios with management fee. Legend as in
figure 4.1. (Source: Own illustration)
Given the structural similarity of the situation with riskless asset, the same result
can be expected for this case.
However, from the perspective of the primary investor there are two caveats.
First, depending on the risk aversion factor , the portfolio manager will most
likely not invest in the same optimal portfolio as the primary investor would. In
most cases, the risk aversion of a portfolio manager will not be the same as that of
the primary investor.
Second, the potential identity of the optimal portfolios only holds if both can
invest in the same set of assets. In a typical situation, the primary investor will
delegate their investments in risky assets only and manage the investment in the
riskless asset by themselves. In such a situation the portfolio manager will most
likely not invest in the tangency portfolio. Figure 5.4 depicts the general situation
of the primary investor if the portfolio manager invests in risky assets only, whereas
the primary investor manages their investment in the riskless asset.
Assume that the portfolio manager realizes portfolio w based on their risk aver-
sion factor . The dashed line indicates the risk-return results of all available
portfolios for the primary investor by combining the risk-free asset with the del-
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egated portfolio. Clearly all these portfolios are inefficient compared to those on
the straight line above. If the primary investor does not adjust the amount of risky
investment, they realize the risk-return position Id in figure 5.4. The underlying
portfolio is inefficient as they could increase the return by  or decrease the stan-
dard deviation by  if they realized the corresponding portfolio on their original
investment line.
The portfolio manager will invest in the tangency portfolio only if their relative
risk aversion factor satisfies
1
1   =
1
10 1(  r1) ; (5.12)
or equivalently if
 = 1  10 1(  r1)
The risk aversion parameter  is equal to one minus the total amount of the risky
investment in case that the riskless asset exists.282
In the more general situation in which the portfolio manager does not invest in
the tangency portfolio, the primary investor could at least increase their utility by
adjusting the amount of risky investment if they knew the risk aversion or the invest-
ment strategy of the portfolio manager. Figure 5.5 illustrates this situation. They
could then maximize their utility by moving their utility curve downwards until
the dashed investment line is the tangency to the utility curve. This would lead to
the optimal portfolio I 0 in the situation of delegated investment. Compared to the
portfolio Id, the primary investor increases their derived utility. However, in the par-
ticular situation depicted in figure 5.5, this would imply investing more than 100%
282A short calculation verifies this. Substitute 5.12 into equation 5.11 and adjust the portfolio for
the amount 10

 1(  r1) invested in risky assets. Then 5.11 becomes
10

 1(  r1)  MV + 1
10 1(  r1)

 1  10 1 MV 
This term can be simplified (using the symmetry of the covariance matrix ) to
=10

 1(  r1) MV + 1  10 1 MV
=10 1 MV   r1
0 11
10 11
 11+ 1  10 1 MV
=  r 11+ 1
= 1(  r1)
This is the tangency portfolio structure from equation 4.7 of the primary investor.
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Figure 5.5.: Adjusted investment strategy to increase efficiency of delegated port-
folios with management fee. Legend as in figure 4.1. (Source: Own
illustration)
of their wealth in the delegated portfolio and finance the exceeding investment with
a credit. In such a situation, the primary investor would prefer to increase the risk-
iness of their investment by 0 and, therefore, receive an increase in the expected
return of 0.
5.3.4. Effects of Market Performance-Related Capital
Flows
A rearrangement of equation 5.10 separates the different capital flow effects:
w(t) = MV   1
1 + c
(awM   a MV ) + 1
1 + c
(cwB   c MV )
+
1
(1 + c)
1
1  
 
 1  10 1 MV  (5.13)
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Figure 5.6.: Efficiency of delegated portfolios with capital flow related to general
market performance. Legend as in figure 4.1. The parameter a is as-
sumed to be 1, therefore the adjusted efficient frontier crosses the port-
folio wM . (Source: Own illustration)
Let now a > 0 and c = 0, i.e. there is only capital flow related to the general market
condition. Equation 5.13 then reduces to
w(t) = MV   (awM   aMV ) + 1
1  
 
 1  10 1 MV  (5.14)
Compared to the solution without market performance-related capital flow, an ad-
ditional sub-portfolio incorporating the market portfolio is added. This portfolio is,
like the minimum-variance portfolio, independent of the investor’s risk aversion.
Figure 5.6 illustrates the structure of the optimal portfolio in a - diagram. For
illustration purposes, the portfolio wM is assumed to be non-efficient, i.e., it is lo-
cated below the efficient frontier of the primary investor. In addition, the parameter
a is assumed to be 1 in this illustration.283 The optimal portfolio w(t) of the port-
folio manager is then located on an efficient frontier below the efficient frontier of
283As result, the portfolio wM lies on the adjusted efficient frontier, displayed as the dotted line.
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the primary investor. This adjusted efficient frontier is determined by the term
MV   (awM(t)  a MV ) ;
which is independent of the risk aversion  and the standard return-oriented sub-
portfolio. This base portfolio has the same functionality as the minimum-variance
portfolio in the standard case. It differs from the minimum-variance portfolio in
the standard solution by the adjustments induced by the flow of capital regard-
ing the overall market performance. This adjustment subtracts the market port-
folio wM(t) with the magnitude a from the minimum-variance portfolio, just as the
return-oriented portfolio is subtracted from the minimum-variance portfolio in the
standard solution.
In effect, the professional investor ‘disinvests’ the market portfolio wM(t) in or-
der to hold the efficient portfolio after market-related capital flow. The professional
investor realizes an efficient portfolio after market-related flows as can be shown
with a short calculation:
w(t) + awM = MV   (awM   a MV )
+
1
1  
 
 1  10 1 MV + awM
= MV + a MV + 1
1  
 
 1  10 1 MV 
= (1 + a) MV + 1
1  
 
 1  10 1 MV  (5.15)
Of course, the flow of capital leads to a sum of the weights of this portfolio that is
not equal to one:
10 

(1 + a) MV + 1
1  
 
 1  10 1 MV  = 1 + a
Normalizing the portfolio in equation 5.15 with the factor 1
1+a
to one leads to
MV +
1
1 + a
1
1  
 
 1  10 1 MV 
Obviously, this portfolio is located on the efficient frontier.
From the portfolio manager’s perspective, they realize an efficient portfolio af-
ter portfolio flows. The weight of the return-oriented portfolio is smaller because
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1
1+a
< 1 for a > 0. Hence, the portfolio manager always invests in the same
portfolio after capital flows, regardless of the structure of the market portfolio. In
effect, the portfolio manager invests as if they were more risk-averse. This ten-
dency depends on the factor a that determines the level of capital flow related to
market performance. The higher the level of capital flow related to general market
performance, the more risk-averse the portfolio manager will invest.
The structure of this optimal portfolio policy is similar to that of non-marketable
income in the static portfolio cases.284 In the case of nonmarketable income, the op-
timal portfolio structure consisting of the minimum-variance and the return-oriented
sub-portfolios is extended by an additional sub-portfolio that hedges the unsystem-
atic risks of the additional income.285 It is equal to the risk-weighted (i.e., with the
inverse of the market covariance matrix) covariance matrix of the non-marketable
income with the marketable assets.286
The solution above has the same structure: awM is the hedging portfolio. Be-
cause the hedging portfolio is perfectly correlated with the market portfolio (the
stochastic drivers are the same Brownian motions), the covariance matrix of the
market benchmark portfolio multiplied by the market covariance matrix results in
1.
The situation for the primary investor is worse compared to the situation without
capital adjustments. Their investment line (the lower dashed line in figure 5.6) is lo-
cated below the investment line without capital adjustments meaning that positions
on that line are more inefficient. They could reduce the risk by  associated with
their investment by simply sticking with the risk-free asset. Compared to their orig-
inal investment line, they lose  in expected return. The losses in efficiency are
even higher compared to the standard delegation case without capital adjustments.
Like the compensation scheme, the capital flow related to market performance
cannot explain the observed investment patterns of institutional investors. If one
assumes that a realistic market portfolio consists of assets of larger companies or
companies listed on highly visible indices, such as the S&P500, this capital flow
even counteracts the investment patterns.
The following numerical examples illustrate the findings above. There are three
284Cf. Mayers (1973) and Brito (1977).
285Cf. Brito (1977), pp. 1110, 1112. Brito (1977) names this hedging portfolio .
286Brito (1977) calculates the hedging portfolio as  = C 1C0, where C 1 is the inverse of the
market covariance matrix and C0 is the covariance vector of the non-marketable asset.
88
5.3. Closed-Form Solution for Linear Model
 0.049
 0.05
 0.051
 0.052
 0.053
 0.054
 0.055
 0  0.01  0.02  0.03  0.04  0.05  0.06
µ
σ
tangential portfolio
original variance minimal portfolio
original optimal portfolio
general market portfolio
new variance minimal portfolio
new optimal portfolio
new optimal portfolio after capital flows
Figure 5.7.: Numerical example 1 of delegated portfolios with capital flow related to
general market performance in a   diagram. The market portfolio
wM is located away from the efficient frontier. Thje horizontal axis rep-
resents the standard deviation, the vertical axis represents the expected
return of portfolios. The riskless rate is fixed at 5%, the parameter a is
set to 1. Legend is given in the figure. (Source: Own calculations)
risky assets with expected returns
 =
0B@ 0:100:12
0:08
1CA
and the covariance matrix
 =
0B@ 1:0 0:2 0:50:2 2=3 0:3
0:5 0:3 0:5
1CA :
The riskless rate is 0:05. The market portfolio is arbitrarily given by
wM =
0B@ 0:80:1
0:1
1CA
Figure 5.7 shows the results.
The market portfolio wM (empty diamond) together with the minimum-variance
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Figure 5.8.: Numerical example 2 of delegated portfolios with capital flow related to
general market performance in a   diagram. The market portfolio
wM is defined to be the tangency portfolio. Legend as in figure 5.7.
(Source: Own calculations)
portfolio (filled triangle) defines the basis point for the new efficient frontier of the
portfolio manager. The new frontier lies below the efficient frontier of the primary
investor. The portfolio manager realizes a portfolio on this new efficient frontier
(empty square). Taking the capital adjustment into account, they realize the portfo-
lio indicated on the standard efficient frontier of the primary investor (empty pen-
tagon). This portfolio still has a lower risk than the original portfolio marked on the
same line.
The special case in which the tangency portfolio of the primary investor (filled
circle) is chosen as the market portfolio (empty diamond) is depicted in figure 5.8.
The situation is similar to that in the first numerical example. However in this exam-
ple the original and adjusted efficient frontier are identical. The investor realizes a
portfolio on the lower portion of the efficient frontier (empty square), the inefficient
area. Despite this, they realize the same portfolio after capital adjustments (empty
pentagon) as in the previous example above.
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5.3.5. Effects of a Benchmark Portfolio
General Benchmark Portfolio
Let now c > 0 and a = 0, i.e., there is only capital flow related to the benchmark
portfolio. The optimal portfolio in equation 5.13 then reduces to
w(t) = MV +
1
1 + c
(cwB(t)  c MV )+ 1
(1 + c)
1
1  
 
 1  10 1 MV 
(5.16)
Beside the factor 1
1+c
this portfolio is structurally similar to the portfolio if only
a general market condition-related flow occurs, cf. equation 5.14, only the alge-
braic sign is reversed. In this case, the portfolio manager additionally invests in the
benchmark portfolio wB(t) and reduces the share invested in the minimum-variance
portfolio by c MV in order to keep the sum of all weights at 1. The reason is sim-
ilar: regardless of how good the portfolio manager’s performance is, they will lose
capital of the size cni=1wBi dPi(t)Pi(t) X(t) as defined in equation 5.1. However, there is
no equivalent structure for the capital they receive of the size c ni=1w(t)dPi(t)Pi(t) X(t).
The reason for this is that the capital they receive, which directly depends on
their optimal portfolio policy, works as a scaling factor for the underlying stochastic
process. It increases the return vector  of their optimal portfolio and, at the same
time, the standard deviation . Because the standard deviation enters the optimal
portfolio policy squared as covariance matrix , only the factor 1
1+c
remains. In
essence, the risk associated with the benchmark-related capital flow outweighs the
additional potential return. As a result, the factor 1
1+c
, that occurs in all three sums,
reduces the amount invested in all portfolios but the minimum-variance portfolio
for c > 0.
The solution in equation 5.16 is also different to the static case with non-
marketable income. The additional sub-portfolio cwB(t) is equivalent, however
the factor 1
1+c
changes the weight of the return-oriented sub-portfolio. This return-
oriented sub-portfolio is unaffected in the case of non-marketable income. The
change is due to the structure of the performance-related capital flow. This capital
flow depends on the structure of the optimal portfolio as defined in equation 5.1.
The non-marketable income in the static case as defined in Brito (1977) is indepen-
dent of the optimal portfolio policy. Hence, the influence of the performance-related
capital flow on the return-oriented sub-portfolio.
Figure 5.9 illustrates the effect on the efficiency of the portfolio choice. In this
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Figure 5.9.: Efficiency of delegated portfolios with performance-related capital
flow. Legend as in figure 4.1. (Source: Own illustration)
illustration, the benchmark portfolio wB is assumed to be non-efficient, i.e., it is
not located on the efficient frontier. The sub-portfolio that is independent of risk
preference is shown as the basis for the new efficient frontier. Even though the
factor c that determines the magnitude of the capital adjustment is set to 1, the
benchmark portfolio is not located on the new efficient frontier due to the additional
factor 1
1+c
.
As with market-related capital flow, it can be shown in this case that the portfolio
manager realizes a portfolio that provides an efficient position after capital flow:
w(t) + c(w   wB) = (1 + c)w(t)  cwB
= (1 + c)

MV +
1
1 + c
(cwB(t)  c MV )
+
1
(1 + c)
1
1  
 
 1  10 1 MV   cwB
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Figure 5.10.: Numerical example 1 of delegated portfolios with performance-
related capital flow in a     diagram. The benchmark portfolio
wB is located away from the efficient frontier. The riskless rate is set
to 5%, the parameter c set to 1. Legend as in figure 5.7. (Source: Own
calculations)
= (1 + c) MV + (cwB(t)  c MV )
+
1
1  
 
 1  10 1 MV   cwB
= MV +
1
1  
 
 1  10 1 MV 
Obviously, this is the solution without any capital adjustments in 4.9. Here the port-
folio manager realizes the standard optimal portfolio after capital flows. From the
perspective of the portfolio manager, the benchmark-related flow does not change
their optimal portfolio policy after capital flow. They can completely hedge the
effects of the benchmark-related flow.
This situation is suboptimal from the perspective of the primary investor. If they
set the benchmark portfolio away from the efficient frontier, their new investment is
located below the original investment line. Compared to their original investment
line, they lose efficiency. The losses in efficiency are even higher compared to the
standard delegation case without capital adjustments.
Figure 5.10 depicts a numerical example of the situation with capital adjustments
due to a benchmark portfolio. The example uses the same data as in the previous
example. The benchmark portfoliowB has been chosen to be the same as the market
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portfolio wM in the previous example,
wB =
0B@ 0:80:1
0:1
1CA
The efficient frontier of the professional investor (dotted-dashed line) moves to-
wards the benchmark portfolio wB (empty diamond), however the benchmark port-
folio is not located on this efficient frontier. This is due to the factor 1
1+c
associated
with the risk aversion of the portfolio investor.
Tangency Portfolio as Benchmark Portfolio
The typical primary investor that invests in the riskless asset by themselves can im-
prove their efficiency situation, if they use the tangency portfolio as the benchmark
portfolio. Let a = 0, so the optimal portfolio policy is given by equation 5.16.
Let the benchmark portfolio be structurally equal to the tangency portfolio 4.7 and
scaled so that 10wB = 1, i.e.,
wB :=
1
10 1(  1r)
 1(  1r)
The optimal portfolio from equation 5.16 then develops to
w(t) = MV +
1
1 + c

c  1
10 1(  1r)
 1(  1r)  c MV

+
1
1 + c
1
1  
 
 1  10 1 MV 
= MV +
c
1 + c

1
10 1(  1r)
 1(  1r)  1
10 11
 11

+
1
1 + c
1
1  
 
 1  10 1 MV 
= MV +
c
1 + c
1
10 1(  1r)10 11
  10 11 1(  1r)  10 1(  1r) 11
+
1
1 + c
1
1  
 
 1  10 1 MV 
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= MV +
c
1 + c
1
10 1(  1r)10 11
 
10 11 1  10 1 11
+
1
1 + c
1
1  
 
 1  10 1 MV 
= MV +
c
1 + c
1
10 1(  1r)
 
 1  10 1 MV 
+
1
1 + c
1
1  
 
 1  10 1 MV 
= MV +

1
1 + c
1
1   +
c
1 + c
1
10 1(  1r)
  
 1  10 1 MV 
Obviously, this portfolio is located on the original efficient frontier.
If equation 5.12 1
1  =
1
10 1( 1r) holds, then the portfolio manager invests in
the tangency portfolio regardless of the factor c.287 Now, let 1
1  =
1
10 1( 1r) + 
with  2 R. In this case, the portfolio manager does not invest in the tangency
portfolio but realizes the portfolio
w(t) = MV +

1
1 + c
 + 1
10 1(  1r)
  
 1  10 1 MV 
As can easily being seen, the distance 1
1+c
  of this portfolio from the tangency
portfolio decreases with increasing c. Hence, the selection of the tangency portfolio
as the benchmark portfolio induces the portfolio manager to invest closer to the
tangency portfolio and the stronger the benchmark-related capital flow, the stronger
the tilt of the portfolio towards the tangency portfolio.
Figure 5.11 illustrates the tilt towards the tangency portfolio. Let
DiffB =
1
10 1(  r1)  

1
1 + c
 + 1
10 1(  1r)

=
1
1 + c
 
be the distance of the portfolio with benchmark-related capital flow from the tan-
gency portfolio and
DiffD =
1
10 1(  r1)  
1
10 1(  r1) +  = 
be the distance of the portfolio without benchmark-related capital flow from the
tangency portfolio.
Figure 5.11 shows numerical results on the differences DiffB and DiffD for differ-
287Cf. footnote 282 in section 5.3.3.
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Figure 5.11.: Distance of portfolios to tangency portfolio. The dark grey area repre-
sents the difference DiffD for portfolios without performance-related
capital flow. The light grey area represents the difference DiffB for
portfolios with performance-related flow. The straight black grid rep-
resents zero difference. (Source: Own calculations)
ent values of  with 1
1  =
1
10 1( r1) +  and c. The light grey areas represent the
difference DiffB, the dark grey areas the difference DiffD. The grid indicates a zero
distance. The area for the difference DiffD is bent only in the  direction because it
does not depend on the parameter c. Figure 5.11a depicts the differences for a size
of the tangency portfolio of 0:2, figure 5.11b for a size of the tangency portfolio of
0:5. The parameters c and  range from 0 to 3 and 0 to 0:9, respectively.
Both figures clearly show that the benchmark-related capital flow pulls the port-
folio towards the tangency portfolio. For negative differences as well as for positive
differences, the absolute distance of the portfolio benchmark portfolio is always
smaller than the distance of the portfolio without benchmark portfolio. Clearly, the
parameter c increases this effect. For larger values of c, the absolute difference of
the portfolio with benchmark portfolio becomes even smaller. The marginal effect
of an increasing c is rather strong for small values of c and decreases for larger val-
ues. In figure 5.11a, a value of c close to 3 pulls the portfolio only slightly closer
to the benchmark portfolio. An increasing parameter  leads generally to a more
risky investment. However, this effect is smaller for the portfolio with benchmark
portfolio.
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Figure 5.12.: Numerical example 2 of delegated portfolios with performance-
related capital flow in a     diagram. The benchmark portfolio
wB is defined to be the tangency portfolio. Parameter values as in
figure 5.10. Legend as in figure 5.7. (Source: Own calculations)
Figure 5.12 depicts the optimal portfolio in the numerical example above if the
benchmark portfolio is equal to the tangency portfolio. It clearly shows that with the
given parameters the investment of the portfolio manager (empty square) is tilted
towards the tangency portfolio (filled circle). By setting the tangency portfolio as
the benchmark portfolio, the primary investor can induce the portfolio manager to
invest more closely in the tangency portfolio. Hence, the efficiency loss reduces for
the primary investor. The stronger their capital flow reaction, the stronger the pull
towards the tangency portfolio and the fewer efficiency losses they incur.
The capital flow related to performance relative to a benchmark portfolio also has
the potential to explain the observed investment patterns of institutional investors.
Assuming that primary investors pick benchmark portfolios consisting of large com-
panies or companies that are members of a popular index such as the S&P500, their
capital flow reaction induces portfolio managers to tilt their portfolio towards these
large companies or index members. In particular, given the size of the performance-
related capital flow, the parameter c can be expected to have a significant size.
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5.4. Numerical Solution for Nonlinear
Performance-Flow Relation
The previous section demonstrated a linear modeling approach to incorporate cap-
ital flow into the portfolio optimization problem. The linear model allowed for
a closed-form solution in equation 5.10. However, empirical research suggests a
nonlinear relationship between past performance and capital flow.288 In order to an-
alyze the influence of such a nonlinear relationship, numerical approximations will
be used in this section.
5.4.1. Model Setup
Performance-Flow Relationship
Chevalier/Ellison (1997) identify a nonlinear relationship between past performance
and future capital flow with an option-like shape. The exponential function
Netflow(t+ 1) = exp
n

0  ExcessReturn(t)
o
+  
0
(5.17)
fits the observed flow rather well. Figure 5.13 displays the approximation with
parameter values 0 = 3:5 and  0 =  0:85. Most importantly, equation 5.17
reflects the convex option-like character of the performance-flow relationship.
In the continuous time framework, this empirical relationship could be modelled
with the exponential expression
g
0
3(t) = exp

 
h
w
0
(t)  w0B
i
 dP (t)
P (t)
X(t)

(5.18)
= exp
(
 
 
nX
i=1
[wi(t)  wBi ]iX(t)dt+
nX
i=1
[wi(t)  wBi ]iX(t)dBi
!)
with 10w(t) = 10wB = 1. However, the time difference of one year in the empirical
analysis of Chevalier/Ellison (1997) cannot be implemented in a continuous time
model such as equation 5.18. Also, for simplicity the parameter  0 will be dropped
in the continuous time model because it simply shifts the curve up or down. Overall,
the nonlinear convex character of the relationship remains.
With this definition of the performance-flow relationship, the stochastic process
288Cf. section 3.2 for more details.
98
5.4. Numerical Solution for Nonlinear Performance-Flow Relation
Figure 5.13.: Exponential approximation of performance-flow relationship through
equation 5.17 with parameter values 0 = 3:5 and  0 =  0:85.
(Source: Chevalier/Ellison (1997), p. 1177, o^wn illustration)
in differential form appears as a parameter in the exponential function. That makes
it intractable with a Markov chain approximation, because the stochastic process is
non-separable into drift and variance term.
A slight change of the performance-flow relationship in equation 5.18 overcomes
this difficulty. The idea is that the performance flow at time t depends on the accu-
mulated performance difference of the portfolio manager’s portfolio and the bench-
mark portfolio. This can be interpreted as if at time t the primary investor compares
their actual wealth with the fictional value of their wealth if they had invested their
capital in the benchmark portfolio from the beginning. The primary investor then
contributes or withdraws capital according to the development of this difference.
Let
Di(t) = Di(0)+
Z t
0
[wi(s) wBi ]iX(s)ds+
Z t
0
[wi(s) wBi ]iX(s)dBi; (5.19)
with Di(0) = 0 be the individual asset’s absolute contribution to the performance
difference between the portfolio manager’s portfolio and the benchmark portfolio.
One could argue that in this specification the volume of flow depends on the level
of the assets under management, which might not necessarily be the case. The
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alternative formulation
D
0
i(t) = D
0
i(0) +
Z t
0
[wi(s)  wBi ]ids+
Z t
0
[wi(s)  wBi ]idBi (5.20)
with D0i(t) = 0, defines a flow that depends only on relative performance. Both
expressions will be considered.
The performance-flow reaction is then given by the exponential functions
G3(t;D(t)) = exp
 
 
nX
i=1
Di(t)
!
(5.21)
for absolute performance differences and
G
0
3(t;D(t)) = exp
 
 
nX
i=1
D
0
i(t)
!
(5.22)
for relative performance differences. Now the application of Itô’s lemma for multi-
dimensional processes allows the evaluation of equations 5.21 and 5.22.
Theorem. (Itô’s lemma)289. Let S(t) = (S1(t); : : : ; Sn(t))be an n-dimensional
Ito-process with
Si(t) = Si(0) +
Z t
0
ai(s)ds+
Z t
0
bi(s)dBi(s); i = 1; : : : ; n;
with the n-dimensional Brownian motion B(t) = (B1(t); : : : ; Bn(t)). Let f :
[0;1)  Rn ! R be a C1;2 function (i.e. f(t; S1(t); : : : ; Sn(t)) is continuous,
once continuously differentiable with regard to the first argument, and twice differ-
entiable with regard to the second argument). Then:
f(t) = f(0) +
Z t
0
ft(s)ds+
nX
i=1
Z t
0
fSi(s)dSi(s)
+
1
2
nX
i=0
nX
j=0
Z t
0
fSiSj(s)d hSi; Sjis (5.23)
289Cf. e.g., Merton (1990), chapter 5, p. 122f., Korn/Korn (2001), p. 59.
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Equation 5.23 evaluates to
f(t) = f(0) +
Z t
0
ft(s)ds
+
"
nX
i=1
Z t
0
fSi(s)ai(s) +
1
2
nX
i=0
nX
j=0
Z t
0
fSiSj(s)ijb
2
ij(s)
#
ds
+
nX
i=1
Z t
0
fSi(s)bi(s)dBi
Given equations 5.19 and 5.20, the parameters for Itô’s lemma are ai(s) =
[wi(s) wBi ]iX(s) and bi(s) = [wi(s) wBi ]iX(s) for the absolute performance
difference and ai(s) = [wi(s) wBi ]i and bi(s) = [wi(s) wBi ]i for the relative
performance difference. In the former case, the lemma allows the development of
the function G3(t;D(t)) to
G3(t) =  
(
nX
i=1
Z t
0
G3(s)[wi(s)  wBi ]iX(s)ds
+
1
2
nX
i=0
nX
j=0
Z t
0
G3(s)ij[wi(s)  wBi ]iX(s)[wj(s)  wBj ]jX(s)ds
+
nX
i=1
Z t
0
G3(s)[wi(s)  wBi ]iX(s)dBi
)
which can be formulated in differential notation as
dG3 =  
(
nX
i=1
G3(t)[wi(t)  wBi ]iX(t)dt
+
1
2
nX
i=0
nX
j=0
G3(t)ij[wi(t)  wBi ]iX(t)[wj(t)  wBj ]jX(t)dt
+
nX
i=1
G3(t)[wi(t)  wBi ]iX(t)dBi
)
(5.24)
G3(0) = 0: (5.25)
In analogy, equation 5.22 with the relative performance difference from equation
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5.20 develops to
dG
0
3 =  
(
nX
i=1
G
0
3(t)[wi(t)  wBi ]idt
+
1
2
nX
i=0
nX
j=0
G
0
3(t)ij[wi(t)  wBi ]i[wj(t)  wBj ]jdt
+
nX
i=1
G
0
3(t)[wi(t)  wBi ]idBi
)
(5.26)
G
0
3(0) = 0: (5.27)
Assets Under Management Process and Minimization Criterion
The assets under management process will be restricted to performance-related flow
only. Therefore, equation 5.3 becomes
dX(t) =
 
nX
i=1
wi(t)i
!
X(t)dt X(t)dt+dG3(t)+
nX
i=1
wi(t)iX(t)dBi (5.28)
with the performance flow dG3 given in equation 5.24 and 5.25 or in analogy with
the performance flow dG03 given in equation 5.26 and 5.27.
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The minimization criterion is the same as in the previous model in section 5.3.
Let U = fu 2 [w;w]n : 10u = 1g be the control space for the control u(t) =
(w1(t); : : : ; wn(t)) with
Pn
i=1wi(t) = 1. The criterion to maximize is
J(t;X;u) = Et;X
Z T
t
L[s;X(t)]ds

: (5.29)
5.4.2. Markov Chain Approximation
State Process
The basic idea of theMarkov chain approximation is the discretization of state space
and time of a continuous time stochastic dynamic problem. In this case, the dis-
cretization incorporates not only the assets under management process in equation
5.28, but also the process of performance-flow reaction in equation 5.24 and 5.25
respectively 5.26 and 5.27. This additional process increases the dimensionality of
290As in section 5.3, Q0 = [0; T ) R is the state space of this stochastic process.
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the discrete optimization problem. Therefore, the implementation will consider the
current performance differences G3(t) and G
0
3(t) of the portfolio manager’s port-
folio and the benchmark portfolio as external variable. Otherwise, the numerical
implementation is adapted similar to the standard portfolio problem in 4.2.3. The
control will be the holdings in each asset wi(t)X(t). Therefore, the substitutes
Hi(t) := wi(t)X(t), with
Pn
i=1Hi(t) = X(t) and HBi(t) := wBiX(t) will be
used.
With this adaption, the model can be expressed in a single equation. With perfor-
mance flow based on absolute performance difference, the assets under management
process develops according to
dX(t) =
 
nX
i=1
Hi(t)i
!
dt  X(t)dt+  
nX
i=1
G3(t)[Hi(t) HBi(t)]idt
+   1
2
nX
i=0
nX
j=0
G3(t)ij[Hi(t) HBi(t)]i[Hj(t) HBj(t)]jdt
+
nX
i=1
Hi(t)idBi +  
nX
i=1
G3(t)[Hi(t) HBi(t)]idBi
This can be simplified to
dX(t) =
nX
i=1
(Hi(t) +  G3(t)[Hi(t) HBi(t)])idt  X(t)dt
+   1
2
nX
i=0
nX
j=0
G3(t)ij[Hi(t) HBi(t)]i[Hj(t) HBj(t)]jdt
+
nX
i=1
(Hi(t) +  G3(t)[Hi(t) HBi(t)])idBi (5.30)
where G3(t) is externally given.
For the performance flow with relative performance difference, the process in
equation 5.30 is adopted such that absolute performance difference Hi(t) HBi(t)
is divided by the current assets under management X(t). Equation 5.30, therefore,
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becomes for the relative performance difference
dX(t) =
nX
i=1

Hi(t) +  G03(t) 
1
X(t)
[Hi(t) HBi(t)]

idt  X(t)dt
+   1
2
nX
i=0
nX
j=0
G3(t)ij  1
X(t)
[Hi(t) HBi(t)]i 
1
X(t)
[Hi(t) HBi(t)]jdt
+
nX
i=1

Hi(t) +  G3(t)  1
X(t)
[Hi(t) HBi(t)]

idBi (5.31)
Transition Probabilities
The process for absolute performance differences above allows for the following
substitutions:
Ai(tk; X;Hi) := (Hi(tk) +  G3(tk)[Hi(tk) HBi(tk)])i   X(tk)
+   1
2
nX
j=0
G3(tk)ij[Hi(tk) HBi(tk)]i[Hj(tk) HBj(tk)]j
Bij(tk; X;Hi) := (Hi(tk) +  G3(tk)[Hi(tk) HBi(tk)])i  ij
  Hj(tk) +  G3(tk)[Hj(tk) HBj(tk)] j
The substitutions for relative performance differences are adopted accordingly.
With these definitions, the probabilities given in equations 4.13-4.17 provide a
Markov chain approximation for the processes 5.30 and 5.31, respectively.
5.4.3. Influence of Nonlinear Performance Flow
In order to investigate the influence of the exponential performance-flow relation-
ship, the benchmark portfolio is set to (0:5; 0:5). If not stated otherwise, the in-
vestment decision is considered with current holdings in both assets of (0:63; 0:63)
which is arbitrarily chosen. The parameters , G and  will vary depending on the
analysis. Other parameter values (drift and standard deviation) are taken from the
example in section 4.2.3. The discussion starts with the inspection of the optimal
portfolio policy. Then, the dependence on the parameter  is investigated. A third
paragraph focuses on the influence of the risk aversion factor . In all discussions,
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(a) Relative performance difference: optimal
portfolio policies for two assets and perfor-
mance difference at G = 0:5.
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(b) Relative performance difference: optimal
portfolio policy for first asset depending on
G for different states of asset holdings.
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(c) Absolute performance difference: optimal
portfolio policies for two assets and perfor-
mance difference at G = 0:5.
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(d) Absolute performance difference: optimal
portfolio policy for first asset depending on
G for different states of asset holdings.
Figure 5.14.: Optimal portfolio policies with nonlinear performance-flow relation-
ship with Markov chain approximation. (Source: Own calculations)
the two models with relative and with absolute performance difference will be ex-
amined in conjunction.
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Optimal Portfolio Policy
The parameter  is set to 3:5. Figure 5.14 displays the optimal portfolio policy
for one and two assets with relative performance difference (above) and absolute
performance difference (below) for various parameter settings. The left-hand side
shows the policies for both assets for various states with fixed G. The right-hand
side displays the optimal policy for the first asset depending on G but with fixed
states. On the right-hand side, the lower and upper straight dashed dotted lines are
the optimal portfolio policy without performance flow (at w1 = 0:2673) and the
benchmark portfolio share of the first asset (at w1 = 0:5) respectively. The relative
performance case will be discussed first.
Figure 5.14a depicts the optimal portfolio policy with fixed G = 0:5. Differently
from the standard solution in figure 4.2b, the optimal policy is not constant with
regard to the state of the asset holdings. The portfolio policy for the first asset
linearly increases with regard to both states and decreases for the second asset. It
is interesting to note that with the given parameters the portfolio policy is rather
close to the benchmark portfolio of (0:5; 0:5) for small asset holdings. It drifts
away towards the standard solution for larger asset holdings. A reason for this
behavior could be the independence of the performance-flow relationship of the
current state in the case of relative performance differences. In that case, even a
small performance difference has a relatively large impact for small asset holdings.
However with big asset holdings, a small performance difference is less severe.
Figure 5.14b shows the optimal portfolio policy for the first asset depending on
the parameter G for three states of asset holdings. The graph exhibits a nonlin-
ear structure of the optimal portfolio policy’s dependence on G. For negative per-
formance differences, i.e., if the portfolio manager’s portfolio has been less suc-
cessful than the benchmark portfolio, the optimal portfolio policy is tilted towards
the benchmark portfolio’s share of 0:5. The optimal policy first increases towards
the benchmark portfolio, then even exceeds the benchmark portfolio to be pulled
back downwards for large negative performance differences. For positive perfor-
mance differences, the optimal portfolio policy exhibits two phases as well. In
the first phase with relatively small performance differences, the optimal portfolio
is tilted further away from the benchmark portfolio, below the optimal portfolio
policy without performance-related flow. From a certain performance difference
on, the “critical” performance difference, the portfolio policy increases again and
is tilted towards the benchmark portfolio. For smaller states, the nonlinearity is
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more contracted, whereas for larger states the tilt towards the benchmark portfolio
is weaker. This contraction with smaller asset holdings confirms the conjecture that
the relative performance difference is more important in such cases.
An explanation for the unequal behavior for positive and negative performance
differences could be the following: negative performance differences imply a port-
folio policy that deviates from the benchmark portfolio. This bears the risk of fur-
ther negative performance differences in the future. Moreover, the portfolio man-
ager is currently already experiencing an outflow of capital. Both together could
drive the portfolio manager to invest even more than the benchmark in the first asset
in the case of negative performance differences. Positive performance differences
are ambiguous. They also indicate different portfolio policy with chances and risks
of future negative performance differences. On the other hand, the current positive
performance difference provides the portfolio manager with a bolster to counterbal-
ance contingent adverse developments. This could explain their slower convergence
to the benchmark portfolio.
In contrast to the solution for relative performance differences, the portfolio pol-
icy for absolute performance differences exhibits a nonlinear structure as indicated
in figure 5.14c. Note in analogy with relative performance difference, that the op-
timal portfolio policy for small assets is more distant from the benchmark portfolio
and then moves further away. Because the absolute performance difference depends
on the current asset holdings, it is smaller for small asset holdings. In relation to
the assets under management, the resulting capital flow is smaller than with rela-
tive performance difference. Additionally, figure 5.14c indicates another difference
to the relative performance case: the overall variance increases and, in particular,
the minimum of the portfolio policy is not constant but decreases for larger asset
holdings.
Influence of Exponential Parameter 
Figure 5.15 displays the optimal portfolio policy of the first asset depending on the
performance difference for various parameter values  and fixed asset holdings. The
two figures above represent relative performance differences, the two figures below
represent absolute performance differences. The left-hand side enlarges a certain
range of the variable G from the right-hand side. Naturally, the optimal policy is
identical for all parameter values of  if the performance difference is zero.
The general structure of nonlinearities in all figures are identical to those in figure
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Figure 5.15.: Sensitivity of portfolio policy for convexity of nonlinear performance-
flow relationship. Relative investment in first asset displayed, i.e.,
w1 = H1=X . Risk aversion parameter  set at 0:5. (Source: Own
calculation)
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Figure 5.16.: Influence of risk aversion on portfolio policy with nonlinear perfor-
mance flow. Relative investment in first asset displayed, i.e., w1 =
H1=X . Parameter  set to 3:5. (Source: Own calculation)
5.14. The parameter  determines how fast the portfolio policies converge towards
the benchmark portfolio. For higher values of , the portfolio policy is contracted
around the origin and converges faster towards the benchmark portfolio. This be-
havior is expected as the parameter  defines the strength of the convexity of the
capital function.
The difference between relative and absolute performance difference is limited.
The overall shape of the curves is identical. The convergence is slightly stronger
for absolute performance differences. For the case of absolute performance differ-
ences, the minimum of the portfolio policy is also lower leading to an overall larger
variance of portfolio policies.
Influence of Risk Aversion
Figure 5.16 highlights the role of the risk aversion parameter . The left-hand figure
depicts the optimal portfolio policy depending on the performance difference G
for various values of  for relative performance differences, the right-hand side for
absolute performance differences. The asset holdings and the parameter  are fixed.
Given the utility function from equation 4.6, a high  represents a low risk aver-
sion and a low  a high risk aversion. From both figures 5.16a and 5.16b, one can
see that the overall variation of the optimal portfolio policy is lower for higher risk
109
5. Portfolio Policies under Compensation and Capital Flow
aversion. For a very high risk aversion, the minimum of the portfolio policy is close
to the portfolio policy without performance-related flow at G = 0. It converges
for negative as well as for positive performance differences towards the benchmark
portfolio, however with a stronger tilt for negative performance differences. Only a
decreasing risk aversion then allows the optimal portfolio policy to even move be-
low the optimal policy without performance-related flow. The convergence towards
the benchmark portfolio is slower for investors with low risk aversion.
Evaluation of Portfolio Policy
For the primary investor, the results are overall positive, though the performance-
flow relationship does not resolve the conflict of interest totally. Conditional on the
model setup in equations 5.24 and 5.25 or 5.26 and 5.27 respectively, the influence
of the benchmark portfolio strongly depends on the current absolute performance
difference between the portfolio manager’s portfolio and the benchmark portfolio.
If both portfolios show the same performance then the portfolio policy of the port-
folio manager is not influenced by the benchmark portfolio. The primary investor
suffers efficiency losses as indicated in section 5.3.3.
But most likely, if their portfolio policy is not equal to the benchmark portfolio,
then there will be a performance difference. If the absolute or relative performance
difference is negative, the portfolio manager is tilted towards the benchmark port-
folio relatively fast. Even small performance differences bring them close to the
benchmark portfolio. The larger the exponential parameter , the risk factor  (i.e.,
the smaller the risk aversion), and the current asset holdings in absolute terms, the
more decided the tilt towards the benchmark portfolio is.
If the absolute or relative performance difference is positive, the portfolio man-
ager’s reaction is not necessarily tilted towards the benchmark portfolio. For smaller
performance differences, they might even deviate more strongly from the bench-
mark portfolio than they would without performance-related flow. This effect be-
comes stronger for larger  (i.e., lower risk aversion) and bigger current asset hold-
ings. But if the performance difference becomes bigger, they will eventually tilt
their portfolio towards the benchmark portfolio.
A clear recommendation regarding the absolute or relative performance differ-
ence seems impossible. The intensity of the convergence depends on all three pa-
rameters G, , and . Ceteris paribus, the relative performance difference is ad-
vantageous for very small asset holdings. However, a bigger parameter  causes a
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greater convergence for absolute performance differences.
Considering the dynamic nature of the problem, the portfolio manager might
continuously change their portfolio policy depending on the current performance
difference. Generally speaking they will tilt their portfolio towards the benchmark
portfolio if “all goes bad” and will be reluctant to tilt it towards the benchmark
portfolio if “all goes well.” Overall, they will only invest in the benchmark portfolio
almost by chance.
Quite generally, the nonlinear capital flow can also explain the observed invest-
ment patterns of institutional investors. Given a suitable benchmark, usually a port-
folio of large stocks or a well-known index, the portfolio manager will tilt their
portfolio towards the benchmark if their past performance has led them towards a
situation where they deviate from it. However, the numerical analysis above was
not able to identify the equilibrium for the portfolio manager, i.e., a portfolio policy
where they balance the risk of underperforming the benchmark, hence being pun-
ished by the primary investor, and their own investment preferences according to
their utility function and risk aversion.
5.5. Concluding Remarks
This chapter has presented two models of compensation and capital flows to ana-
lyze optimal portfolio policies from the primary investor’s perspective and to probe
for their explanatory power regarding observed investment patterns of institutional
investors.
The first model with a proportional management fee and linear capital flow
regarding both general market performance and portfolio manager performance
showed ambiguous results. A management fee alone does not change the optimal
portfolio policy compared to a primary investor who invests on their own. However,
the primary investor might experience an efficiency loss if the portfolio manager
can only invest in risky assets and, hence, does not realize the tangency portfolio.
Capital flow due to general market performance does not improve the situation. In
that case, the portfolio manager will disinvest the market portfolio leading to an in-
creased efficiency loss for the primary investor. But capital flow due to the portfolio
manager’s performance compared to a benchmark portfolio improves the situation
for the primary investor. Their reallocation induces the portfolio manager to tilt
their portfolio towards the benchmark portfolio. This has been demonstrated for the
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tangency portfolio as benchmark portfolio.
Regarding the explanatory power of the linear model, only capital flow-related
to the portfolio manager’s performance can explain why institutional investors pre-
fer stocks that are listed in important market indices such as the S&P500. It ap-
pears highly likely that primary investors use such indices as benchmarks in the real
world. Given the relatively large size of the performance-related flow reported by
e.g., Chevalier/Ellison (1997) and Sirri/Tufano (1998), the tilt towards these bench-
marks appears reasonable.
The second model implemented a nonlinear capital flow with regard to the port-
folio manager’s performance. Using a Markov chain approximation, it could be
shown that with such a capital flow the portfolio policy of the portfolio manager is
tilted towards the benchmark portfolio. In particular, the tilt is stronger for larger
current deviations from the benchmark and for a stronger convex capital flow. This
analysis also supports the hypothesis that capital flow related to portfolio manager’s
performance is at least partly responsible for the observed investment patterns of
institutional investors.
Next to compensation and capital flow, portfolio managers, in particular if they
manage large portfolios, face price effects from their trades. The next chapter
demonstrates how this can be incorporated into their optimization problem and what
the effect on the optimal portfolio policy is.
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This chapter investigates the influence of price effects from trades on optimal port-
folio policies in a single and multiperiod context. It accounts for the special char-
acteristics of portfolio management as outlined in chapter 3, i.e., compensation,
capital flows, and price effects. After a review of related research, I present a trino-
mial portfolio model incorporating price effects that is based on a standard trinomial
model as outlined in section 4.3. This discrete time model will allow the main im-
plications of price effects from transactions to be understood. I will then present
numerical solutions for several single and multiperiod models. The solutions start
with optimal portfolio policies under compensation and price effects in a single-
period context. The model is then extended to multiple periods. Finally, the joint
influence of compensation, capital flows, and price effects is investigated. Results
are discussed with regard to their explanatory power for observed investment strate-
gies as well as from the perspective of the primary investor. Concluding remarks
terminate this chapter.
6.1. Related Research
Incorporating price effects into investment decisions was initially developed in the
context of hedging strategies.291 Dynamical aspects of price effects are usually
discussed in the context of optimal liquidation strategies of large stock holdings or
portfolios.292 Results from research on portfolio optimization under price effects in
291Cf. Jarrow (1992) and Jarrow (1994) for discrete time models. For continuous time mod-
els cf. Frey/Stremme (1997), Platen/Schweizer (1998), Sircar/Papanicolaou (1998), Jonsson/
Keppo (2002), Cetin/Jarrow/Protter (2004), and Bank/Baum (2004).
292For discrete time approaches, cf. Bertsimas/Lo (1998), Almgren (2003), and Huberman/
Stanzl (2005). Impulse control approach is pursued by Subramanian/Jarrow (2001). Vath/Mnif/
Pham (2007) use an impulse control framework to analyze simultaneous price impact and trans-
action costs. Cf. He/Mamaysky (2005) and Mönch (2005) for continuous time liquidation strate-
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a multiperiod context are summarized below.
Cuoco/Cvitanic (1998) are among the first to address the large investor problem in
portfolio optimization in a multiperiod context.293 They consider a situation where
the portfolio policy, i.e., the optimal weights wi(t), of the investor affects the drift
of asset prices. Cuoco/Cvitanic (1998) add an additional drift term to the stochastic
price process in order to make the price dependent on the portfolio policy. The price
process of stochastic assets becomes
dPi(t) = [i + ^i(wi(t))]Pi(t)dt+ Pidt+ iPi(t)dBi(t)
where ^i(wi(t)) is the drift that depends on the portfolio policy wi(t). Using the
martingale technique together with a duality approach, Cuoco/Cvitanic (1998) pro-
vide closed-form solutions for investors with a logarithmic utility function. For a
logarithmic investor, they find that consumption does not change under price pres-
sure. But the share of wealth in absolute terms invested in the risky asset is always
lower than without price effects. However, the model of Cuoco/Cvitanic (1998) in-
corporates price effects not based on transactions but based on the actual share of
wealth invested in the particular assets. This might be relevant for very large-scale
investments where the capital market assumes an influence of the investor on the
corporate’s performance. However, it does not cover the price effect investors face
when they try to purchase or sell large portions of stocks on a day-to-day basis as
outlined in section 3.3.
Matsumoto (2006) investigates the situation in which investors cannot be 100%
sure that purchases or sales are executed.294 He introduces a random success func-
tion that indicates whether a desired transaction has successfully been executed or
not. Using the standard price process dP (t) for the risky asset, Matsumoto (2006)
models the development of the holdings in one risky asset as
S(t) = S0 +
Z t
0
S(s )dP (s)
P (s)
ds+
Z t
0
V (s)dO(s)
where S0 is the initial asset position in t = 0, S(t ) represent the asset holding
before the transaction, and dP (t)
P (t)
is the relative change in price. The success rate is
gies.
293Cf. also Karoui/Peng/Quenez (1997). They use a recursive utility function.
294Gârleanu (2009) proposes a similar setup in which investors can only trade a certain portions of
the time line, represented by Poisson arrival times.
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modeled with a Poisson-Process dO(t) that enables the agent to trade an amount of
V (t) at its jump times. He provides a solution for the case of an investor who maxi-
mizes expected utility from terminal wealth under a logarithmic utility function. In
that case, the optimal transactions converge to the standard Merton solution when
liquidity increases.
Longstaff (2001) provides a similar portfolio selection model in which he models
illiquidity as “the risk that a trader might not be able to extricate himself from a
position quickly when need arises.”295 The investor is allowed to trade (t)dt assets
at t, where (t) is a process bounded from below and above. He conjectures that
the investor trades as much as possible at any time. However, Longstaff (2001) does
not provide a formal solution to the value function.
Vath/Mnif/Pham (2007) use a transaction-based approach to analyze the simulta-
neous influence of price impact function and proportional transaction costs. They
allow the investor to trade at discrete times only. They model this situation as an
impulse control problem. Let Y (tn) be the number of shares of an asset hold by
the investor at tn and (tn) the number of shares purchased or sold at tn. Then
Y (tn+1) = Y (tn)+(tn). They introduce an exponential (i.e., convex) price impact
function Q(; P ) := P  e with  > 0 and P as the pre-trading price. However,
Vath/Mnif/Pham (2007) do focus their analysis on the form of the value function.
They do not, however, provide an explicit solution for the optimal portfolio.
In a similar setup, Isaenko (2010) analyzes the effect of transitory price impact.
The price impact is modeled in a convex form using the sum of a linear cost term
1S juj and a nonlinear cost term 2S juj1+" with " > 0, where 1 and 2 are
cost parameters, S is the current share price, and u the number of shares traded.296
Isaenko (2010) shows that the linear cost term implies a non-trading area around the
traditional optimal portfolio choice. The nonlinear cost term leads to a limitation of
overall tradeing volume.
Ghysels/Pereira (2008) choose a non-parametric approach to investigate the in-
fluence of liquidity defined by three different measures on optimal portfolio choices.
Based on empirical data from the New York Stock Exchange, they estimate optimal
portfolio choices for small and large stocks. Ghysels/Pereira (2008) show that the
295Longstaff (2001), p. 408. Diesinger/Kraft/Seifried (2010) investigate in a related article the
implications of potential complete market breakdowns on optimal portfolio choices. However,
Diesinger/Kraft/Seifried (2010) use a different mathematical setup applying catlag-processes to
simulate the market state.
296Cf. Isaenko (2010), p. 2377-2379.
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optimal portfolio choices depend on the liquidity of the underlying assets, however
with different specifications depending on the sample of assets and the investment
and trading horizon.
In a numerical analysis Pereira/Zhang (2010) investigate the influence of con-
stant and stochastic liquidity, in particular its volatility, on optimal portfolio poli-
cies with numerical methods (open-loop feedback control and closed-loop control).
They find that investors trade according to the current liquidity state with high vol-
umes at times of high liquidity and low volumes at times of low liquidity. Pereira/
Zhang (2010) also demonstrate with their model that assets with high liquidity
volatility require a lower liquidity premium.
6.2. Model Setup with Price Effects
The approaches presented above do not incorporate price effects either as price
changes depending on the transaction size or with a concave price impact function
as outlined in section 3.3 or both. Hence, a new modeling approach is developed
based on the discrete time trinomial model presented in section 4.3. This model will
differ from that in section 4.3 in two aspects: first, the price process will depend on
the transactions in each period. Second, instead of maximizing expected utility of
terminal wealth, the investor will optimize expected utility from the management
fee that is withdrawn from the portfolio.
6.2.1. Model Processes
Price Process
According to empirical research, price effects from trades can be separated into
two parts: the execution price initially changes due to the transaction.297 After this
initial change, the price effect reverses to a certain extent. This separation results
in three different prices at each time t compared to a single price in the standard
model:
1. A price P ai before the transaction that is comparable to the price in the stan-
dard model.298
297Cf. Pereira/Zhang (2010), p. 1081f., for a similar setup of price changes.
298a is meant as abbreviation for ante.
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Figure 6.1.: Standard model vs. model with initial price effect and reversal.
(Source: Own illustration)
2. A price P pi at which the transaction is executed that incorporates the price
effect due to the transaction.299
3. A price P ri after the transaction has been executed and the price effect repre-
sented in P pi has reversed.
300
Figure 6.1 accompanies the definition and discussion of the following price process.
It displays the single-period case but can easily be extended to the multiperiod case
as well. The upper part of the illustration shows the standard case without price
effects. The price Pi(1; t) in t = 1 is equal to an initial price Pi;0 given as external
value. The price in t = 2 develops from Pi(1; t) according to equation 4.20 as
Pi(2; t) = Pi(1; t)  si(k). The difference between these prices is considered as
asset return. The lower part of this figure describes the price process with price
effects from transactions and will be discussed in the remaining section.
The prices P ai , P
p
i , and P
r
i can be defined as follows. Let Pi(t   1; t) be the -
later to be defined - price in t   1 from which the price in t develops. The investor
299p is meant as abbreviation for post.
300r is meant as abbreviation for reversed.
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then arrives in t with a price
P ai (t; t) =
8<:Pi;0 if t = 1Pi(t  1; t)  si(k) if t > 1 i = 1; : : : ; n:
This is the price before transactions have been executed. It is equal to Pi;0 in t = 0,
which is given as an external value and indicated in figure 6.1. The price Pi(t 1; t)
for t > 1 is the price of the previous period which changes due to the return factor
si(k). This price will be specified below as the price P ri (t 1; t) after price reversal
for t > 1. Generally, the calculation of the price P ai follows the one in the standard
model without price effects.
Now let
Ui(t; t) =
8<:Ni(1; t) Ni;0 if t = 1Ni(t; t) Ni(t  1; t) if t > 1
be the transaction necessary at time t to hold Ni(t; t) number of shares of asset i
if the holding in t   1 is Ni(t   1; t). For t = 1 the holding Ni;0 represent the
initial holdings given as the external parameter. These holdings are provided to the
investor.
Let the function qi(Ui(t; t); P ai (t; t)) be the price impact function that defines
the effect of a transaction on the asset price. With this price impact function, the
new price immediately after transactions can be defined as
P pi (t; t) = qi (Ui(t; t); P
a
i (t; t)) i = 1; : : : ; n
In figure 6.1, the prices P pi (1; t) and P
p
i (2; t) follow the prices before transactions
P ai (1; t) and P
a
i (2; t). The indicated difference is due to the price effect from, in
this example, purchasing transactions Ui(1; t) and Ui(2; t) respectively.
After the transaction is executed at this price, the price reverses according to a
price reversal function ri (Ui(t; t); P
p
i (t; t)) and results in the new price
P ri (t; t) = ri (Ui(t; t); P
p
i (t; t)) i = 1; : : : ; n
Both, the price impact function qi as well as the reversal function ri are specific
for each asset and can, therefore, differ. This price P ri (t; t) after price reversal
in each period provides the basis for the price P ai (t + 1; t) before price effects
in the following period. In figure 6.1, the prices after price reversal follow the
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prices P pi (1; t) and P
p
i (2; t). The difference indicates the reversal of price effects.
Because the transactions Ui(1; t) and Ui(2; t) are assumed to be purchases, the
price reversal is negative. The price P ri (1; t) builds the basis for the price P
a
i (2; t)
in the following period.
In the later analysis, three cases of price reversals will be considered: no price
reversal, partial price reversal, and total price reversal. In the first case, the prices
after transaction P pi (t; t) and after price reversal P
r
i (t; t) are equal. The price
effect is permanent and not lost in future periods but is added to the return of the
asset. In case of total price reversal, the price after price reversal P ri (t; t) is equal
to the price before transaction P ai (t; t) of the same period. In this case, the price
effect is fully temporary and comparable to additional transaction costs. The case
of partial price reversal in which the price after price reversal P ri (t; t) is located
somewhere in between P ai (t; t) and P
p
i (t; t) contains both components. This
price effect is partly temporary and partly permanent.
It should be noted that the price process above might not necessarily be arbitrage-
free.301 Using feasible transactions, it might be possible to create profit without
initial capital. However, the conditions of an arbitrage-free market and the role of
price effects on arbitrage opportunities are not the focus of this work.302
Price Impact Functions
Two alternative price impact functions will be considered. In order to study the gen-
eral influence of price effects on the portfolio policy, a linear price impact function
will be used. The linear price impact function is defined as
qlini (Ui(t; t); P
a
i (t; t)) = (1 + li  Ui(t; t))  P ai (t; t)
with li 2 R+. The positivity of li implies the realistic scenario that purchases lead
to an increase of prices and sales to a decrease of prices. The new price P pi (t; t)
depends linearly on the size of the transaction. The factor li determines the level of
influence of the transaction. The corresponding reversal function rlini is defined as
rlini (Ui(t; t); P
p
i (t; t)) =

1
1 + i  li  Ui(t; t)

 P pi (t; t)
301Cf. Pliska (1997), p. 92, for a definition of arbitrage opportunities in a multiperiod securities
market.
302Cf. e.g., Jarrow (1994) and Jarrow/Protter (2005). Parameter settings in numerical solutions are
set to avoid arbitrage opportunities.
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with i 2 [0; 1]. For i = 1 this leads to a complete reversal of the price effect,
i = 0 implies no reversal at all. The factor is constrained on the interval [0; 1] in
order to ensure that the price reversal does not exceed the original price effect and
that the reversal does not further increase the price effect.
As an alternative price impact function a concave hyperbolic tangent function
will be used as indicated by Plerou et al. (2002).303 It is defined as
qtanhi (Ui(t; t); P
a
i (t; t)) = (1 + i  tanh(i  Ui(t; t)))  P ai (t; t)
with two parameters i 2 R+ and i 2 R+. Correspondingly the reversal function
is defined as
rtanhi (Ui(t; t); P
p
i (t; t)) =

1
1 + i  i  tanh(i  Ui(t; t))

 P pi (t; t):
Figure 6.2 illustrates the price impact functions with parameter values li = 7 
10 7, i = 7:5  10 3 and i = 2  10 4. Kraus/Stoll (1972) reported for transactions
with more than 10,000 shares an average price decrease of 0:43% for sales and an
average increase of 0:66% for purchases.304 With these values in mind, parameter
values are set so that a transaction of 10,000 shares leads to a price increase of
about 0:6% to 0:7%. This is only an approximation of the real price effect and
can be considered as the upper bar for price effects because Kraus/Stoll (1972)
use all transactions with more than 10,000 shares. However, this determination of
parameter values is sufficient to allow a general understanding of price effects. In
specific models below, these parameter values and variations will be used.
State Process
The standard model in 4.3 used two state process definitions for portfolio values
before transactions Xa(t; t) and after transactions Xp(t; t). These definitions
need to be redefined considering price effects. Let the investor be given an initial
portfolio
Pn
i=1Ni;0Pi;0. The equivalent toXa(t; t)in the context with price effects
303Cf. section 3.3.4. The description of price effects with such a function might not fit the price
effect in the short term precisely. However, the hyperbolic tangent function has the advantage of
not being discontinuous in zero which is helpful for the numerical optimization algorithm used.
304Cf. Kraus/Stoll (1972), p. 575f.
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Figure 6.2.: Price impact functions. (Source: Own illustration)
is
Xa;pc (t; t) =
8<:X0 if t = 1Pn
i=1Ni(t  1; t)  P pi (t; t) if t > 1:
This is the value of the portfolio value using previous portfolio holdings and current
prices after transactions. In this case the investor is given a fixed amountX0 of cap-
ital in cash. If the investor is given a portfolio of value Ni;0  Pi;0 as an endowment,
the portfolio value is defined as
Xa;ppf (t; t) =
8<:
Pn
i=1Ni;0  P pi (t; t) if t = 1Pn
i=1Ni(t  1; t)  P pi (t; t) if t > 1:
In this case, the investor has to make initial transactions Ui(1; t) = Ni(1; t) Ni;0
in t = 1 which will influence the price. Note that the portfolio value Xa;p is purely
calculatory, a portfolio with such value never exists.
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The equivalent to Xp in the context with price effects is
Xp;p(t; t) =
nX
i=1
Ni(t; t)  P pi (t; t):
It is calculated with the new holdings in t and prices after the transaction. Xa;p and
Xp;p will form the basis for the self-financing constraint.
In addition to these definitions, the portfolio value before transactions and before
price effects will be used later. If the investor is endowed with capital X0 in cash,
this portfolio value can be defined as
Xa;ac (t; t) =
8<:X0 if t = 1Pn
i=1Ni(t  1; t)  P ai (t; t) if t > 1:
(6.1)
In case of endowment with an initial portfolio this changes to
Xa;apf (t; t) =
8<:
Pn
i=1Ni;0  Pi;0 if t = 1Pn
i=1Ni(t  1; t)  P ai (t; t) if t > 1:
6.2.2. Optimization Problem
Compensation and Maximization Criterion
Unlike in the portfolio model outlined in section 4.3 the criterion to maximize in
the context of delegated portfolio management is the expected utility of a periodical
management fee. Following the continuous time model in section 5.3, the manage-
ment fee is calculated as a fraction of total assets under management
c(t; t) =
8<:0 if t = 1X(t; t) if t > 1
where X(t) are the assets under management. The management fee is calculated
at the end of each period and deducted from the portfolio value.305 The investor
does not receive management fee in t = 1 because they initially choose an optimal
portfolio at that time. With price effects and three different definitions of portfo-
305This is comparable to the financing of consumption in Merton (1990), p. 125. The con-
sumption is financed with the difference of old and new portfolio holdings, i.e.,  C(t)h =Pn
i=1 [Ni(t) Ni(t  1)]  Pi(t). Cf. Merton (1990), p. 125, eq. 5.8.
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lio values above, it must be considered which of the portfolio values is relevant
for the calculation of management fees. If Xa;p or Xp;p are used as the basis then
the transaction to finance the management fee influences the portfolio value which
then again influences the compensation and so forth. The investor would try to
maximize expected utility from compensation but this solution will affect the com-
pensation through the price effect, which does not appear to be a realistic scenario.
In contrast, it appears reasonable to require a separation between the calculation of
the management fee and its deduction from the portfolio value. Two options are
available.
First, the management fee could be based on the previous period’s portfolio value
Xa;p(t   1; t) before transaction and after price effects. It would be financed one
period later in t which introduces a time gap of one period.
Second, the management fee could be based on the current period’s portfolio
value Xa;a(t; t) before transaction and before price effects. This portfolio value
represents what would be considered as the success of the portfolio strategy from
t to t + 1. It contains the price effect and price reversal from the previous period’s
transactions and the development of the portfolio value resulting from the portfolio
structure. The management fee would be financed in t, which would be reflected
in the portfolio value Xp;p(t; t) after transaction and after price effects. But this
financing transaction would not influence the level of compensation.
I will generally follow the second option because it allows the influence of the
management fee in a single-period model to be investigated. For the first option, a
single-period model would not be possible. Hence
c(t; t) =
8<:0 if t = 1Xa;a(t; t) if t > 1
With the CRRA utility function
L(t;Xa;a(t; t); N(t; t)) =
1

(c(t; t))
 ;
the criterion to maximize is
J(X0) =
TX
t=1
KT 1X
t=1

~p(t)
1

(c(t; t))


:
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Performance-Related Capital Flow
For the calculation of capital flow, I will use the same portfolio value Xa;a(t; k).306
Performance-based capital flow can be defined as
f(t; t) =
8<:0 if t = 1 Xa;a(t; t) Pni=1 biXa;a(t 1;t)Pai (t 1;t)  P ai (t; t) if t > 1: (6.2)
Here capital flow starts in t = 2 similar to management fee. From that point in time
on, the portfolio manager faces capital flow as a linear function of their performance
compared to a benchmark portfolio b = (b1; : : : ; bn)0. The benchmark portfolio in-
vests fixed percentages bi; i = 1; : : : ; n in n assets. The factor
biXa;a(t 1;t)
Pai (t 1;t) repre-
sents the number of shares invested in the i-th asset. The value of the benchmark
portfolio in t at prices P ai (t; t) before transactions is compared to the portfolio
value Xa;a(t; t).
With performance-related capital flow, compensation changes to
c(t; t) =
8<:0 if t = 1 (Xa;a(t; t) + f(t; t)) if t > 1: (6.3)
This definition incorporates compensation for current performance-based capital
flow in t.
Maximization Criterion
Hence, the criterion to maximize is
J(X0) =
TX
t=1
KT 1X
t=1

~p(t)
1

(c(t; t))


using the definition of compensation from equation 6.3 and the definition of capital
flow from equation 6.2. The self-financing constraint in the situation with price
effects is
Xa;p(t; t)+f(t; t) = X
p;p(t; t)+c(t; t) t = 1; : : : ; T 1; t = 1; : : : ; Kt 1:
306I will restrict capital flow to performance-based flow considering the different explanatory power
of both phenomena regarding the investment strategies of professional portfolio managers in the
continuous time models in chapter 5.
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Figure 6.3.: General single-period model setup with price effects. The dashed boxes
become relevant in a multiperiod model. The investor optimizes the
dark shaded box, the management fee, by choosing the optimal hold-
ings represented by the light grey shaded box. (Source: Own illustra-
tion)
The left-hand side, the portfolio value Xa;p(t; t) =
Pn
i=1Ni(t   1; t)  P pi (t; t)
(for t > 1) before transactions and after price effects and the capital flow f(t; t),
represent the available capital for refinancing. The available capital must be equal
to the sum of the new portfolio value Xp;p(t; t) =
Pn
i=1Ni(t; t)  P pi (t; t) (for
t > 1) and the withdrawn management fee c(t; t). Both portfolio values are based
on asset prices after price effects because it is assumed that restructuring of the
portfolio, i.e., the purchases and sales of assets, is done simultaneously.
6.2.3. Summary of Model Setup
Figure 6.3 summarizes the single-period model setup. In the upper third, it shows
the price process, below in the middle the holdings process. The lower third displays
the state process, the portfolio value. It is simplified by depicting only one price
and one holding process representing the processes for all assets contained in the
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portfolio. The setup easily extends to several periods by extrapolating the t = 2
prices, holdings, and portfolio values into future periods.
The investor is endowed with an initial wealth consisting of the holdings Ni;0
with price Pi;0. The price P ai (1; t) is equal to Pi;0 and X
a;a(1; t) is equal toPn
i=1Ni;0  Pi;0. At the end of the period, the portfolio manager receives additional
capital flow based on their performance compared to a benchmark. This is added to
the available capital in t = 2. The objective is to maximize the expected utility of
the management fee that is calculated based on Xa;a(2; t) + c(2; t) by choosing
the optimal holdings Ni(1; t). These holdings together with the initial holdings
Ni;0 determine the transactions necessary to carry out in t = 1. The transactions
Ui(1; t) determine the price effect that is reflected in prices P
p
i (1; t).
The figure illustrates that the price in t = 1 after the transaction P pi (1; t) is
relevant to calculate the portfolio values before and after the transaction,Xa;p(1; t)
and Xp;p(1; t), which must be equal in the first period because compensation and
capital flow are 0. For the single-period model, there is no self-financing constraint
Xa;p(2; t) + f(t; t) = X
p;p(2; t)   c(t; t) in t = 2, because the optimization
objective is already in t = 2 being based on Xa;a(2; t).
This implies that the investor ends with an undetermined portfolio structure be-
cause there is no requirement to finance the management fee or invest the capital
flow in the last period with any transaction. In principle, the self-financing require-
ment for the last period could easily be added. This would require including the
financing of the management fee and investment of capital flow into the optimiza-
tion problem by optimizing the holdings Ni(2; t) as well. However, this optimiza-
tion would not target a risk-return optimal portfolio structure but only the optimal
financing of the management fee and investment of capital flow. Unreported results
show that the portfolio structure in t = 2 will show extreme and hence unrealistic
positions. Therefore, I omit the self-financing constraint for the last period.
6.3. Numerical Solutions for Portfolio
Optimization with Price Effects
After the definition of the general model in the previous section, this section will
present numerical results from various alternative model setups. The general setup
follows the trinomial model with two risky assets in section 4.3.2 and uses the same
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Figure 6.4.: Overview of numerical models with price effects and modifications.
(Source: Own illustration)
parameter values. An overview over the different models and their modifications is
provided in figure 6.4. In total, four different kinds of models will be considered.
The first three models will have no capital flow. This will be added in the fourth
model.
First, a single-period model will provide initial insight into the influence of price
effects (section 6.3.1, model A). Then, three different multiperiod models will be
analyzed. I will start with a two-period model without initial holdings where the
investor is endowed with cash (section 6.3.2, models B and C). This model will
provide insights about the allocation of transactions over time. The next model
assumes that the investor can choose their optimal portfolio in t = 1 without price
effects (section 6.3.3, model D). This model allows the understanding of the pure
price effect from the portfolio adjustments due to the stochastic development of
prices. The last model incorporates capital flow into the previous model (section
6.3.4, model E). Results for this model reflect the joint influence of compensation,
capital flows and price effects.
Different modifications in terms of parameter setups of these basic model types
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will be investigated. Regarding price effects, I will analyze the effect of equal or
different price effects for both assets. In reality, assets of small companies with
smaller capitalization often show a higher standard deviation. Therefore, the price
effect of the first asset with a higher standard deviation is modeled with higher price
effects. The size of the price effect will be varied to be big or small. Regarding
the functional form, I will consider linear and concave price impact functions in
the second model to analyze the dynamic effect of these different functional forms.
For all other models, only the linear function will be considered. Regarding price
reversal, models will be simulated with zero, partial, and total price reversal. The
fourth model will additionally incorporate capital flow as a linear function of past
performance compared to a benchmark.
The discussion in this chapter will focus on the influence of price effects. Hence,
the comparison of solutions presented here with optimal portfolio holdings of pri-
mary investors as outlined in the continuous time case in chapter 5, including effi-
ciency portraits, will be very limited. In this regard, results for the discrete models
in this chapter are expected to be very similar to those in chapter 5.
6.3.1. Single-Period Model
The single-period model setup follows the general model structure outlined above in
section 6.2.3. Instead of an initial portfolio, the portfolio manager is endowed with
a certain amount of cash X0 that they need to invest for a single-period. A linear
price impact function will be used. In a single-period context, a linear price impact
function is sufficient to understand the general implications of price effects. The
nonlinear price impact function becomes interesting in a multiperiod setup where
the form of the price impact function can potentially alter the allocation of transac-
tions over time. This issue will be discussed in section 6.3.2. The general parameter
settings are identical to the standard portfolio model in table 4.1.
The analyzed models vary in terms of the differentiation of the price effect for
each asset, the size of the price effect, and the reversal of the price effect. Table 6.1
summarizes the characteristics and parameter settings for the models A1-A8. The
characteristics have the following meaning:
 Size: Refers to the size of the price effect. Big size is equal to the values
described in section 6.2.1 and represents an almost realistic scenario. The
small price effect is a magnitude smaller, i.e., a tenth of the big.
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S A1 A2 A3 A4
Characteristic
Size n.a. big big small small
Differentiation n.a. equal different equal different
Reversal n.a. none none none none
Parameter
l1 0 7  10 7 7  10 7 7  10 8 7  10 8
l2 0 7  10 7 3:5  10 7 7  10 8 3:5  10 8
1, 2 0 0 0 0 0
Variable
w1(1; 1) 38.89% 38.89% 38.89% 38.89% 38.89%
w2(1; 1) 61.11% 61.11% 61.11% 61.11% 61.11%
N1(1; 1) 3889.27 3878.36 3878.36 3887.83 3887.83
N2(1; 1) 6110.73 6085.19 6098.10 6108.50 6109.80
U1(1; 1) 3889.27 3878.36 3878.36 3887.83 3887.83
U2(1; 1) 6110.73 6085.19 6098.10 6108.50 6109.80
P p1 (1; 1) 100.00 100.27 100.27 100.03 100.03
P r1 (1; 1) 100.00 100.27 100.27 100.03 100.03
P p2 (1; 1) 100.00 100.43 100.21 100.04 100.02
P r2 (1; 1) 100.00 100.43 100.21 100.04 100.02
S A5 A6 A7 A8
Characteristic
Size n.a. big big small small
Differentiation n.a. different different different different
Reversal n.a. partial total partial total
Parameter
l1 0 7  10 7 7  10 7 7  10 8 7  10 8
l2 0 3:5  10 7 3:5  10 7 3:5  10 8 3:5  10 8
1, 2 0 0:2 1 0:2 1
Variable
w1(1; 1) 38.89% 35.48% 33.96% 38.12% 36.42%
w2(1; 1) 61.11% 64.52% 66.04% 61.88% 63.58%
N1(1; 1) 3889.27 3539.17 3387.52 3811.26 3641.11
N2(1; 1) 6110.73 6437.56 6589.26 6186.38 6356.55
U1(1; 1) 3889.27 3539.17 3387.52 3811.26 3641.11
U2(1; 1) 6110.73 6437.56 6589.26 6186.38 6356.55
P p1 (1; 1) 100.00 100.25 100.24 100.03 100.03
P r1 (1; 1) 100.00 100.20 100.00 100.02 100.00
P p2 (1; 1) 100.00 100.23 100.23 100.02 100.02
P r2 (1; 1) 100.00 100.18 100.00 100.02 100.00
Table 6.1.: Parameter values and results for the single-period model with price ef-
fects. The model S refers to the standard model in figure 4.5 for compar-
ison. N.a. indicates a non-relevant feature. (Source: Own calculation)
 Differentiation: Indicates different price effects for both assets. Equal price
effect uses the same parameters for both assets. Different price effects reduce
the price effect for the second asset to one half.
 Reversal: Marks the kind of reversal of price effects. Models with “none” re-
versal show no reversal of price effects. “Partial” price reversal uses a reversal
parameter of 0:2, “total” reversal a parameter of 1.
Table 6.1 provides the numerical solutions of single-period models with price ef-
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fects. The upper part shows the numerical solutions with permanent price effect,
the lower part with price reversal. These and the following tables share an identical
structure: at the top, various characteristics of the models are listed. Below these
characteristics, important parameter settings related to these characteristics are dis-
played.307 The remaining part of the table contains solution values for various vari-
ables, usually the optimal share of wealth, optimal holdings, resulting transactions,
prices after transaction, and prices after reversal. The first column with numerical
values repeats the solutions of the standard model as a reference.
Models A1 to A4, all models with permanent price effects, highlight the first
finding: a permanent price effect has no influence on the portfolio structure in the
single-period context. This is plausible because the investor maximizes their port-
folio by considering the return on asset holdings in terms of absolute value and not
in terms of number of assets.
The investor maximizes the expected utility of their compensation which is equiv-
alent to maximizing the expected terminal wealth due to the monotony of the utility
and compensation function. The portfolio value in t = 2 which is relevant for
compensation from equation 6.1 is Xa;a(2; t) =
Pn
i=1Ni(1; t)  P ai (2; t). Dis-
solving the price yields
Pn
i=1Ni(1; t)  P ri (1; t)  si(2; k). Because price effects
are assumed to be permanent, this is equal to
Pn
i=1Ni(1; t)  P pi (1; t)  si(2; k).
From this equation, it becomes clear that the investor chooses the share of wealth
Ni(1; t) P pi (1; t) invested in the i-th asset by selecting the appropriate number of
stocks Ni(1; t). Because the investor is endowed with cash holdings, the portfolio
value after transactionsXp;p(1; t) is equal to the portfolio value before transactions
Xa;p(1; t). The investor invests the same amount of capital and receives the return
based on the absolute amount invested in each asset. Hence, the central conditions
of the optimization problem have not changed compared to the standard problem
without price effects. Under these conditions, the solution must be equal.
The situation is different if price effects are not permanent and price rever-
sal occurs. Given the parameter values, the investor purchases assets, hence
P ri (1; t) < P
p
i (1; t). In that case, the value of the portfolio after price re-
versals
Pn
i=1Ni(1; t)  P ri (1; t)  si(2; k) is smaller than after price effectsPn
i=1Ni(1; t)  P pi (1; t)  si(2; k). Compared to the situation without price ef-
fects or with permanent price effects, the investor incurs a loss of
Pn
i=1Ni(1; t) 
(P pi (1; t)   P ri (1; t))  si(2; k) at the end of the period. Hence, it is rational to
307For other parameter settings, cf. table 4.1.
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S B1 B2 B3 B4
Characteristic
Size n.a. small small small small
Differentiation n.a. equal equal different different
Reversal n.a. none partial none partial
Funcational form n.a. linear linear linear linear
Parameter
l1 0 7  10 8 7  10 8 7  10 8 7  10 8
l2 0 7  10 8 7  10 8 3:5  10 8 3:5  10 8
1, 2 0 0 0:2 0 0:2
Table 6.2.: Parameter values for the two-period model with initial cash endowment
and linear price impact function. The model S refers to the two-period
standard model in figure 4.5 for comparison. N.a. indicates a non-
relevant feature. (Source: Own calculation)
reduce the amount invested in the asset that shows the bigger price effect and rever-
sal.
This is reflected in the results of the models A5 to A8 in table 6.1. The larger the
price effect and the larger the price reversal, the less capital is invested in the first
asset that has the bigger price effect. For example, in model A6 the investor reduces
their investment in the first asset by 5 percentage points compared to the solution
without price effects and price reversal. However, the situation changes completely
in a multiperiod setting as is described in the following section.
6.3.2. Multiperiod Model with Cash Endowment
The multiperiod model with cash endowment extends the single-period model to
two periods. The investor receives a fixed amount of capital X0 as endowment
which they can only invest in two assets. Their objective is to maximize the ex-
pected utility from the periodical compensation that is calculated based on the port-
folio values Xa;a(1; t) and Xa;a(2; t). I will present results for models similar to
the single-period case (models B1-B4). In addition, the effect of a concave price
impact function will be analyzed (models C1-C4).
Table 6.2 provides the parameter values and figure 6.5 the results for different
models B1-B4 with a linear price impact function.308 Generally, price effects lead
to a time dependency of the optimal portfolio structure. In addition, price reversals
introduce a path dependency.
With permanent and equal price effects for both assets (model B1), the investor
308More detailed numerical results are shown in table B.1 in section B.
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Relative weight of shares (in percent)
t = 2
κ1 = 1 κ2 = 1 κ2 = 2 κ2 = 3
t = 1
33,0
34,5
36,0
37,5
39,0
40,5
42,0
40,50
33,82 33,82 33,82
38,89 38,89 38,89 38,89
Model B1
Model B2
Reference
Model
Model B4
Model B3
w1(t,κt)
Figure 6.5.: Results for two-period model with initial cash endowment and linear
price impact function. (Source: Own illustration)
initially invests more in the first assets only to disinvest from that asset in t = 2
and hold much less than in the standard solution. This investment strategy turns
around in case of permanent but different price effects for both assets (model B3).
If the price effect associated with the first asset is higher, the investor initially invests
less in the first asset only to increase their holdings above the standard solution in
t = 2. The numerical solutions supply no information about the underlying logic
and structure of this solution. Therefore, I can only conjecture the reasons.
Generally in a situation without price effects, the investor prefers the second as-
set, because it has the more appealing risk-return profile. The multiperiod context
with price effects allows the investor to influence the risk-return profile. By selling
the first asset in t = 2, they reduce the overall return over the period from t = 2
to t = 3 via the price effect because the return is calculated based on the portfolio
value before transactions in t = 2, i.e. Xa;a(2; t), and the portfolio value before
transactions in t = 3, i.e. Xa;a(3; t), including price effects in t = 2. Because the
return in t = 3 is stochastic from the perspective of time t = 2, any transaction af-
fects the return in all three states of nature, hence it decreases the standard deviation
as well. On the other hand, by purchasing the second asset in t = 2, the investor
increases the return and risk of that asset.
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From standard portfolio theory, it is well-known that the return enters the opti-
mal portfolio equation linearly whereas the risk, the standard deviation, enters the
equation in squared form as variance, respectively covariance.309 Hence, if both,
risk and return are scaled up linearly the risk-return profile becomes less preferable
for purchases and more preferable for sales. Therefore, by selling the first asset the
portfolio manager can improve the risk-return profile of the first asset relative to the
second asset which they purchase.
The model B3 gives results for a different situation. Here, the permanent price
effect of the second, generally preferred, asset is smaller than the price effect of
the first asset. It then depends on the set of parameters regarding risk, return, and
covariance in the unknown structure of the optimal solution whether one or the other
asset is preferred. With a price effect for the second asset that is half the size of the
price effect for the first asset, it is preferable to invest in the first asset.
In the case of price reversal visible in models B2 and B4, the investor moves
away from the optimal solution with permanent price effects towards the standard
solution. As discussed in the previous section, price reversals convert price effects
into additional cost. Because of this, in model B2 the investor increases the holdings
in the first asset in t = 2 as its risk-return profile becomes less preferable. In
analogy, in model B4 the investor decreases their investments to come closer to the
solution without price effects.
Price reversals introduce a path dependency of the optimal portfolio structure.
The investor invests more in “good” states and less in “bad” states, independently of
the time dependency of the strategy. However, it remains unclear why the investor
in t = 1 invests above the standard solution at equal price effects and below at
different price effects. This might be due to a complex mix of risk-return profile of
assets and the total risk of the portfolio over both periods.
Unreported results show that this overall investment strategy holds also in three
and more period models. In all cases, the initial investment in model B1 is slightly
above in t = 1, to fall below the standard solution without price effects in t = 2,
and then further reduce till the final transaction. The more periods the model has,
the lower the holdings are in the last period.
The two-period model represents a suitable basis to analyze the allocation of port-
folio decisions over time with non-linear price impact functions. Table 6.3 provides
the parameter values and figure 6.6 an overview of the model results with a concave
309Cf., for example, the solutions provided in sections 4.1.2 and 5.3.
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S C1 C2 C3 C4
Characteristic
Size n.a. small small small small
Differentiation n.a. equal equal different different
Reversal n.a. none partial none partial
Funcational form n.a. linear linear linear linear
Parameter
1 0 7:5  10 3 7:5  10 3 7:5  10 3 7:5  10 3
1 0 2  10 4 2  10 4 2  10 4 2  10 4
2 0 7:5  10 3 7:5  10 3 3:25  10 3 3:25  10 3
2 0 2  10 4 2  10 4 2  10 4 2  10 4
1, 2 0 0 0:2 0 0:2
Table 6.3.: Parameter values for the two-period model with initial cash endowment
and concave price impact function. The model S refers to the two-
period standard model in figure 4.5 for comparison. N.a. indicates a
non-relevant feature. (Source: Own calculation)
Relative weight of shares (in percent)
t = 2
κ1 = 1 κ2 = 1 κ2 = 2 κ2 = 3
t = 1
14
21
28
35
42
49
44,88
18,51
17,44
16,43
38,89 38,89 38,89 38,89
Model C1
Model C2
Reference
Model
Model C4
Model C3
w1(t,κt)
Figure 6.6.: Results for two-period model with initial cash endowment and concave
price impact function. (Source: Own illustration)
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utility function.310
Overall, the results are comparable to the results with a linear price impact func-
tion. Models C1 and C2 are similar to models B1 and B2. In both cases, the investor
starts with an initially higher investment in the first asset to sell the asset in t = 2
and hold a much smaller portion of their portfolio in that asset. Though the absolute
values are much more extreme with a concave price impact function.
Models C3 and C4 differ from B3 and B4 and are similar to C1 and C2. Here
the difference of price effects between both assets was apparently not sufficient to
make the first asset more attractive relative to the second. In both cases the investor
initially invests more in the first asset to sell large portions of their holdings and
keep a small position in t = 2. This effect is slightly reduced with partial price
reversal.
These results are not surprising. A concave price impact function does not make
it preferable to stretch large investments over a longer time period. This is due to
the decreasing marginal costs associated with such types of functions. The price
effect of large trades is relatively smaller compared to the effect of many small
trades. Hence, it is hard to tell whether the more extreme positions that imply
more extreme trades in models C1 to C4 are due to generally higher price effects
or to a lower relative price effect of larger transactions. A convex price impact
function might reverse this result. With a convex price impact function and its
increasing marginal costs, it could be profitable to stretch transactions over a longer
time period. However, a convex price impact function is not reported in empirical
research.
The following section will present results with price effects only after the initial
trade to investigate the implications of price effects from trades that are necessary
to dynamically follow the optimal portfolio policy.
6.3.3. Multiperiod Model Without Initial Price Effect
The results in the previous section 6.3.2 above combined price effects from two
sources: the initial purchase of assets and the transactions triggered by the stochastic
development of prices. The first effect has been analyzed in the single-period model
in section 6.3.1. In order to investigate the second effect, the two-period model
will now be changed. At the first trading time t = 1, the investor can build their
310More detailed numerical results are shown in table B.2 in section B.
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S D1 D2 D3 D4
Characteristic
Size n.a. small small small small
Differentiation n.a. equal equal different different
Reversal n.a. none partial none partial
Funcational form n.a. linear linear linear linear
Parameter
l1 0 7  10 8 7  10 8 7  10 8 7  10 8
l2 0 7  10 8 7  10 8 3:5  10 8 3:5  10 8
1, 2 0 0 0:2 0 0:2
Table 6.4.: Parameter values for the two-period model without price effect of initial
transactions and linear price impact function. The model S refers to the
two-period standard model in figure 4.5 for comparison. N.a. indicates
a non-relevant feature. (Source: Own calculation)
Relative weight of shares (in percent)
t = 2
κ1 = 1 κ2 = 1 κ2 = 2 κ2 = 3
t = 1
33,0
34,5
36,0
37,5
39,0
40,5
42,0
40,50
33,82 33,82 33,82
38,89 38,89 38,89 38,89
Model D1
Model D2
Reference
Model
Model D4
Model D3
w1(t,κt)
Figure 6.7.: Results for the two-period model without price effect of initial transac-
tions and linear price impact function. (Source: Own illustration)
portfolio without any price effects. This is equivalent to as if the investor were
given a portfolio whose structure they can determine. Due to technical reasons,
the problem is realized in this second way. Because the given portfolio is equal
to the one chosen in t = 1 no transaction is necessary in t = 1. Hence, it is
Pi;0 = P
a
i (1; 1) = P
p
i (1; 1) = P
r
i (1; 1) and X
a;a(1; 1) = Xa;p(1; 1) = Xp;p(1; 1).
Table 6.4 presents the parameter values and figure 6.7 the results of this model.311
The model modifications considered here are the same as in the two-period model
311More detailed numerical results are shown in table B.3 in section B.
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S E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6
Characteristic
Size n.a. n.a. n.a. small small small small
Differentiation n.a. n.a. n.a. equal equal different different
Reversal n.a. n.a. n.a. none partial none partial
Parameter
l1 0 0 0 7  10 7 7  10 7 7  10 8 7  10 8
l2 0 0 0 7  10 7 3:5  10 7 7  10 8 3:5  10 8
1, 2 0 0 0 0 0:2 0 0:2
 0 0:2 0:6 0:2 0:2 0:2 0:2
Table 6.5.: Parameter values for the two-period model without price effect of initial
transactions and performance-related capital flow. The model S refers
to the two-period standard model in figure 4.5 for comparison. N.a.
indicates a non-relevant feature. (Source: Own calculation)
with linear transaction costs and cash endowment. The results are almost identical
to models B1 to B4. Depending on the difference of price effects, the investor
initially purchases more in t = 1 to sell in t = 2 or vice versa.
While the results for permanent price effects are identical, the results with price
reversal are slightly different. First, the effect of price reversal is smaller in t = 2.
The tilt towards the standard portfolio is less distinctive without transaction costs
in t = 1. This is valid for equal as well as for different price effects. Second, the
effect of price reversal in t = 1 has the opposite direction. Instead of increasing the
deviation from the standard solution, the holdings are slightly tilted back towards
the standard solution.
The principle consequences of price effect and reversals have been discussed.
The next section incorporates performance-related capital flow into the model.
6.3.4. Multiperiod Model with Capital Flow
This last section will present models that include performance-related capital flow
and combine all three characteristics of portfolio managers described in chapter 3:
compensation as a proportional management fee, performance-related capital flow,
and price effects and reversals. There will be no price effects from transactions in
t = 1 in order to analyze the dynamic effect of capital flow. However, it is not
expected that results would considerably deviate from those presented here if the
investor was endowed with cash as indicated in the previous section.
Table 6.5 provides parameter values and figure 6.8 and 6.9 numerical results.312
312More detailed numerical results are shown in table B.4 in section B.
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Relative weight of shares (in percent)
t = 2
κ1 = 1 κ2 = 1 κ2 = 2 κ2 = 3
t = 1
28
30
32
34
36
38
40
35,48
35,72 35,71 35,70
38,89 38,89 38,89 38,89
Model E2
Reference
Model
Model E1
w1(t,κt)
Figure 6.8.: Results for the two-period model with performance-related capital flow
but without price effects. (Source: Own illustration)
The benchmark portfolio will be fixed throughout this section to be b1 = 0:2 and
b2 = 0:8. The size of the capital flow may vary to be either  = 0:2 or  = 0:6.
Models E1 and E2 investigate the isolated effect of performance-related capital flow.
Models E3 to E6 then also include price effects and price reversal.
As evident from model E1, the effect of the benchmark portfolio is comparable to
the continuous time model in chapter 5. Clearly, the holdings are tilted towards the
benchmark portfolio from time t = 1 on. In addition, this effect becomes stronger
for bigger capital flows as shown with model E2. However unlike in the continuous
time case with linear performance-related flow, the portfolio holdings become time-
and slightly state-dependent. The numerical results indicate that the benchmark
effect is stronger at t = 1 than at the last trading chance in t = 2. This means that
the portfolio deviates more strongly from the benchmark portfolio towards the end
of the investment horizon.
I suspect that this is due to compound effects. If the investor deviates strongly
from the benchmark portfolio in the beginning, they potentially suffer first from
immediate outflow and second from smaller absolute returns in future periods. This
effect becomes stronger for bigger capital flows. Unreported results from a four
period model of type E1 show that the initial holdings further slightly decrease,
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Relative weight of shares (in percent)
t = 2
κ1 = 1 κ2 = 1 κ2 = 2 κ2 = 3
t = 1
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
35,21
36,92
36,62
36,32
35,13
37,14
37,05
36,95
36,40
32,04
31,89
31,79
38,89 38,89 38,89 38,89
Model E1
Reference
Model
Model E5
Model E6
Model E4
Model E3
w1(t,κt)
Figure 6.9.: Results for the two-period model without price effect of initial transac-
tions and performance-related capital flow. (Source: Own illustration)
whereas the holdings at the end do not exceed those reported for model E1. This
further supports the argumentation with compound effects.
The introduction of price effects leads to results similar to those in models D1 to
D4 with E1, not S, as the reference portfolio. In model E3 with equal price effects,
the portfolio manager invests slightly more in t = 1 only to disinvest in t = 2
significantly. In model E5 with different price effects, the strategy is the opposite.
The introduction of price reversal tilts both results towards the reference portfolio
E1.
6.4. Concluding Remarks
This chapter investigated optimal portfolio policies under the conditions of profes-
sional portfolio managers in single and multiple period contexts using a trinomial
model setup. The central findings are summarized in the following paragraphs.
The use of periodical management fee deducted from the portfolio value does
not alter the optimal portfolio structure compared to a terminal wealth maximizing
agent.
The investigation of price effects in a trinomial model of one and two periods led
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to interesting results. In a single-period setup, permanent price effects have no influ-
ence on the optimal portfolio structure expressed as relative portfolio holdings. The
transactions are adjusted so that the share of wealth invested in each asset remains
constant across several modifications. The effect of price reversals is comparable to
additional costs associated with transactions. They reduce the returns of the affected
assets resulting in portfolio structures that are tilted towards assets with lower price
effects and price reversals.
In a two-period setup, these results do not hold. Price effects introduce a time
dependency, and a complex interaction of the risk return profile of the assets and
the size of the price effect determines the portfolio structure. The details of the
strategy, hence, depend on the actual parameter settings. Generally, the share of
the less preferred asset is bigger, the larger its price effect relative to the preferred
asset. This effect is visible in situations with and without price effects from initial
trades. Price reversals generally tilt the portfolio structures towards the structure of
the standard solution without price effects. Only in the case with cash endowment,
does the initial trade further deviate from the standard solution. The introduction of
a concave price impact function does not change these general results.
Performance-related flow has similar effects as in the continuous time case. It tilts
the investment decision of the portfolio manager towards the benchmark portfolio.
This effect increases with larger capital flows. Unlike in the continuous time case,
the portfolio structure becomes time-dependent in that the structure is tilted towards
the benchmark portfolio more strongly at the beginning than at the end of the overall
investment period. This is most likely due to compound effects of capital flows.
The joint occurrence of capital flow and price effects is comparable to the situation
without capital flow. The portfolio structure shows the same characteristics with the
capital-flow-only portfolio as the reference portfolio.
From the perspective of the primary investor, these results demonstrate that price
effects can lead to an efficiency loss because the portfolio manager generally does
not invest in the standard portfolio solution. Only in the one period model without
price reversal, does the portfolio manager follow the standard solution. In all other
situations, they deviate significantly. However, it depends on the specific parameter
constellation whether the actual portfolio holdings are tilted towards the tangency
portfolio or not.
Only in the case of performance-related capital flow, is the primary investor able
to influence the portfolio manager reliably to invest in their interests. By selecting
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the right benchmark portfolio, for example the tangency portfolio, the portfolio is
tilted towards this benchmark. The extent of this tilt depends on the size of the
capital flow. Additional price effects do not improve the situation for the primary
investor. Instead, they could make it worse depending on the parameter setup.
The explanatory power of price effects regarding the portfolio manager’s pref-
erence for highly capitalized assets with high liquidity was limited. Only price
effects with reversal in a single-period model can explain the tilt towards highly
capitalized assets. Results regarding the influence of performance-related capital
flow were comparable to those of the continuous time models in chapter 5. Price
effects could not explain this preference in a multiperiod context.
This is most likely due to the concavity of the price impact function that makes
large transactions appear preferable. A convex price impact function might change
these results. However, the empirical research outlined in chapter 3.3 very strongly
indicated that the price impact function is indeed concave. Another explanation
could be the focus of practitioners on single-period models. If they applied mod-
els similar to the single-period model in this work, they would tilt their portfolios
towards highly liquid assets.313
However, it appears very unlikely that participants in the capital market contin-
uously forgo utility using simplified models. In essence, the general preference
for liquidity reported in empirical studies cannot be explained with the multiperiod
models presented here.
313As an example, Sofianos/Takriti/Tierens (2007) present a model by Goldman Sachs that provides
optimal portfolio structures taking “shortfall risk” (similar to price risk effect with reversal) into
account. Even though they do not disclose detailed information about this model, in a reported
example the holdings in the asset with lower liquidity is reduced compared with the case of no
“shortfall risk”.
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7. Conclusion
The objective of this work was to investigate the optimal portfolio policies of pro-
fessional portfolio managers. Accounting for the conditions of delegated portfolio
management, i.e., compensation, capital flow, and price effects, I probed whether
these conditions can explain empirically observed investment strategies of portfolio
managers. Empirical research provides evidence that institutional investors pre-
fer large stocks and stocks that are listed in a prominent index, e.g., the S&P500.
Furthermore, I discussed optimal portfolio structures from the primary investor’s
perspective. This work focused on equity portfolio management and, in particular,
mutual funds and institutional accounts. Empirical details were presented for the
US market, but similar conditions should apply to other regions as well.
I summarized empirical research about compensation, capital flow, and price ef-
fects that form the conditions for delegated portfolio management in chapter 3. The
predominant compensation for portfolio managers of mutual funds as well as port-
folio managers of institutional accounts is a proportional management fee based on
assets under management. Because compensation is based on the level of assets un-
der management, it is important for mutual fund and institutional account portfolio
managers to understand why primary investors will contribute or withdraw capi-
tal. In that sense, mutual funds face capital flow that largely depends on the past
performance of the fund as well as some concurrent flow that is influenced by the
current general market situation. The performance-related flow has a nonlinear form
with high inflows for overperformance and only marginal outflows for underperfor-
mance. For institutional accounts, capital flow plays a much less important role and
is overall linear. Because portfolio managers very often maneuver large volumes it
is important for them to understand the effect of their trades on prices. It turns out
that price effects have a concave form with regard to trading volume. Price effects
are generally larger for small-cap companies with low liquidity, measured e.g., as
normal trading volume.
In chapter 5, I presented two models that incorporate compensation and capital
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flow following empirical research from chapter 3. The models were based on the
seminal work of Merton (1969) and Merton (1971). In contrast to Merton (1971),
the portfolio manager in both models could not choose their optimal consumption
but maximized expected utility from a fixed management fee. The first model ex-
tended the model of Merton (1971) with capital flows with regard to general market
performance and fund performance in a linear way. For this model, I was able to
derive closed-form solutions using the method of stochastic control. It turns out that
by maximizing expected utility from management fee, the optimal portfolio policy
does not change compared to the standard solution.314 However, if the portfolio
manager is restricted to risky assets only, they will most likely not invest in the
tangency portfolio which creates an efficiency loss for the primary investor whose
investment line then becomes inefficient. Concurrent flow increases the inefficiency
further. With a market portfolio that is not located on the efficient frontier, the port-
folio manager will chose an optimal portfolio that is located away from the efficient
frontier. They will disinvest from the market portfolio. With linear performance-
related flow, the situation can improve from the primary investor’s perspective. Sim-
ilarly to capital flow related to general market condition, the portfolio manager will
invest away from the efficient frontier if the benchmark portfolio is not located on
the efficient frontier.315 However, if the primary investor chooses the tangency port-
folio as the benchmark portfolio, they can induce the portfolio manager to invest
closer to the tangency portfolio. This tilt becomes stronger with increasing capital
flow.
With regard to empirically observed investment patterns of institutional investors,
the performance-related flow could in principle explain the preference of portfolio
managers to invest in assets that are listed in popular indices assuming that this
index is used as a benchmark portfolio. However, the general market-related capital
flow was not able to explain this preference, in fact it acted in the opposite direction
and pulled the portfolio manager away from the benchmark portfolio.
In a second model, I incorporated nonlinear performance-related capital flow. I
approximated the convex character of the capital flow with an exponential func-
tion. Using Markov chain approximations, numerical solutions could be provided.
Unlike in the linear model, the investment strategy of the portfolio manager with
exponential capital flow depended on the current level of performance difference
314This is in line with e.g., Wilhelm (1987).
315This result is very similar to Roll (1992).
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between their and a benchmark portfolio. This model predicted that portfolio man-
agers would tilt their portfolios towards the benchmark portfolio if they deviate
from the benchmark. Quite generally, the tilt towards the benchmark portfolio was
stronger for larger performance differences and more convex capital flows. But due
to the dependence of the portfolio policy on the current level of performance dif-
ference, a general statement about the tilt towards the benchmark portfolio was not
possible.
In effect, the nonlinear capital flow could also improve the situation for the pri-
mary investor as it induces the portfolio manager to tilt their portfolio towards the
benchmark if their performance deviates significantly. Hence, nonlinear capital flow
can, similarly to linear capital flow, also explain observed investment patterns of in-
stitutional investors.
A third model was set up in discrete time to analyze price effects from trades
in chapter 6. This model also incorporated compensation and capital flow effects.
I provided numerical solutions for a trinomial specification with two risky assets.
Many modifications of the basic model have been solved including linear and con-
cave price impact functions, permanent and temporary price effects, i.e., price ef-
fects without and with reversal, and single and multiperiod setups.
In a single-period context, temporary price effects lead to portfolios with a
smaller portion invested in the asset with higher price effects and reversal. Per-
manent price effects did not change the portfolio structure. The multiperiod models
with price effects lead to different results. Depending on the size of the relative price
effect of the first asset, its share in the portfolio increased or decreased compared
to the standard solution. Hence, a general preference for assets with high liquidity
was not visible. The introduction of price reversals pulled the portfolio structure
towards the standard solution but generally left it above or below, depending on
the parameter setup. In consequence, a price effect can only explain the preference
of investors for highly liquid assets in a single-period context, not in a multiperiod
context.
The discrete model including capital flow provided similar results to the contin-
uous time models. In models with performance-related capital flow, the portfolio
was tilted towards the benchmark portfolio. This pull was stronger for higher capital
flows. A joint model of capital flow and price effect showed a slightly reverted ef-
fect. The portfolio structure in such models was pulled back to the standard solution
leading to a counter effect. Hence, performance-related capital flow can explain the
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preference for larger stocks assuming that they are part of the benchmark, but price
effects do not generally increase this capital flow effect.
Overall, the use of benchmark portfolios with regard to capital flow is an effec-
tive behavior of primary investors to induce portfolio managers to invest in their
interests. This has been shown in a continuous time and discrete time setup. How-
ever, one should keep in mind that the analysis presented here was restricted to the
portfolio manager. In particular, I did not model explicitly an equilibrium behavior
of the primary investor with regard to capital flows. On an aggregate level, an un-
constrained capital flow as modeled here is reasonable. But this is not necessarily
the case on the level of individual primary investors, because the amount a primary
investor can delegate is limited to their total wealth.
Similar results to the effect of capital flows can be attained by introducing a com-
pensation based on benchmarks as proposed by e.g., Ou-Yang (2003) and Kraft/
Korn (2008). Because the majority of portfolio managers do not offer benchmark-
related compensation schemes, the observed performance-related capital flow can
be understood as reaction of primary investors to this lack. With performance-
related capital flow, they can at least incite portfolio managers to invest in their
interests.
To avoid efficiency loss, primary investors could alternatively - at least from a
theoretical viewpoint - invest in mixed mutual funds or balanced institutional ac-
counts, i.e., portfolios that consist of risky and riskless assets to improve their ef-
ficiency situation. Portfolio theory indicates that a portfolio manager would then
invest in the tangency portfolio.316 However, it might be unlikely from a practical
viewpoint that portfolio managers do indeed invest in the tangency portfolio. First,
they must differentiate themselves from other portfolio managers which would re-
quire an investment at least partly away from the tangency portfolio. Secondly, they
must provide a value proposition against index certificates that simply mimic the
performance of indices.317 This can only be done by investing at least partly away
316Even though I do not present optimal portfolio policies for portfolio managers who can also
invest in the riskless asset, it is very likely that the portfolio structure would be equal to the
standard solution. I conjecture this given the equality of the solutions for the case of risky assets
only. The introduction of the riskless asset would not affect the structure of the optimization
problem.
317Index certificates also beg the question why active portfolio management actually exists. In
particular in light of their largely debated performance results documented in the ever growing
research literature about mutual fund performance, cf. Bollen (2005) and Wermers (2000) as two
recent references with differing results. However, this question could not be addressed in this
thesis.
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from the index. Given these practical constraints, the focus on benchmarks appears
to be the more suitable strategy.
The analysis of price effects provided interesting insights into an important mod-
ification of portfolio optimization. There is still much to be understood regarding
the complex influence of risk, return, and price effects on the portfolio structure in
a multiperiod context. Results presented in this work showed that the optimal struc-
ture largely depends on the set of parameter values. An analytical solution, even
of a short two-period model, would be helpful to understand their interrelation. In
addition, other variants with different maximization criteria and framing conditions,
such as initial and terminal holdings or even a convex price impact function, could
be analyzed. Practitioners should reconsider the usage of single-period portfolio
models. The numerical results indicate that the structure of portfolios with price
effects is clearly different in a single and a multiperiod context. However, further
research is necessary to allow for general recommendations.
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A. Portfolio Policies under
Compensation and Capital
Flow
This chapter provides detailed steps for the solution of the portfolio optimization
problem defined in chapter 5.3
A.1. Optimal Control Candidate
To simplify the notation, let w = a  wM   c  wB. The conditions of optimality
5.6-5.8 allow to calculate an optimal control candidate. Assuming that  has full
rank, equation 5.6 can be solved for w(t):
0 =  01+ VX(1 + c)X(t)
+VXX(1 + c) [(1 + c)w
(t) + w]X(t)2
, 0 =  01+ VX(1 + c)X(t)
+VXX(1 + c)wX(t)
2
+VXX(1 + c)(1 + c)w
(t)X(t)2
, VXX(1 + c)2w(t)X(t)2 = 01  VX(1 + c)X(t)
 VXX(1 + c)w(t)X(t)2
, w(t) = 0
(1 + c)2VXXX(t)2
 11
  VX
(1 + c)VXXX(t)
 1  1
1 + c
w (A.1)
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Substituting equation A.1 into 5.7 one can solve for 0
0 = 1  10w(t)
, 0 = 1  10 0
(1 + c)2VXXX(t)2
 11
+10
VX
(1 + c)VXXX(t)
 1 + 10
1
1 + c
w
, 0
(1 + c)2VXXX(t)2
10 11 = 1 +
VX
(1 + c)VXXX(t)
10 1 +
1
1 + c
10w
, 0 = (1 + c)
2VXXX(t)
2
10 11
+
(1 + c)VXX(t)
10 11
10 1
+
(1 + c)VXXX(t)
2
10 11
10w
, 0 = (1 + c)VXXX(t)
2
10 11
[(1 + c) + 10w]
+
(1 + c)VXX(t)
10 11
10 1
Replacing 0 in equation A.1 leads to the specific equation for w(t)
w(t) =

(1 + c)VXXX(t)
2
10 11
[(1 + c) + 10w] +
(1 + c)VXX(t)
10 11
10 1

 1
(1 + c)2VXXX(t)2
 11  VX
(1 + c)VXXX(t)
 1  1
1 + c
w
=
1
10 11
 11+
1
1 + c

10w(t)
10 11
 11  w

+
VX
(1 + c)VXXX(t)

10 1
10 11
 11   1

(A.2)
A.2. Solution to the HJB Equation
To find a solution for the value function V (t;X) I substitute equation A.2 into equa-
tion 5.8. The resulting equation
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0 = L[t;X(t)] + Vt +
(1)z }| {
VX
h
w
0
+ (1 + c)w
(t)0  
i
X(t)
+
1
2
(3)z }| {
VXX [w + (1 + c)w
(t)]
0
(2)z }| {
 [w + (1 + c)w
(t)]X(t)2 (A.3)
can be simplified. The first term (1) develops as follows. Using the fact that  1 is
symmetric318 and some further expansion lead to
VXw
0
X(t)  VXX(t)
+ VXX(t)(1 + c)

1
10 11
 11+
1
1 + c

10w
10 11
 11  w

+
VX
(1 + c)VXXX(t)

10 1
10 11
 11   1
0

= VXw
0
X(t)  VXX(t)
+ (1 + c)VXX(t)
1
10 11
 
 11
0
 + VXX(t)

10w
10 11
 
 11
0
  w0

+
VX
2
VXX

10 1
10 11
 
 11
0
    10 
= (1 + c)VXX(t)
10 1
10 11
+ VXX(t)

10w
10 11
10 1

+
VX
2
VXX
 
(10 1)2
10 11
  0 1
!
  VXX(t) (A.4)
318The symmetry of  1 implies 10 1 = 
0
 11.
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The second term (2) can be transformed as follows
wX(t)
2 + (1 + c)X(t)2

1
10 11
 11
+
1
1 + c

10w
10 11
 11  w

+
VX
(1 + c)VXXX(t)

10 1
10 11
 11   1

= (1 + c)X(t)2
1
10 11
1+X(t)2

10w
10 11
1

+
VXX(t)
VXX

10 1
10 11
1  

Using this result, the third term (3) can be transformed as follows
VXX [w + (1 + c)w
(t)]0


(1 + c)X(t)2
1
10 11
1+X(t)2

10w
10 11
1

+
VXX(t)
VXX

10 1
10 11
1  

=
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VXX(1 + c)
1
10 11
 
 11
0
+VXX

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 
 11
0
+
VX
X(t)

10 1
10 11
 
 11
0     10

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1
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
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1
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+
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10 11
1  

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= VXX(1 + c)
1
10 11
 
 11
0  (1 + c)X(t)2 1
10 11
1
+ VXX

10w
10 11
 
 11
0  (1 + c)X(t)2 1
10 11
1
+
VX
X(t)

10 1
10 11
 
 11
0     10  (1 + c)X(t)2 1
10 11
1
+ VXX(1 + c)
1
10 11
 
 11
0 X(t)2 10w
10 11
1

+ VXX

10w
10 11
 
 11
0 X(t)2 10w
10 11
1

+
VX
X(t)

10 1
10 11
 
 11
0     10 X(t)2 10w
10 11
1

+ VXX(1 + c)
1
10 11
 
 11
0  VXX(t)
VXX

10 1
10 11
1  

+ VXX

10w
10 11
 
 11
0  VXX(t)
VXX

10 1
10 11
1  

+
VX
X(t)

10 1
10 11
 
 11
0     10  VXX(t)
VXX

10 1
10 11
1  

= VXX(1 + c)
2X(t)2
1
10 11
+ VXX(1 + c)X(t)
2 1
0w
10 11
+ 0
+ VXX(1 + c)X(t)
2 1
0w
10 11
+ VXX
 
(10w)
2
10 11
!
X(t)2 + 0
+ 0 + 0  VX
2
VXX
 
(10 1)2
10 11
  0 1
!
= VXX(1 + c)
2X(t)2
1
10 11
  VX
2
VXX
 
(10 1)2
10 11
  0 1
!
+ VXXX(t)
2
 
(10w)
2
10 11
+ 2(1 + c)
10w
10 11
!
(A.5)
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Substituting A.4 and A.5 back into A.3 leads to
0 = L(t;X(t)] + Vt + VX
h
w
0
 + (1 + c)w
(t)0  
i
X(t)
+
1
2
VXX
h
w
0
 + (1 + c)w
(t)0
i
 [w + (1 + c)w
(t)]X(t)2
, 0 = L[t;X(t)] + Vt
+ (1 + c)VXX(t)
10 1
10 11
+
VX
2
VXX
 
(10 1)2
10 11
  0 1
!
+ VXX(t)

10w(t)
10 11
10 1

  VXX(t)
+
1
2
"
VXX(1 + c)
2X(t)2
1
10 11
  VX
2
VXX
 
(10 1)2
10 11
  0 1
!
+VXXX(t)
2
 
(10w(t))
2
10 11
+ 2(1 + c)
10w(t)
10 11
!#
, 0 = L[t;X(t)] + Vt
+ (1 + c)VXX(t)
10 1
10 11
+ VXX(t)

10w(t)
10 11
10 1

  VXX(t)
+
1
2
VXX(1 + c)
2X(t)2
1
10 11
+
1
2
VX
2
VXX
 
(10 1)2
10 11
  0 1
!
+
1
2
VXXX(t)
2
 
(10w(t))
2
10 11
+ 2(1 + c)
10w(t)
10 11
!
(A.6)
Condition 5.8 is fulfilled if there exists a V that solves equation A.6. Let
L(t;X(t)) be the utility function in equation 5.5. To find a solution for the value
function, let V (t;X(t)) be defined as in equation 5.9
V (t;X) = f(t)  1

[X(t)] ; f(T ) = 1: (A.7)
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The relevant derivatives are319
Vt = _f(t)  1

[X(t)]
VX = f(t)  X(t) 1
VXX = f(t)  (   1)X(t) 2
Replacing the derivatives of V in equation A.6 leads to
0 =
1

e t[X(t)] + _f(t)  1

[X(t)] + (1 + c)f(t)  X(t) 1X(t)1
0 1
10 11
+ f(t)  X(t) 1X(t)

10w(t)
10 11
10 1

  f(t)  X(t) 1X(t)
+
1
2
f(t)  (   1)X(t) 2(1 + c)2X(t)2 1
10 11
+
1
2
(f(t)  X(t) 1)2
f(t)  (   1)X(t) 2
 
(10 1)2
10 11
  0 1
!
+
1
2
f(t)  (   1)X(t) 2X(t)2
 
(10w(t))
2
10 11
+ 2(1 + c)
10w(t)
10 11
!
which can further be simplified to
0 =
1

e t[X(t)] + _f(t)  1

[X(t)] + (1 + c)f(t)  [X(t)] 1
0 1
10 11
+ f(t)  [X(t)]

10w(t)
10 11
10 1  

+
1
2
f(t)  (   1)[X(t)](1 + c)2 1
10 11
+
1
2
f(t)  [X(t)]
(   1)
 
(10 1)2
10 11
  0 1
!
+
1
2
f(t)  (   1)[X(t)]
 
(10w(t))
2
10 11
+ 2(1 + c)
10w(t)
10 11
!
319Note thatX(t) is known at t, it has no functional form that could be derived with regard to time.
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Dividing by [X(t)] and rearrangements give the ordinary differential equation
0 =
1

e t + _f(t)
1

+ (1 + c)f(t)
10 1
10 11
+ f(t)

10w(t)
10 11
10 1  

+
1
2
f(t)(   1)(1 + c)2 1
10 11
+
1
2
f(t)
(   1)
 
(10 1)2
10 11
  0 1
!
+
1
2
f(t)(   1)
 
(10w(t))
2
10 11
+ 2(1 + c)
10w(t)
10 11
!
0 = e t + _f(t) + f(t)

(1 + c)
10 1
10 11
+
10w(t)
10 11
10 1  
+
1
2
(   1)
 
(1 + c)2
1
10 11
+
(10w(t))
2
10 11
+ 2(1 + c)
10w(t)
10 11
!
+
1
2
1
(   1)
 
(10 1)2
10 11
  0 1
!#
Now let
a := 

(1 + c)
10 1
10 11
+
10w(t)
10 11
10 1  
+
1
2
(   1)
 
(1 + c)2
1
10 11
+
(10w(t))
2
10 11
+ 2(1 + c)
10w(t)
10 11
!
+
1
2
1
(   1)
 
(10 1)2
10 11
  0 1
!#
Then the ordinary differential equation has the form
_f(t) =  e t   f(t)a
with final condition f(T ) = 1. A solution to this equation is given by
f(t) =
1
  + a 
 
e( +a)T   e( +a)t e at + ea(T t)
This solution is strictly positive, because for T > t the sign of the term in brackets
is the same as the sign of the factor 1 +a . If a >  then the term in brackets as
well as the factor is positive. For a <  the exponential e( +a)T is smaller than
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e( +a)t, leading to a negative term, same sign as the factor.
Explicit solutions for the optimal controls can be found by substituting the value
function from equation A.7 into equation A.2
w(t) =
1
10 11
 11+
1
1 + c

10w(t)
10 11
 11  w(t)

+
f(t)  X(t) 1
(1 + c)f(t)  (   1)X(t) 2X(t)

10 1
10 11
 11   1

This can be simplified to
w(t) =
1
10 11
 11+
1
1 + c

10w(t)
10 11
 11  w(t)

+
1
(1 + c)(   1)

10 1
10 11
 11   1

Denoting the minimum-variance sub-portfolio withMV = 110 11   11 gives
w(t) = MV   1
1 + c
(w(t)  10w(t) MV )
+
1
(1 + c)(1  )
 
 1  10 1 MV  (A.8)
A.3. Checking Assumptions
All assumptions have been satisfied:
Wealth Process
The wealth process X(t) with the optimal portfolio policy w(t) is the unique
strictly positive solution to the wealth process from equation 5.3 with the optimal
portfolio policy in A.8,
dX(t) =
 
nX
i=1
wi (t)i
!
X(t)dt  X(t)dt+ g(t) +
nX
i=1
wi (t)iX(t)dBi
X(0) = x:
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This will be shown below. In addition, the coefficients of the stochastic differential
equation satisfy the conditions on the coefficients of the stochastic process.320
Now denote the return-oriented portfolio as R := 1
1  (
 1  10 1 MV ),
let MVi and Ri be the i-th element of the vectors MV and R. Using the fact that
1
0
wB = 1
0
wM = 1, equation A.8 becomes
w(t) = MV   1
1 + c
(w(t)  (a  c) MV )
+
1
(1 + c)(1  )
 
 1  10 1 MV 
= MV +
1
1 + c
((a  c) MV   w) + 1
1 + c
R
=
1
1 + c
[(1 + a)MV +R  w]
or
wi (t) =
1
1 + c
[(1 + a)MVi +Ri   wi ] (A.9)
Using the substitute w equation g(t) (equation 5.2) can be written as
g(t) =
nX
i=1
(a  wMi + c  [wi (t)  wBi ])iX(t)dt
+
nX
i=1
(a  wMi + c  [wi (t)  wBi ])iX(t)dBi
=
nX
i=1
(c  wi (t) + wi)iX(t)dt+
nX
i=1
(c  wi (t) + wi) iX(t)dBi
With equation A.9 this becomes
g(t) =
nX
i=1

c  1
1 + c
[(1 + a)MVi +Ri   wi ] + wi

iX(t)dt
+
nX
i=1

c  1
1 + c
[(1 + a)MVi +Ri   wi ] + wi

iX(t)dBi
=
nX
i=1
1
1 + c
(c [(1 + a)MVi +Ri] + wi)iX(t)dt
+
nX
i=1
1
1 + c
(c [(1 + a)MVi +Ri] + wi)iX(t)dBi
320Regarding the conditions on the coefficients cf. Korn/Korn (2001), p. 224.
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With this equation the stochastic differential equation
dX(t) =
 
nX
i=1
wi (t)i
!
X(t)dt   X(t)dt + g(t) +
nX
i=1
wi (t)iX(t)dBi
becomes
dX(t) =
 
nX
i=1
1
1 + c
[(1 + a)MVi +Ri   wi ]i
!
X(t)dt  X(t)dt
+
nX
i=1
1
1 + c
(c [(1 + a)MVi +Ri] + wi)iX(t)dt
+
nX
i=1
1
1 + c
(c [(1 + a)MVi +Ri] + wi)iX(t)dBi
+
nX
i=1
1
1 + c
[(1 + a)MVi +Ri   wi ]iX(t)dBi
=
nX
i=1
((1 + a)MVi +Ri)iX(t)dt  X(t)dt
+
nX
i=1
((1 + a)MVi +Ri)iX(t)dBi (A.10)
This process equation differs from the standard process with regard to the man-
agement fee parameter  and the term 1 + a. The term 1 + a represents the addi-
tional capital due to general market performance. Interestingly, the parameter c for
performance-related flow does not appear in the process of assets under manage-
ment. This means that the process is independent of the performance-related flow
because the portfolio is perfectly hedged against this flow.
Now substitute (t;X(t)) =
Pn
i=1 ((1 + a)MVi +Ri)iX(t)   X(t) and
(t;X(t)) =
Pn
i=1 ((1 + a)MVi +Ri)iX(t). With time-independent MVi
and Ri, the coefficients (t;X(t)) and (t;X(t)) satisfy the conditions on the
coefficients of the stochastic process.321 With the explicit form in equation
A.10, the stochastic differential process has a unique strictly positive solution
that can be obtained using the “variation of constants”-theorem.322 Let A(t) =Pn
i=1 ((1 + a)MVi +Ri)i  and Si(t) = ((1 + a)MVi +Ri) i. Then with the
321Regarding the conditions on the coefficients cf. Korn/Korn (2001), p. 224.
322Cf. Korn/Korn (2001), p. 54f., theorem 2.54.
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“variation of constants”-theorem equation A.10 has the unique solution323
X(t) = x  exp
(Z t
0
 
A(s)  1
2
nX
i=1
S2i (s)
!
ds+
nX
i=1
Z t
0
Si(s)dBi(s)
)
:
with initial positive value X(0) = x > 0. Due to the exponential function the
process of assets under management is always positive.
Optimal Control
The optimal control w(t) is constant and therefore bounded in U .
Value Function
The value function, as the product of the strictly positive function f(t) and the
concave utility function, is strictly concave as well. It is, like the standard solution,
a classical C1;2 solution and satisfies the polynomial growth condition.324
323Cf. also in analogy the stock price solution Korn/Korn (2001), p. 57.
324Cf. Korn/Korn (2001), p. 239.
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B. Numerical Solution Approach
for Trinomial Portfolio Models
B.1. Details of Numerical Solutions
This section shows the detailed numerical solutions for models B to E in chapter
6.3.2, 6.3.3, and 6.3.4.
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S B1 B2 B3 B4
Characteristic
Size n.a. small small small small
Differentiation n.a. equal equal different different
Reversal n.a. none partial none partial
Funcational form n.a. linear linear linear linear
Parameter
l1 0 7  10 8 7  10 8 7  10 8 7  10 8
l2 0 7  10 8 7  10 8 3:5  10 8 3:5  10 8
1, 2 0 0 0:2 0 0:2
Variable
w1(1; 1) 38.89% 40.50% 41.30% 38.05% 37.77%
w1(2; 1) 38.89% 33.82% 36.60% 40.78% 40.26%
w1(2; 2) 38.89% 33.82% 36.23% 40.78% 39.97%
w1(2; 3) 38.89% 33.82% 35.86% 40.78% 39.67%
w2(1; 1) 61.11% 59.50% 58.70% 61.95% 62.23%
w2(2; 1) 61.11% 66.18% 63.40% 59.22% 59.74%
w2(2; 2) 61.11% 66.18% 63.77% 59.22% 60.03%
w2(2; 3) 61.11% 66.18% 64.14% 59.22% 60.33%
N1(1; 1) 3888.89 4048.45 4128.67 3804.32 3776.49
N1(2; 1) 3652.10 3180.35 3443.43 3825.54 3775.79
N1(2; 2) 3850.00 3347.78 3585.85 4035.73 3955.90
N1(2; 3) 4070.57 3534.40 3744.46 4269.99 4155.17
N2(1; 1) 6111.11 5947.93 5867.73 6193.32 6221.16
N2(2; 1) 6266.07 6791.84 6512.01 6066.68 6118.47
N2(2; 2) 6050.00 6548.48 6310.50 5861.92 5941.76
N2(2; 3) 5848.33 6321.33 6122.53 5670.81 5778.17
U1(1; 1) 3888.89 4048.45 4128.67 3804.32 3776.49
U1(2; 1) -236.79 -868.10 -685.24 21.21 -0.69
U1(2; 2) -38.89 -700.66 -542.82 231.40 179.41
U1(2; 3) 181.68 -514.04 -384.20 465.67 378.68
U2(1; 1) 6111.11 5947.93 5867.73 6193.32 6221.16
U2(2; 1) 154.96 843.91 644.28 -126.64 -102.69
U2(2; 2) -61.11 600.55 442.77 -331.40 -279.40
U2(2; 3) -262.78 373.40 254.80 -522.51 -442.99
P p1 (1; 1) 100.00 100.03 100.03 100.03 100.03
P p1 (2; 1) 107.00 107.02 107.02 107.03 107.02
P p1 (2; 2) 101.00 101.02 101.02 101.03 101.02
P p1 (2; 3) 96.00 96.02 96.02 96.03 96.02
P r1 (1; 1) 100.00 100.03 100.02 100.03 100.02
P r1 (2; 1) 107.00 107.02 107.02 107.03 107.02
P r1 (2; 2) 101.00 101.02 101.02 101.03 101.02
P r1 (2; 3) 96.00 96.02 96.02 96.03 96.02
P p2 (1; 1) 100.00 100.04 100.04 100.02 100.02
P p2 (2; 1) 98.00 98.05 98.04 98.02 98.02
P p2 (2; 2) 101.00 101.05 101.04 101.02 101.02
P p2 (2; 3) 105.00 105.05 105.04 105.02 105.02
P r2 (1; 1) 100.00 100.04 100.03 100.02 100.02
P r2 (2; 1) 98.00 98.05 98.04 98.02 98.02
P r2 (2; 2) 101.00 101.05 101.04 101.02 101.02
P r2 (2; 3) 105.00 105.05 105.04 105.02 105.02
Table B.1.: Parameter values and results for the two-period model with initial cash
endowment and linear price impact function. The model S refers to the
two-period standard model in figure 4.5 for comparison. N.a. indicates
a non-relevant feature. (Source: Own calculation)
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S C1 C2 C3 C4
Characteristic
Size n.a. small small small small
Differentiation n.a. equal equal different different
Reversal n.a. none partial none partial
Funcational form n.a. linear linear linear linear
Parameter
1 0 7:5  10 3 7:5  10 3 7:5  10 3 7:5  10 3
1 0 2  10 4 2  10 4 2  10 4 2  10 4
2 0 7:5  10 3 7:5  10 3 3:25  10 3 3:25  10 3
2 0 2  10 4 2  10 4 2  10 4 2  10 4
1, 2 0 0 0:2 0 0:2
Variable
w1(1; 1) 38.89% 44.88% 47.62% 44.84% 45.36%
w1(2; 1) 38.89% 18.51% 26.79% 27.81% 31.68%
w1(2; 2) 38.89% 17.44% 25.75% 27.34% 31.15%
w1(2; 3) 38.89% 16.43% 24.76% 26.93% 30.65%
w2(1; 1) 61.11% 55.12% 52.38% 55.16% 54.64%
w2(2; 1) 61.11% 81.49% 73.21% 72.19% 68.32%
w2(2; 2) 61.11% 82.56% 74.25% 72.66% 68.85%
w2(2; 3) 61.11% 83.57% 75.24% 73.07% 69.35%
N1(1; 1) 3888.89 4487.99 4761.74 4483.81 4535.24
N1(2; 1) 3652.10 1747.46 2535.49 2625.56 2992.49
N1(2; 2) 3850.00 1726.41 2549.57 2706.39 3083.29
N1(2; 3) 4070.57 1710.82 2572.08 2803.62 3189.84
N2(1; 1) 6111.11 5508.40 5234.86 5514.23 5462.82
N2(2; 1) 6266.07 8393.71 7559.40 7438.25 7042.58
N2(2; 2) 6050.00 8167.48 7345.47 7191.01 6814.36
N2(2; 3) 5848.33 7949.15 7139.55 6953.73 6596.47
U1(1; 1) 3888.89 4487.99 4761.74 4483.81 4535.24
U1(2; 1) -236.79 -2740.53 -2226.25 -1858.25 -1542.75
U1(2; 2) -38.89 -2761.58 -2212.17 -1777.42 -1451.95
U1(2; 3) 181.68 -2777.17 -2189.66 -1680.20 -1345.40
U2(1; 1) 6111.11 5508.40 5234.86 5514.23 5462.82
U2(2; 1) 154.96 2885.30 2324.54 1924.02 1579.76
U2(2; 2) -61.11 2659.08 2110.61 1676.78 1351.54
U2(2; 3) -262.78 2440.74 1904.70 1439.50 1133.65
P p1 (1; 1) 100.00 100.01 100.01 100.01 100.01
P p1 (2; 1) 107.00 107.00 107.00 107.00 107.00
P p1 (2; 2) 101.00 101.00 101.00 101.00 101.00
P p1 (2; 3) 96.00 96.00 96.00 96.00 96.00
P r1 (1; 1) 100.00 100.01 100.01 100.01 100.01
P r1 (2; 1) 107.00 107.00 107.00 107.00 107.00
P r1 (2; 2) 101.00 101.00 101.00 101.00 101.00
P r1 (2; 3) 96.00 96.00 96.00 96.00 96.00
P p2 (1; 1) 100.00 100.06 100.06 100.03 100.03
P p2 (2; 1) 98.00 98.10 98.08 98.04 98.03
P p2 (2; 2) 101.00 101.10 101.08 101.04 101.03
P p2 (2; 3) 105.00 105.10 105.08 105.04 105.03
P r2 (1; 1) 100.00 100.06 100.05 100.03 100.02
P r2 (2; 1) 98.00 98.10 98.07 98.04 98.03
P r2 (2; 2) 101.00 101.10 101.07 101.04 101.03
P r2 (2; 3) 105.00 105.10 105.07 105.04 105.03
Table B.2.: Parameter values and results for the two-period model with initial cash
endowment and concave price impact function. The model S refers
to the two-period standard model in figure 4.5 for comparison. N.a.
indicates a non-relevant feature. (Source: Own calculation)
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S D1 D2 D3 D4
Characteristic
Size n.a. small small small small
Differentiation n.a. equal equal different different
Reversal n.a. none partial none partial
Funcational form n.a. linear linear linear linear
Parameter
l1 0 7  10 8 7  10 8 7  10 8 7  10 8
l2 0 7  10 8 7  10 8 3:5  10 8 3:5  10 8
1, 2 0 0 0:2 0 0:2
Variable
w1(1; 1) 38.89% 40.50% 40.23% 38.05% 38.22%
w1(2; 1) 38.89% 33.82% 36.03% 40.78% 40.44%
w1(2; 2) 38.89% 33.82% 35.66% 40.78% 40.15%
w1(2; 3) 38.89% 33.82% 35.30% 40.78% 39.85%
w2(1; 1) 61.11% 59.50% 59.77% 61.95% 61.78%
w2(2; 1) 61.11% 66.18% 63.97% 59.22% 59.56%
w2(2; 2) 61.11% 66.18% 64.34% 59.22% 59.85%
w2(2; 3) 61.11% 66.18% 64.70% 59.22% 60.15%
N1(1; 1) 3888.89 4049.55 4023.18 3805.34 3821.63
N1(2; 1) 3652.10 3180.90 3387.70 3826.64 3795.52
N1(2; 2) 3850.00 3348.36 3530.89 4036.89 3975.10
N1(2; 3) 4070.57 3535.01 3690.27 4271.22 4173.82
N2(1; 1) 6111.11 5950.45 5976.82 6194.66 6178.37
N2(2; 1) 6266.07 6795.05 6566.91 6067.91 6103.37
N2(2; 2) 6050.00 6551.58 6369.08 5863.10 5924.89
N2(2; 3) 5848.33 6324.33 6184.63 5671.95 5759.63
U1(1; 1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
U1(2; 1) -236.79 -868.66 -635.48 21.31 -26.11
U1(2; 2) -38.89 -701.19 -492.28 231.56 153.47
U1(2; 3) 181.68 -514.54 -332.91 465.89 352.19
U2(1; 1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
U2(2; 1) 154.96 844.61 590.09 -126.76 -75.00
U2(2; 2) -61.11 601.13 392.26 -331.56 -253.48
U2(2; 3) -262.78 373.88 207.81 -522.71 -418.74
P p1 (1; 1) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P p1 (2; 1) 107.00 106.99 107.00 107.00 107.00
P p1 (2; 2) 101.00 101.00 101.00 101.00 101.00
P p1 (2; 3) 96.00 96.00 96.00 96.00 96.00
P r1 (1; 1) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P r1 (2; 1) 107.00 106.99 107.00 107.00 107.00
P r1 (2; 2) 101.00 101.00 101.00 101.00 101.00
P r1 (2; 3) 96.00 96.00 96.00 96.00 96.00
P p2 (1; 1) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P p2 (2; 1) 98.00 98.01 98.00 98.00 98.00
P p2 (2; 2) 101.00 101.00 101.00 101.00 101.00
P p2 (2; 3) 105.00 105.00 105.00 105.00 105.00
P r2 (1; 1) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
P r2 (2; 1) 98.00 98.01 98.00 98.00 98.00
P r2 (2; 2) 101.00 101.00 101.00 101.00 101.00
P r2 (2; 3) 105.00 105.00 105.00 105.00 105.00
Table B.3.: Parameter values and results for the two-period model without price ef-
fect of initial transactions and linear price impact function. The model
S refers to the two-period standard model in figure 4.5 for comparison.
N.a. indicates a non-relevant feature. (Source: Own calculation)
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S E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6
Characteristic
Size n.a. n.a. n.a. small small small small
Differentiation n.a. n.a. n.a. equal equal different different
Reversal n.a. n.a. n.a. none partial none partial
Parameter
l1 0 0 0 7  10 7 7  10 7 7  10 8 7  10 8
l2 0 0 0 7  10 7 3:5  10 7 7  10 8 3:5  10 8
1, 2 0 0 0 0 0:2 0 0:2
 0 0:2 0:6 0:2 0:2 0:2 0:2
Variable
w1(1; 1) 38.89% 35.48% 28.68% 36.40% 36.23% 35.13% 35.21%
w1(2; 1) 38.89% 35.72% 30.46% 32.04% 33.53% 37.14% 36.92%
w1(2; 2) 38.89% 35.71% 30.41% 31.89% 33.12% 37.05% 36.62%
w1(2; 3) 38.89% 35.70% 30.36% 31.79% 32.71% 36.95% 36.32%
w2(1; 1) 61.11% 64.52% 71.32% 63.60% 63.77% 64.87% 64.79%
w2(2; 1) 61.11% 64.28% 69.54% 67.96% 66.47% 62.86% 63.08%
w2(2; 2) 61.11% 64.29% 69.59% 68.11% 66.88% 62.95% 63.38%
w2(2; 3) 61.11% 64.30% 69.64% 68.21% 67.29% 63.05% 63.68%
N1(1; 1) 3,888.89 3,547.53 2,868.29 3,640.22 3,622.80 3,512.63 3,520.96
N1(2; 1) 3,652.10 3,353.34 2,852.40 3,011.23 3,150.18 3,485.85 3,465.50
N1(2; 2) 3,850.00 3,535.19 3,010.49 3,157.67 3,278.68 3,667.43 3,625.07
N1(2; 3) 4,070.57 3,737.86 3,186.70 3,325.44 3,422.02 3,869.68 3,804.17
N2(1; 1) 6,111.11 6,452.47 7,131.71 6,359.78 6,377.20 6,487.37 6,479.04
N2(2; 1) 6,266.07 6,589.37 7,109.58 6,972.96 6,819.37 6,440.89 6,464.02
N2(2; 2) 6,050.00 6,364.81 6,889.51 6,742.31 6,621.31 6,232.57 6,274.93
N2(2; 3) 5,848.33 6,155.23 6,684.10 6,522.85 6,436.33 6,038.25 6,097.30
U1(1; 1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
U1(2; 1) -236.79 -194.19 -15.89 -628.99 -472.62 -26.78 -55.46
U1(2; 2) -38.89 -12.34 142.21 -482.55 -344.12 154.80 104.12
U1(2; 3) 181.68 190.34 318.42 -314.78 -200.78 357.05 283.21
U2(1; 1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
U2(2; 1) 154.96 136.90 -22.13 613.18 442.17 -46.48 -15.03
U2(2; 2) -61.11 -87.66 -242.21 382.53 244.11 -254.80 -204.12
U2(2; 3) -262.78 -297.25 -447.61 163.07 59.13 -449.12 -381.74
CF 2;1 0.00 2,785.55 6,251.65 2,952.39 2,921.03 2,722.73 2,737.72
CF 2;2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CF 2;3 0.00 -2,785.55 -6,251.65 -2,952.39 -2,921.03 -2,722.73 -2,737.72
CF 3;1 0.00 1,372.73 4,457.85 738.27 1,001.92 1,617.47 1,580.69
CF 3;2 0.00 -1,487.04 -3,126.16 -1,458.64 -1,463.35 -1,498.98 -1,496.22
CF 3;3 0.00 -4,361.53 -10,741.12 -3,670.00 -3,943.11 -4,630.26 -4,587.94
CF 3;4 0.00 811.37 -570.09 123.00 343.88 1,052.41 975.14
CF 3;5 0.00 -2,040.20 -8,160.80 -2,042.23 -2,041.34 -2,039.59 -2,039.85
CF 3;6 0.00 -4,911.97 -15,832.31 -4,227.67 -4,446.78 -5,151.78 -5,075.04
CF 3;7 0.00 258.04 -5,603.68 -483.36 -310.72 497.40 381.26
CF 3;8 0.00 -2,613.56 -13,276.24 -2,646.23 -2,639.72 -2,600.53 -2,603.80
CF 3;9 0.00 -5,511.04 -21,080.25 -4,835.29 -4,994.86 -5,724.21 -5,614.65
Table B.4.: Parameter values and results for the two-period model without price ef-
fect of initial transactions and performance-related capital flow. The
model S refers to the two-period standard model in figure 4.5 for com-
parison. N.a. indicates a non-relevant feature. (Source: Own calcula-
tion)
167
B. Numerical Solution Approach for Trinomial Portfolio Models
B.2. Implementation of Trinomial Portfolio
Model
The numerical solutions in section 4.3 and in chapter 6 have been calculated using
the GAMS software package.325 GAMS requires to define the problem in a special
modeling language. Using a set of Python scripts,326 various definition files have
been created implementing the characteristics of models in the text. The program
listing below represents a comprehensive model (model E4 from section 6.3.4) in-
cluding management fee and price effects.327 A linear price impact function is used
in that case. Other trinomial models with a linear price impact function can be de-
rived as special cases from this model.328 For other forms of price impact functions,
a different number of assets or states, a new file must be created.
The listing contains additional definitions in lines starting with “*py” that will be
substituted in the definition of equations. These substitutions make the source file
more readable and make it closely follow the mathematical formulation in chapter
6. Another Python script performs the substitution resulting in a very long (and
unreadable) file that can then be used with GAMS.
Lines 1-41 define parameter values. Solution variables are declared in lines 42-
69. Lines 70-85 determine lower and upper bounds of variables for technical rea-
sons. Initial and terminal holdings are given in 105. Lines 106-183 define the
prices P ai (t; k), P
p
i (t; k), and P
r
i (t; k) in altering order. Terms for portfolio val-
ues Xa;a(t; k), Xa;p(t; k), and Xp;p(t; k) are given in lines 184-222. Lines 223-235
define the value of the benchmark portfolio, lines 236-248 the capital flow, and
lines 249-261 the management fee. The target variable is declared in lines 262 and
263. Lines 264-277 represent the maximization criterion. Financing constraints are
defined in lines 278-289. Line 290 defines the total model and line 291 calls the
“discontinuous nonlinear programming” solver to provide numerical solutions that
maximize the target variable.
1 S c a l a r
2 s1 p r i c e impac t s c a l i n g / 0 . 1 /
3 s2 p r i c e impac t s c a l i n g / 0 . 1 /
325Cf. www.gams.com. A version, that is sufficient for all models presented in this work, is freely
available for download.
326These scripts are available from the author upon request. Python is available from www.
python.org.
327Excluded from the program listing are those technical but lengthy parts that only perform the
output of solution values.
328The models are available from the author upon request.
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4 r1 p r i v e r e v e r s a l / 0 . 2 /
5 r2 p r i c e r e v e r s a l / 0 . 2 /
6 f l i n e a r c a p i t a l f low f a c t o r / 0 . 2 /
7 g r i s k a v e r s i o n p a r ame t e r / 0 . 5 /
8 XT1S1 i n i t i a l wea l t h / 1 . 0 E6 /
9 p1 p r o b a b i l i t y 1 / 0 . 3 3 /
10 p2 p r o b a b i l i t y 2 / 0 . 3 3 /
11 p3 p r o b a b i l i t y 2 / 0 . 3 4 /
12 P1T0i / 1 0 0 /
13 P2T0i / 1 0 0 /
14 tA1S1 / 1 . 0 7 /
15 tA1S2 / 1 . 0 1 /
16 tA1S3 / 0 . 9 6 /
17 tA2S1 / 0 . 9 8 /
18 tA2S2 / 1 . 0 1 /
19 tA2S3 / 1 . 0 5 /
20 ce1 p r i c e impac t v a r i a b l e / 7 . 5 E 3/
21 c f1 / 2 . 0 E 5/
22 l 1 / 7 . 0 E 7/
23 vexe1 / 7 /
24 vexf1 / 1 . 0 E 5/
25 r evpos1 p o s i t i v e p r i c e r e v e r s e a l / 0 /
26 revneg1 n e g a t i v e p r i c e r e v e r s e a l / 0 /
27 ce2 p r i c e impac t v a r i a b l e / 7 . 5 E 3/
28 c f2 / 2 . 0 E 4/
29 l 2 / 7 . 0 E 7/
30 vexe2 / 7 /
31 vexf2 / 1 . 0 E 5/
32 r evpos2 p o s i t i v e p r i c e r e v e r s e a l / 0 /
33 revneg2 n e g a t i v e p r i c e r e v e r s e a l / 0 /
34 b1 f i r s t benchmark a s s e t / 0 . 2 /
35 b2 second benchmark a s s e t / 0 . 8 /
36 lambda management f e e / 0 . 0 1 /
37 ;
38  Se t p r o b a b i l i t i e s t o 1 /3 and use maximal p r e c i s i o n o f GAMS
39 p1 = 1 / 3 ;
40 p2 = 1 / 3 ;
41 p3 = 1 / 3 ;
42 P o s i t i v e V a r i a b l e s
43 N1T1S1
44 N1T2S1
45 N1T2S2
46 N1T2S3
47 N1T3S1
48 N1T3S2
49 N1T3S3
50 N1T3S4
51 N1T3S5
52 N1T3S6
53 N1T3S7
54 N1T3S8
55 N1T3S9
56 N2T1S1
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57 N2T2S1
58 N2T2S2
59 N2T2S3
60 N2T3S1
61 N2T3S2
62 N2T3S3
63 N2T3S4
64 N2T3S5
65 N2T3S6
66 N2T3S7
67 N2T3S8
68 N2T3S9
69 ;
70 N1T1S1 . l o = 1 ;
71 N1T2S1 . l o = 1 ;
72 N1T2S2 . l o = 1 ;
73 N1T2S3 . l o = 1 ;
74 N2T1S1 . l o = 1 ;
75 N2T2S1 . l o = 1 ;
76 N2T2S2 . l o = 1 ;
77 N2T2S3 . l o = 1 ;
78 N1T1S1 . up = 9999 ;
79 N1T2S1 . up = 9999 ;
80 N1T2S2 . up = 9999 ;
81 N1T2S3 . up = 9999 ;
82 N2T1S1 . up = 9999 ;
83 N2T2S1 . up = 9999 ;
84 N2T2S2 . up = 9999 ;
85 N2T2S3 . up = 9999 ;
86 py _N1T0S1i_ == (N1T1S1 ) ;
87 py _N2T0S1i_ == (N2T1S1 ) ;
88 py _N1T3S1t_ == (N1T2S1 ) ;
89 py _N1T3S2t_ == (N1T2S1 ) ;
90 py _N1T3S3t_ == (N1T2S1 ) ;
91 py _N1T3S4t_ == (N1T2S2 ) ;
92 py _N1T3S5t_ == (N1T2S2 ) ;
93 py _N1T3S6t_ == (N1T2S2 ) ;
94 py _N1T3S7t_ == (N1T2S3 ) ;
95 py _N1T3S8t_ == (N1T2S3 ) ;
96 py _N1T3S9t_ == (N1T2S3 ) ;
97 py _N2T3S1t_ == (N2T2S1 ) ;
98 py _N2T3S2t_ == (N2T2S1 ) ;
99 py _N2T3S3t_ == (N2T2S1 ) ;
100 py _N2T3S4t_ == (N2T2S2 ) ;
101 py _N2T3S5t_ == (N2T2S2 ) ;
102 py _N2T3S6t_ == (N2T2S2 ) ;
103 py _N2T3S7t_ == (N2T2S3 ) ;
104 py _N2T3S8t_ == (N2T2S3 ) ;
105 py _N2T3S9t_ == (N2T2S3 ) ;
106 py _Pa1T1S1_ == ( P1T0i ) ;
107 py _Pp1T1S1_ == ( ( ( 1 + s1 l 1  (N1T1S1 _N1T0S1i_ ) ) _Pa1T1S1_ ) ) ;
108 py _Pr1T1S1_ == ( ( 1 / ( 1 + r1 s1 l 1  (N1T1S1 _N1T0S1i_ ) ) _Pp1T1S1_ ) ) ;
109 py _Pa1T2S1_ == ( _Pr1T1S1_ tA1S1 ) ;
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110 py _Pp1T2S1_ == ( ( ( 1 + s1 l 1  (N1T2S1 N1T1S1 ) ) _Pa1T2S1_ ) ) ;
111 py _Pr1T2S1_ == ( ( 1 / ( 1 + r1 s1 l 1  (N1T2S1 N1T1S1 ) ) _Pp1T2S1_ ) ) ;
112 py _Pa1T2S2_ == ( _Pr1T1S1_ tA1S2 ) ;
113 py _Pp1T2S2_ == ( ( ( 1 + s1 l 1  (N1T2S2 N1T1S1 ) ) _Pa1T2S2_ ) ) ;
114 py _Pr1T2S2_ == ( ( 1 / ( 1 + r1 s1 l 1  (N1T2S2 N1T1S1 ) ) _Pp1T2S2_ ) ) ;
115 py _Pa1T2S3_ == ( _Pr1T1S1_ tA1S3 ) ;
116 py _Pp1T2S3_ == ( ( ( 1 + s1 l 1  (N1T2S3 N1T1S1 ) ) _Pa1T2S3_ ) ) ;
117 py _Pr1T2S3_ == ( ( 1 / ( 1 + r1 s1 l 1  (N1T2S3 N1T1S1 ) ) _Pp1T2S3_ ) ) ;
118 py _Pa1T3S1_ == ( _Pr1T2S1_ tA1S1 ) ;
119 py _Pp1T3S1_ == ( ( ( 1 + s1 l 1  ( _N1T3S1t_ N1T2S1 ) ) _Pa1T3S1_ ) ) ;
120 py _Pr1T3S1_ == ( ( 1 / ( 1 + r1 s1 l 1  ( _N1T3S1t_ N1T2S1 ) ) _Pp1T3S1_ ) ) ;
121 py _Pa1T3S2_ == ( _Pr1T2S1_ tA1S2 ) ;
122 py _Pp1T3S2_ == ( ( ( 1 + s1 l 1  ( _N1T3S2t_ N1T2S1 ) ) _Pa1T3S2_ ) ) ;
123 py _Pr1T3S2_ == ( ( 1 / ( 1 + r1 s1 l 1  ( _N1T3S2t_ N1T2S1 ) ) _Pp1T3S2_ ) ) ;
124 py _Pa1T3S3_ == ( _Pr1T2S1_ tA1S3 ) ;
125 py _Pp1T3S3_ == ( ( ( 1 + s1 l 1  ( _N1T3S3t_ N1T2S1 ) ) _Pa1T3S3_ ) ) ;
126 py _Pr1T3S3_ == ( ( 1 / ( 1 + r1 s1 l 1  ( _N1T3S3t_ N1T2S1 ) ) _Pp1T3S3_ ) ) ;
127 py _Pa1T3S4_ == ( _Pr1T2S2_ tA1S1 ) ;
128 py _Pp1T3S4_ == ( ( ( 1 + s1 l 1  ( _N1T3S4t_ N1T2S2 ) ) _Pa1T3S4_ ) ) ;
129 py _Pr1T3S4_ == ( ( 1 / ( 1 + r1 s1 l 1  ( _N1T3S4t_ N1T2S2 ) ) _Pp1T3S4_ ) ) ;
130 py _Pa1T3S5_ == ( _Pr1T2S2_ tA1S2 ) ;
131 py _Pp1T3S5_ == ( ( ( 1 + s1 l 1  ( _N1T3S5t_ N1T2S2 ) ) _Pa1T3S5_ ) ) ;
132 py _Pr1T3S5_ == ( ( 1 / ( 1 + r1 s1 l 1  ( _N1T3S5t_ N1T2S2 ) ) _Pp1T3S5_ ) ) ;
133 py _Pa1T3S6_ == ( _Pr1T2S2_ tA1S3 ) ;
134 py _Pp1T3S6_ == ( ( ( 1 + s1 l 1  ( _N1T3S6t_ N1T2S2 ) ) _Pa1T3S6_ ) ) ;
135 py _Pr1T3S6_ == ( ( 1 / ( 1 + r1 s1 l 1  ( _N1T3S6t_ N1T2S2 ) ) _Pp1T3S6_ ) ) ;
136 py _Pa1T3S7_ == ( _Pr1T2S3_ tA1S1 ) ;
137 py _Pp1T3S7_ == ( ( ( 1 + s1 l 1  ( _N1T3S7t_ N1T2S3 ) ) _Pa1T3S7_ ) ) ;
138 py _Pr1T3S7_ == ( ( 1 / ( 1 + r1 s1 l 1  ( _N1T3S7t_ N1T2S3 ) ) _Pp1T3S7_ ) ) ;
139 py _Pa1T3S8_ == ( _Pr1T2S3_ tA1S2 ) ;
140 py _Pp1T3S8_ == ( ( ( 1 + s1 l 1  ( _N1T3S8t_ N1T2S3 ) ) _Pa1T3S8_ ) ) ;
141 py _Pr1T3S8_ == ( ( 1 / ( 1 + r1 s1 l 1  ( _N1T3S8t_ N1T2S3 ) ) _Pp1T3S8_ ) ) ;
142 py _Pa1T3S9_ == ( _Pr1T2S3_ tA1S3 ) ;
143 py _Pp1T3S9_ == ( ( ( 1 + s1 l 1  ( _N1T3S9t_ N1T2S3 ) ) _Pa1T3S9_ ) ) ;
144 py _Pr1T3S9_ == ( ( 1 / ( 1 + r1 s1 l 1  ( _N1T3S9t_ N1T2S3 ) ) _Pp1T3S9_ ) ) ;
145 py _Pa2T1S1_ == ( P2T0i ) ;
146 py _Pp2T1S1_ == ( ( ( 1 + s2 l 2  (N2T1S1 _N2T0S1i_ ) ) _Pa2T1S1_ ) ) ;
147 py _Pr2T1S1_ == ( ( 1 / ( 1 + r2 s2 l 2  (N2T1S1 _N2T0S1i_ ) ) _Pp2T1S1_ ) ) ;
148 py _Pa2T2S1_ == ( _Pr2T1S1_ tA2S1 ) ;
149 py _Pp2T2S1_ == ( ( ( 1 + s2 l 2  (N2T2S1 N2T1S1 ) ) _Pa2T2S1_ ) ) ;
150 py _Pr2T2S1_ == ( ( 1 / ( 1 + r2 s2 l 2  (N2T2S1 N2T1S1 ) ) _Pp2T2S1_ ) ) ;
151 py _Pa2T2S2_ == ( _Pr2T1S1_ tA2S2 ) ;
152 py _Pp2T2S2_ == ( ( ( 1 + s2 l 2  (N2T2S2 N2T1S1 ) ) _Pa2T2S2_ ) ) ;
153 py _Pr2T2S2_ == ( ( 1 / ( 1 + r2 s2 l 2  (N2T2S2 N2T1S1 ) ) _Pp2T2S2_ ) ) ;
154 py _Pa2T2S3_ == ( _Pr2T1S1_ tA2S3 ) ;
155 py _Pp2T2S3_ == ( ( ( 1 + s2 l 2  (N2T2S3 N2T1S1 ) ) _Pa2T2S3_ ) ) ;
156 py _Pr2T2S3_ == ( ( 1 / ( 1 + r2 s2 l 2  (N2T2S3 N2T1S1 ) ) _Pp2T2S3_ ) ) ;
157 py _Pa2T3S1_ == ( _Pr2T2S1_ tA2S1 ) ;
158 py _Pp2T3S1_ == ( ( ( 1 + s2 l 2  ( _N2T3S1t_ N2T2S1 ) ) _Pa2T3S1_ ) ) ;
159 py _Pr2T3S1_ == ( ( 1 / ( 1 + r2 s2 l 2  ( _N2T3S1t_ N2T2S1 ) ) _Pp2T3S1_ ) ) ;
160 py _Pa2T3S2_ == ( _Pr2T2S1_ tA2S2 ) ;
161 py _Pp2T3S2_ == ( ( ( 1 + s2 l 2  ( _N2T3S2t_ N2T2S1 ) ) _Pa2T3S2_ ) ) ;
162 py _Pr2T3S2_ == ( ( 1 / ( 1 + r2 s2 l 2  ( _N2T3S2t_ N2T2S1 ) ) _Pp2T3S2_ ) ) ;
171
B. Numerical Solution Approach for Trinomial Portfolio Models
163 py _Pa2T3S3_ == ( _Pr2T2S1_ tA2S3 ) ;
164 py _Pp2T3S3_ == ( ( ( 1 + s2 l 2  ( _N2T3S3t_ N2T2S1 ) ) _Pa2T3S3_ ) ) ;
165 py _Pr2T3S3_ == ( ( 1 / ( 1 + r2 s2 l 2  ( _N2T3S3t_ N2T2S1 ) ) _Pp2T3S3_ ) ) ;
166 py _Pa2T3S4_ == ( _Pr2T2S2_ tA2S1 ) ;
167 py _Pp2T3S4_ == ( ( ( 1 + s2 l 2  ( _N2T3S4t_ N2T2S2 ) ) _Pa2T3S4_ ) ) ;
168 py _Pr2T3S4_ == ( ( 1 / ( 1 + r2 s2 l 2  ( _N2T3S4t_ N2T2S2 ) ) _Pp2T3S4_ ) ) ;
169 py _Pa2T3S5_ == ( _Pr2T2S2_ tA2S2 ) ;
170 py _Pp2T3S5_ == ( ( ( 1 + s2 l 2  ( _N2T3S5t_ N2T2S2 ) ) _Pa2T3S5_ ) ) ;
171 py _Pr2T3S5_ == ( ( 1 / ( 1 + r2 s2 l 2  ( _N2T3S5t_ N2T2S2 ) ) _Pp2T3S5_ ) ) ;
172 py _Pa2T3S6_ == ( _Pr2T2S2_ tA2S3 ) ;
173 py _Pp2T3S6_ == ( ( ( 1 + s2 l 2  ( _N2T3S6t_ N2T2S2 ) ) _Pa2T3S6_ ) ) ;
174 py _Pr2T3S6_ == ( ( 1 / ( 1 + r2 s2 l 2  ( _N2T3S6t_ N2T2S2 ) ) _Pp2T3S6_ ) ) ;
175 py _Pa2T3S7_ == ( _Pr2T2S3_ tA2S1 ) ;
176 py _Pp2T3S7_ == ( ( ( 1 + s2 l 2  ( _N2T3S7t_ N2T2S3 ) ) _Pa2T3S7_ ) ) ;
177 py _Pr2T3S7_ == ( ( 1 / ( 1 + r2 s2 l 2  ( _N2T3S7t_ N2T2S3 ) ) _Pp2T3S7_ ) ) ;
178 py _Pa2T3S8_ == ( _Pr2T2S3_ tA2S2 ) ;
179 py _Pp2T3S8_ == ( ( ( 1 + s2 l 2  ( _N2T3S8t_ N2T2S3 ) ) _Pa2T3S8_ ) ) ;
180 py _Pr2T3S8_ == ( ( 1 / ( 1 + r2 s2 l 2  ( _N2T3S8t_ N2T2S3 ) ) _Pp2T3S8_ ) ) ;
181 py _Pa2T3S9_ == ( _Pr2T2S3_ tA2S3 ) ;
182 py _Pp2T3S9_ == ( ( ( 1 + s2 l 2  ( _N2T3S9t_ N2T2S3 ) ) _Pa2T3S9_ ) ) ;
183 py _Pr2T3S9_ == ( ( 1 / ( 1 + r2 s2 l 2  ( _N2T3S9t_ N2T2S3 ) ) _Pp2T3S9_ ) ) ;
184 py _XaPaT1S1_ == (XT1S1 ) ;
185 py _XaPaT2S1_ == ( _Pa1T2S1_N1T1S1+_Pa2T2S1_N2T1S1 ) ;
186 py _XaPaT2S2_ == ( _Pa1T2S2_N1T1S1+_Pa2T2S2_N2T1S1 ) ;
187 py _XaPaT2S3_ == ( _Pa1T2S3_N1T1S1+_Pa2T2S3_N2T1S1 ) ;
188 py _XaPaT3S1_ == ( _Pa1T3S1_N1T2S1+_Pa2T3S1_N2T2S1 ) ;
189 py _XaPaT3S2_ == ( _Pa1T3S2_N1T2S1+_Pa2T3S2_N2T2S1 ) ;
190 py _XaPaT3S3_ == ( _Pa1T3S3_N1T2S1+_Pa2T3S3_N2T2S1 ) ;
191 py _XaPaT3S4_ == ( _Pa1T3S4_N1T2S2+_Pa2T3S4_N2T2S2 ) ;
192 py _XaPaT3S5_ == ( _Pa1T3S5_N1T2S2+_Pa2T3S5_N2T2S2 ) ;
193 py _XaPaT3S6_ == ( _Pa1T3S6_N1T2S2+_Pa2T3S6_N2T2S2 ) ;
194 py _XaPaT3S7_ == ( _Pa1T3S7_N1T2S3+_Pa2T3S7_N2T2S3 ) ;
195 py _XaPaT3S8_ == ( _Pa1T3S8_N1T2S3+_Pa2T3S8_N2T2S3 ) ;
196 py _XaPaT3S9_ == ( _Pa1T3S9_N1T2S3+_Pa2T3S9_N2T2S3 ) ;
197 py _XaPpT1S1_ == (XT1S1 ) ;
198 py _XaPpT2S1_ == ( _Pp1T2S1_N1T1S1+_Pp2T2S1_N2T1S1 ) ;
199 py _XaPpT2S2_ == ( _Pp1T2S2_N1T1S1+_Pp2T2S2_N2T1S1 ) ;
200 py _XaPpT2S3_ == ( _Pp1T2S3_N1T1S1+_Pp2T2S3_N2T1S1 ) ;
201 py _XaPpT3S1_ == ( _Pp1T3S1_N1T2S1+_Pp2T3S1_N2T2S1 ) ;
202 py _XaPpT3S2_ == ( _Pp1T3S2_N1T2S1+_Pp2T3S2_N2T2S1 ) ;
203 py _XaPpT3S3_ == ( _Pp1T3S3_N1T2S1+_Pp2T3S3_N2T2S1 ) ;
204 py _XaPpT3S4_ == ( _Pp1T3S4_N1T2S2+_Pp2T3S4_N2T2S2 ) ;
205 py _XaPpT3S5_ == ( _Pp1T3S5_N1T2S2+_Pp2T3S5_N2T2S2 ) ;
206 py _XaPpT3S6_ == ( _Pp1T3S6_N1T2S2+_Pp2T3S6_N2T2S2 ) ;
207 py _XaPpT3S7_ == ( _Pp1T3S7_N1T2S3+_Pp2T3S7_N2T2S3 ) ;
208 py _XaPpT3S8_ == ( _Pp1T3S8_N1T2S3+_Pp2T3S8_N2T2S3 ) ;
209 py _XaPpT3S9_ == ( _Pp1T3S9_N1T2S3+_Pp2T3S9_N2T2S3 ) ;
210 py _XpPpT1S1_ == ( _Pp1T1S1_N1T1S1+_Pp2T1S1_N2T1S1 ) ;
211 py _XpPpT2S1_ == ( _Pp1T2S1_N1T2S1+_Pp2T2S1_N2T2S1 ) ;
212 py _XpPpT2S2_ == ( _Pp1T2S2_N1T2S2+_Pp2T2S2_N2T2S2 ) ;
213 py _XpPpT2S3_ == ( _Pp1T2S3_N1T2S3+_Pp2T2S3_N2T2S3 ) ;
214 py _XpPpT3S1_ == ( _Pp1T3S1_N1T3S1t+_Pp2T3S1_N2T3S1t ) ;
215 py _XpPpT3S2_ == ( _Pp1T3S2_N1T3S2t+_Pp2T3S2_N2T3S2t ) ;
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216 py _XpPpT3S3_ == ( _Pp1T3S3_N1T3S3t+_Pp2T3S3_N2T3S3t ) ;
217 py _XpPpT3S4_ == ( _Pp1T3S4_N1T3S4t+_Pp2T3S4_N2T3S4t ) ;
218 py _XpPpT3S5_ == ( _Pp1T3S5_N1T3S5t+_Pp2T3S5_N2T3S5t ) ;
219 py _XpPpT3S6_ == ( _Pp1T3S6_N1T3S6t+_Pp2T3S6_N2T3S6t ) ;
220 py _XpPpT3S7_ == ( _Pp1T3S7_N1T3S7t+_Pp2T3S7_N2T3S7t ) ;
221 py _XpPpT3S8_ == ( _Pp1T3S8_N1T3S8t+_Pp2T3S8_N2T3S8t ) ;
222 py _XpPpT3S9_ == ( _Pp1T3S9_N1T3S9t+_Pp2T3S9_N2T3S9t ) ;
223 py _BPaT1S1_ == ( _XaPaT1S1_ ) ;
224 py _BPaT2S1_ == ( b1  ( _XaPaT1S1_ ) / _Pa1T1S1__Pa1T2S1_+b2  ( _XaPaT1S1_ ) / _Pa2T1S1_
_Pa2T2S1_ ) ;
225 py _BPaT2S2_ == ( b1  ( _XaPaT1S1_ ) / _Pa1T1S1__Pa1T2S2_+b2  ( _XaPaT1S1_ ) / _Pa2T1S1_
_Pa2T2S2_ ) ;
226 py _BPaT2S3_ == ( b1  ( _XaPaT1S1_ ) / _Pa1T1S1__Pa1T2S3_+b2  ( _XaPaT1S1_ ) / _Pa2T1S1_
_Pa2T2S3_ ) ;
227 py _BPaT3S1_ == ( b1  ( _XaPaT2S1_ ) / _Pa1T2S1__Pa1T3S1_+b2  ( _XaPaT2S1_ ) / _Pa2T2S1_
_Pa2T3S1_ ) ;
228 py _BPaT3S2_ == ( b1  ( _XaPaT2S1_ ) / _Pa1T2S1__Pa1T3S2_+b2  ( _XaPaT2S1_ ) / _Pa2T2S1_
_Pa2T3S2_ ) ;
229 py _BPaT3S3_ == ( b1  ( _XaPaT2S1_ ) / _Pa1T2S1__Pa1T3S3_+b2  ( _XaPaT2S1_ ) / _Pa2T2S1_
_Pa2T3S3_ ) ;
230 py _BPaT3S4_ == ( b1  ( _XaPaT2S2_ ) / _Pa1T2S2__Pa1T3S4_+b2  ( _XaPaT2S2_ ) / _Pa2T2S2_
_Pa2T3S4_ ) ;
231 py _BPaT3S5_ == ( b1  ( _XaPaT2S2_ ) / _Pa1T2S2__Pa1T3S5_+b2  ( _XaPaT2S2_ ) / _Pa2T2S2_
_Pa2T3S5_ ) ;
232 py _BPaT3S6_ == ( b1  ( _XaPaT2S2_ ) / _Pa1T2S2__Pa1T3S6_+b2  ( _XaPaT2S2_ ) / _Pa2T2S2_
_Pa2T3S6_ ) ;
233 py _BPaT3S7_ == ( b1  ( _XaPaT2S3_ ) / _Pa1T2S3__Pa1T3S7_+b2  ( _XaPaT2S3_ ) / _Pa2T2S3_
_Pa2T3S7_ ) ;
234 py _BPaT3S8_ == ( b1  ( _XaPaT2S3_ ) / _Pa1T2S3__Pa1T3S8_+b2  ( _XaPaT2S3_ ) / _Pa2T2S3_
_Pa2T3S8_ ) ;
235 py _BPaT3S9_ == ( b1  ( _XaPaT2S3_ ) / _Pa1T2S3__Pa1T3S9_+b2  ( _XaPaT2S3_ ) / _Pa2T2S3_
_Pa2T3S9_ ) ;
236 py _CFT1S1_ == ( 0 ) ;
237 py _CFT2S1_ == ( ( f  ( _XaPaT2S1_ _BPaT2S1_ ) ) ) ;
238 py _CFT2S2_ == ( ( f  ( _XaPaT2S2_ _BPaT2S2_ ) ) ) ;
239 py _CFT2S3_ == ( ( f  ( _XaPaT2S3_ _BPaT2S3_ ) ) ) ;
240 py _CFT3S1_ == ( ( f  ( _XaPaT3S1_ _BPaT3S1_ ) ) ) ;
241 py _CFT3S2_ == ( ( f  ( _XaPaT3S2_ _BPaT3S2_ ) ) ) ;
242 py _CFT3S3_ == ( ( f  ( _XaPaT3S3_ _BPaT3S3_ ) ) ) ;
243 py _CFT3S4_ == ( ( f  ( _XaPaT3S4_ _BPaT3S4_ ) ) ) ;
244 py _CFT3S5_ == ( ( f  ( _XaPaT3S5_ _BPaT3S5_ ) ) ) ;
245 py _CFT3S6_ == ( ( f  ( _XaPaT3S6_ _BPaT3S6_ ) ) ) ;
246 py _CFT3S7_ == ( ( f  ( _XaPaT3S7_ _BPaT3S7_ ) ) ) ;
247 py _CFT3S8_ == ( ( f  ( _XaPaT3S8_ _BPaT3S8_ ) ) ) ;
248 py _CFT3S9_ == ( ( f  ( _XaPaT3S9_ _BPaT3S9_ ) ) ) ;
249 py _MFT1S1_ == ( 0 ) ;
250 py _MFT2S1_ == ( ( lambda  ( _XaPaT2S1_+_CFT2S1_ ) ) ) ;
251 py _MFT2S2_ == ( ( lambda  ( _XaPaT2S2_+_CFT2S2_ ) ) ) ;
252 py _MFT2S3_ == ( ( lambda  ( _XaPaT2S3_+_CFT2S3_ ) ) ) ;
253 py _MFT3S1_ == ( ( lambda  ( _XaPaT3S1_+_CFT3S1_ ) ) ) ;
254 py _MFT3S2_ == ( ( lambda  ( _XaPaT3S2_+_CFT3S2_ ) ) ) ;
255 py _MFT3S3_ == ( ( lambda  ( _XaPaT3S3_+_CFT3S3_ ) ) ) ;
256 py _MFT3S4_ == ( ( lambda  ( _XaPaT3S4_+_CFT3S4_ ) ) ) ;
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257 py _MFT3S5_ == ( ( lambda  ( _XaPaT3S5_+_CFT3S5_ ) ) ) ;
258 py _MFT3S6_ == ( ( lambda  ( _XaPaT3S6_+_CFT3S6_ ) ) ) ;
259 py _MFT3S7_ == ( ( lambda  ( _XaPaT3S7_+_CFT3S7_ ) ) ) ;
260 py _MFT3S8_ == ( ( lambda  ( _XaPaT3S8_+_CFT3S8_ ) ) ) ;
261 py _MFT3S9_ == ( ( lambda  ( _XaPaT3S9_+_CFT3S9_ ) ) ) ;
262 V a r i a b l e s
263 va l u e ;
264 Equa t i o n s
265 c r i t ;
266 c r i t . . v a l u e =e=p1 1 / g  ( ( max ( _MFT2S1_ , 0 ) ) g )
267 + p2 1 / g  ( ( max ( _MFT2S2_ , 0 ) ) g )
268 + p3 1 / g  ( ( max ( _MFT2S3_ , 0 ) ) g )
269 + p1p1 1 / g  ( ( max ( _MFT3S1_ , 0 ) ) g )
270 + p1p2 1 / g  ( ( max ( _MFT3S2_ , 0 ) ) g )
271 + p1p3 1 / g  ( ( max ( _MFT3S3_ , 0 ) ) g )
272 + p2p1 1 / g  ( ( max ( _MFT3S4_ , 0 ) ) g )
273 + p2p2 1 / g  ( ( max ( _MFT3S5_ , 0 ) ) g )
274 + p2p3 1 / g  ( ( max ( _MFT3S6_ , 0 ) ) g )
275 + p3p1 1 / g  ( ( max ( _MFT3S7_ , 0 ) ) g )
276 + p3p2 1 / g  ( ( max ( _MFT3S8_ , 0 ) ) g )
277 + p3p3 1 / g  ( ( max ( _MFT3S9_ , 0 ) ) g ) ;
278 Equa t i o n s
279 XfinT1S1 ;
280 XfinT1S1 . . _XaPpT1S1_ + _CFT1S1_   _MFT1S1_=e=_XpPpT1S1_ ;
281 Equa t i o n s
282 XfinT2S1 ;
283 XfinT2S1 . . _XaPpT2S1_ + _CFT2S1_   _MFT2S1_=e=_XpPpT2S1_ ;
284 Equa t i o n s
285 XfinT2S2 ;
286 XfinT2S2 . . _XaPpT2S2_ + _CFT2S2_   _MFT2S2_=e=_XpPpT2S2_ ;
287 Equa t i o n s
288 XfinT2S3 ;
289 XfinT2S3 . . _XaPpT2S3_ + _CFT2S3_   _MFT2S3_=e=_XpPpT2S3_ ;
290 model o p t p f / a l l / ;
291 s o l v e o p t p f u s i n g dn lp maximiz ing v a l u e ;
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